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This thesis studies two types of problems, the theory of risk functionals and the risk
sharing problem. We put a special focus on a class of non-monotone law-invariant risk
functionals, called the signed Choquet integrals.
The contribution can be seen as three portions.
The first portion of this thesis contains various results on signed Choquet integrals.
A functional characterization via comonotonic additivity is established, along with some
theoretical properties including six equivalent conditions for a signed Choquet integral to be
convex. We proceed to address two practical issues currently popular in risk management,
namely, robustness (continuity) issues and risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty,
for signed Choquet integrals. Our results generalize in several directions those in the
literature of risk functionals. From the results obtained in this chapter, we see that many
existing elegant mathematical results in the theory of risk measures hold for the general
class of signed Choquet integrals; thus they do not rely on the assumption of monotonicity.
In the second portion, we analyze the “convex level sets” (CxLS) property of risk
functionals, which is a necessary condition for the notions of elicitability, identifiability,
and backtestability, popular in the recent statistics and risk management literature. We
put the CxLS property in the context of multi-dimensional risk functionals. We obtain two
main analytical results in dimension one and dimension two, by characterizing the CxLS
property of all one-dimensional signed Choquet integrals, and that of all two-dimensional
signed Choquet integrals with a quantile component. Using these results, we proceed to
show that a comonotonic-additive coherent risk measure is co-elicitable with a Value-at-
Risk if and only if it is a convex combination of the mean and the corresponding Expected
Shortfall. The new findings generalize several results in the recent literature and partially
answer an open question on the characterization of multi-dimensional elicitability.
In the third portion, we study a risk sharing problem. Unlike classic risk sharing
problems based on expected utilities or convex risk measures, quantile-based risk sharing
problems exhibit two special features. First, quantile-based risk measures (such as the
Value-at-Risk) are often not convex, and second, they ignore some part of the distribution
of the risk. These features create technical challenges in establishing a full characterization
of optimal allocations, a question left unanswered in the literature. In this paper, we
address the issues on the existence and the characterization of (Pareto-)optimal allocations
in quantile-based risk sharing problems. It turns out that negative dependence, mutual
exclusivity in particular, plays an important role in the optimal allocations, in contrast to
positive dependence appearing in classic risk sharing problems. As a by-product of our
v
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Over the past few decades, measures of risk and variability are introduced to quantify
various characteristics of random financial losses of a financial institution. These measures
are mappings from the set of random variables to real numbers (thus, risk functionals).
Typical examples of risk measures include the Value-at-Risk, the Expected Shortfall and
various coherent or convex risk measures as introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer
and Schied (2002), and typical examples of variability measures include the variance, the
standard deviation, the mean absolute deviation, and various deviation measures as intro-
duced by Rockafellar et al. (2006). We refer to McNeil et al. (2015) for a comprehensive
treatment of the use of risk measures in modern risk management.
There has been extensive study on risk functionals. Most of them focus on monotone
or convex ones due to the axiomatic definition given in the seminal work of Artzner et
al. (1999). In addition, another separate stream of research targeting non-monotone risk
functionals - measures of dispersion (Bickel and Lehmann (1976)) or deviation measures
(Rockafellar et al. (2006)) has also received considerable attention. To put the two streams
of work under the same umbrella, we study risk functionals and preferences that are not
necessary monotone or convex.
In the practice of risk management, one very often assesses a risk through its distri-
bution, which is obtained via statistical and simulation analysis. In academic terms, this
means that commonly used measures of risk and variability are law-invariant. From the
work of Kusuoka (2001) and Grechuk et al. (2009), a class of risk functionals becomes the
building block of law-invariant risk measures and variability measures: the (law-invariant)
signed Choquet integrals. Roughly speaking, each of them maps the distribution of a risk to
a real number with the use of some given function h, which represents the decision maker’s
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distorted belief.
From a risk management perspective, we focus on law-invariant functionals in this
thesis. In what follows we shall omit the term “law-invariant”, as all risk functionals we
discuss are law-invariant.
In the following, we broadly describe the background and the main contribution of each
chapter.
In Chapter 2, a signed Choquet integral Ih : L




(h(P(X > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(P(X > x)) dx, (1.1)
where L∞ is the set of bounded random variables in a probability space, and h : [0, 1]→ R
is a function of bounded variation with h(0) = 0. Note that a signed Choquet integral in
Chapter 3 is defined as a functional mapping from the set of distributions instead of random
variables. The notion of signed Choquet integrals without law-invariance originates from
Choquet (1954) in the framework of capacities, and is further characterized and studied in
decision theory by Schmeidler (1986, 1989) and extended by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012,
2015) to general spaces.
There has been an extensive literature on a subclass of signed Choquet integrals, in
which h is increasing and h(1) = 1; we simply call this class of functionals increasing
Choquet integrals. In different contexts, such functionals Ih are referred to as L-functionals
(Huber and Ronchetti (2009)) in statistics, Yaari’s dual utilities (Yaari (1987)) in deci-
sion theory, distorted premium principles (Denneberg (1994) and Wang et al. (1997)) in
insurance, and distortion risk measures (Kusuoka (2001) and Acerbi (2002)) in finance. In
particular, the two most important risk measures used in current banking and insurance
regulation, the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall, are increasing Choquet integrals.
For properties and recent advances on various issues related to increasing Choquet inte-
grals, we refer to Dhaene et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2015), Kou and Peng (2016), Delbaen
et al. (2016) and Ziegel (2016).
On the other hand, there has been relatively limited research on signed Choquet in-
tegrals compared to that on increasing Choquet integrals. The major difference between
an increasing Choquet integral and a signed one is that the latter, being more general, is
not necessarily monotone. We are particularly interested in signed Choquet integrals for
various practical and theoretical reasons. First, although a suitable risk measure should be
monotone as argued by Artzner et al. (1999), this issue is irrelevant for a measure of variabil-
ity. Indeed, all practical measures of variability are not monotone (for instance, variance,
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standard deviation, or deviation measures in Rockafellar et al. (2006) and Grechuk et al.
(2009)). Therefore, instead of obtaining an increasing-Choquet-integral-based representa-
tion for law-invariant coherent risk measures as in Kusuoka (2001), one naturally arrives
at a signed-Choquet-integral-based representation of deviation measures as in Grechuk et
al. (2009). In other words, signed Choquet integrals are relevant as long as a measure
of variability is concerned. Second, there are many preferences or risk measures used in
practice which are not monotone. A prominent example is the mean-variance and the
mean-standard-deviation preferences as already studied by Markowitz (1952); see also Fil-
ipović and Svindland (2008) for a study of risk sharing with non-monotone risk measures,
and Furman et al. (2017) for the class of Gini Shortfall risk measures, which are not nec-
essarily monotone. Third, in economic decision theory, signed Choquet integrals appear
naturally in many rank-based decision making; see Quiggin (1982), Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) and De Waegenaere and Wakker (2001). Fourth, from a mathematical perspective,
we aim to generalize some elegant results, which are known to hold true for increasing
Choquet integrals, to the broader class of signed Choquet integrals.
Chapter 2 gives the characterization of the signed Choquet integrals using a result in
Schmeidler (1986), and presents some theoretical properties. Though some of the properties
are known, few literature lists them completely. Moreover, we give the sufficient conditions
of the robustness properties and study the problem of risk aggregation under uncertainty
for homogeneous portfolio as well as heterogeneous portfolio. We demonstrate our results
through a numerical illustration.
Chapter 3 characterizes risk functionals with the “convex level sets” (CxLS) property,
a necessary condition to the notions of elicitability (Osband (1985)), identifiability, and
backtestability, which received an increasing attention in the statistics and risk manage-
ment literature (e.g. Gneiting (2011), Ziegel (2016), Fissler and Ziegel (2016), Kou and
Peng (2016), Acerbi and Szekely (2017)). These concepts refer to the quality and validity
of risk forecasts, and have been a prominent issue in banking regulation and model risk
management (see e.g. BCBS (2016)).
In decision theory, the CxLS property is closely related to (slightly weaker than) the
axiom of betweenness, one of the possible relaxations of the independence axiom of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory; see, e.g. Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989).
As mentioned above, the recently growing importance of the CxLS property in risk man-
agement is mainly due to its close relation with the statistical notions of elicitability,
identifiability and backtestability.
In the literature of risk measures, many results on characterization of elicitable risk
measures are obtained via characterizing the CxLS property; see Weber (2006), Bellini
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and Bignozzi (2015) and Delbaen et al. (2016) for convex risk measures, Ziegel (2016) for
coherent risk measures, Kou and Peng (2016) and Wang and Ziegel (2015) for distortion
risk measures, and Liu and Wang (2016) for tail risk measures. For higher-dimensional
elicitability and their statistical implications, see Lambert et al. (2008), Fissler and Ziegel
(2016), Nolde and Ziegel (2017) and Acerbi and Szekely (2017).
In the above literature, characterization results are obtained for one-dimensional in-
creasing or convex risk functionals. As mentioned above, although risk measures are typi-
cally increasing functionals, many statistical quantities, such as measures of variability or
shape, are not monotone with respect to the natural order onM, and they play an impor-
tant role in the statistical analysis of risks. In this chapter, we study the CxLS property of
non-monotone, non-convex, and multi-dimensional functionals, with a particular focus on
the class of signed Choquet integrals (multi-dimensional). One dimensional signed Choquet
integrals include many commonly used risk functionals, such as risk measures and vari-
ability measures. Moreover, as discussed by Fissler and Ziegel (2016), a two-dimensional
signed Choquet integral (Example 3.4.1) gives the first example of a multi-dimensional
elicitable risk functional that is not connected to one-dimensional ones via a bijection.
Characterization of elicitability or CxLS for multi-dimensional signed Choquet integrals is
generally an open question, as mentioned by both Kou and Peng (2016) and Fissler and
Ziegel (2016).
We study the CxLS property in dimension one as well as in higher dimensions with
a special focus on signed Choquet integrals. In dimension one, we show that the exact
choices of h are very restricted after imposing the CxLS property. In dimension two, we
characterize the CxLS property of all two-dimensional signed Choquet integrals with a
quantile component. Using these results, we proceed to show that a comonotonic-additive
coherent risk measure is co-elicitable with a Value-at-Risk if and only if it is a convex
combination of the mean and the corresponding Expected Shortfall. The new findings
generalize several results in the recent literature and partially answer an open question on
the characterization of multi-dimensional elicitability.
Chapter 4 discusses existence and uniqueness of the quantile-based risk sharing prob-
lem. Quantile-based risk sharing problems, as studied by Embrechts et al. (2018), have
recently drawn considerable interest in the literature of risk management, due to the pop-
ularity of quantile-based risk measures such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected
Shortfall (ES) in current banking and insurance regulation. The key feature of these risk
sharing problems is that each agent’s preference is modelled by a quantile-based risk mea-
sure (called an RVaR), and these risk measures are often not convex; see Section 4.2 for
more details. This feature distinguishes quantile-based risk sharing problems from the
classic ones based on utility functions or convex risk measures. The non-convexity of the
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preferences brings in substantial challenges for studying risk sharing problems, as well
as interesting mathematical and economic observations. For recent results and financial
implications of quantile-based risk sharing, we refer to Embrechts et al. (2018) and the ref-
erences therein. Weber (2018) contains discussions on quantile-based optimal risk sharing
problem in the context of Solvency II.
The existing literature on this topic focuses on finding the minimum possible aggregate
risk value and giving some optimal risk allocations, whereas existence and characterization
issues are left partially or completely unaddressed. Embrechts et al. (2018) obtained some
Pareto-optimal allocations and Weber (2018) generalized the underlying risk measures from
the RVaR family to the so-called VaR-type distortion risk measures with concave active
parts (see Section 4.5.2). The case of heterogeneous beliefs is analyzed by Embrechts et
al. (2019). These papers give some solutions, but do not characterize the whole family of
the optimal allocations.
In Chapter 4, we provide a complete answer to the questions of the existence and the
characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations in quantile-based risk sharing problems. As
a by-product of our main finding, we give some technical lemmas on the optimization of
the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall and briefly discuss how the approaches can
be applied to VaR-type risk measures.
As noted by Embrechts et al. (2018), Pareto-optimal allocations (which we shall simply
refer to as optimal allocations) are often equivalent to sum-optimal allocations. As we
shall see from the main results, the characterization of all optimal allocations is highly
non-trivial, since the quantile-based risk measures often ignore part of the distribution of
the risk, creating a considerable amount of probabilistic freedom. A further complication
arises when the total risk is not continuously distributed, leading to various issues with
non-uniqueness of the quantile. Our results show that an optimal allocation exhibits a
strong negative dependence, in sharp contrast to the classic risk sharing problems where
an optimal allocation is always strongly positively dependent (see Section 4.5.1).
Chapter 4 builds on the main results of Embrechts et al. (2018) on quantile-based risk
sharing. As mentioned before, techniques in this framework are different from the classic
risk sharing problems with convex risk measures or expected utilities; for the latter, we
refer to Barrieu et al. (2005), Acciaio (2007), Jouini et al. (2008), Filipović and Svindland
(2008), Anthropelos and Kardaras (2017) and the references therein. The RVaR family of
risk measures are introduced by Cont et al. (2010) featuring its robustness properties, and
Li et al. (2018) and Embrechts et al. (2018) contain more discussions on its properties and
financial applications. In this chapter, the term “risk sharing problem” refers to the search
for Pareto-optimal allocations. For discussions on competitive equilibria, see Embrechts et
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al. (2018, 2019) and Chapter 5. As a first attempt to characterize the forms of optimal
allocations, the risk sharing problems we consider are formulated in a static setting with
homogeneous beliefs, as opposed to the more sophisticated settings of dynamic equilibrium
(see e.g. Beissner and Riedel (2018)) or heterogeneous beliefs (see e.g. Embrechts et al.
(2019)).
The proofs of some theorems and lemmas are in the end of each chapter. We end the
thesis with conclusions and possible future work.
Due to the different contexts of each chapter, we remind the reader that VaR, ES and
the signed Choquet integrals are defined separately and may have different formulations




Aggregation of Signed Choquet
Integrals
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contains various results on signed Choquet integrals and discusses ro-
bustness issues and risk aggregation under uncertainty. It appears in large part in the
submitted paper Wang et al. (2018).
The main contributions that we offer are summarized below. In Section 2.2, we estab-
lish a characterization of signed Choquet integrals via comonotonic additivity based on the
seminal work of Schmeidler (1986). Furthermore, various theoretical properties of signed
Choquet integrals are studied, such as monotonicity, additivity, quantile representations,
convexity, quasi-convexity, convex order consistency, and mixture-concavity. The charac-
terization and properties are partially known in the literature; yet we are unaware of a
good summarizing article (hopefully this chapter serves as one). In particular, few results
were found for an atomless probability space.
We proceed to discuss in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 two practically relevant and currently
popular problems concerning signed Choquet integrals: robustness issues and risk aggrega-
tion with dependence uncertainty. As pointed out by the recent Basel accords (see BCBS
(2016)), model uncertainty and robustness become a focal point in both academic research
and industry practice of risk assessment over the past few years. We refer to Embrechts
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et al. (2014) and Emmer et al. (2015) for a summary on these issues and their relation
to the recent development in banking and insurance regulation. For more on robustness
of risk measures, see Cont et al. (2010), Kou et al. (2013), Krätschmer et al. (2014) and
Embrechts et al. (2015), and for more on risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty, see
Embrechts et al. (2013), Bernard et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2017). Our results generalize
those of Cont et al. (2010), Embrechts et al. (2015) and Pesenti et al. (2016) on robustness
of distortion risk measures and L-statistics, and those of Wang et al. (2015) and Cai et al.
(2017) on extreme risk aggregation for distortion risk measures. In particular, the detailed
analysis in Wang et al. (2015) used to characterize an extreme-aggregation measure can-
not be applied to signed Choquet integrals, and in this chapter, we develop a completely
different and more systemic approach based on some recent results on asymptotics of the
set of risk aggregation.
2.2 Characterization and properties
2.2.1 Notation and definition
We first list some notation which will be used throughout. Let (Ω,F ,P) be an atomless
probability space. Consistently with the literature on risk measures, we work with the
space L∞ of essentially bounded random variables in (Ω,F ,P) equipped with L∞-norm
|| · ||∞; this choice of common domain ensures all functionals we encounter are well-defined.
A functional ρ : L∞ → R is law-invariant if ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) for any X, Y ∈ L∞ that have
the same distribution under P (denoted as X d= Y ). For all functionals discussed in this
chapter, we assume law-invariance. Moreover, we denote by M the set of distribution
functions of X ∈ L∞. Terms of “increasing” and “decreasing” are in the non-strict sense.
For F ∈M, we writeX ∼ F forX ∈ L∞ andX has distribution F . The left-continuous
generalized inverse of F (left-quantile) is denoted by
F−1(t) = inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > t}, t ∈ (0, 1], and F−1(0) = sup{x ∈ R : F (x) = 0},
whereas its right-continuous generalized inverse (right-quantile) is
F−1+(t) = sup{x ∈ R : F (x) 6 t}, t ∈ [0, 1), and F−1+(1) = F−1(1).
For any random variable X, we use FX to denote its distribution function. Further, write
H = {h : h maps [0, 1] to R, h is of bounded variation and h(0) = 0}.
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Next we present the definition of a signed Choquet integral, which originates from
the seminal work of Choquet (1954) in the theory of capacities without assuming law-
invariance.
Definition 2.2.1. A signed Choquet integral Ih : L




(h(P(X > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(P(X > x)) dx, (2.1)
where h ∈ H. The function h is called the distortion function of Ih.
We first note that Ih is always finite on L
∞. For X ∈ L∞, since h ∈ H is of bounded





(h(P(X > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ M
0
h(P(X > x)) dx.
As h is bounded, we have |Ih(X)| <∞.
Remark 2.2.1. Ih has an alternative formulation by replacing P(X > x) with P(X > x)
in (2.1). For X ∈ L∞, the functions h(P(X > x)) and h(P(X > x)) are equal almost




(h(P(X > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(P(X > x)) dx. (2.2)
In different places we shall use either of (2.1) and (2.2), whichever is more convenient.
From (2.1), it is clear that Iah1+bh2 = aIh1 + bIh2 for h1, h2 ∈ H and a, b ∈ R. In
particular, for any h ∈ H, we have Ih = Ih+−Ih− , where h+ ∈ H and h− ∈ H are increasing
functions such that h = h+−h− via the Jordan decomposition. This decomposition will be
used repeatedly in this chapter, as often results are available in the literature for Choquet
integrals with an increasing distortion function.
Before we proceed with characterizing signed Choquet integrals, we present some more
terminology used throughout the chapter. A most relevant concept to signed Choquet
integrals is comonotonicity. Random variables X and Y are said to be comonotonic if
there exists Ω0 ∈ F with P(Ω0) = 1 such that ω, ω′ ∈ Ω0,
(X(ω)−X(ω′))(Y (ω)− Y (ω′)) > 0.
For a functional ρ : L∞ → R, we say that ρ is comonotonic-additive, if for any comonotonic
random variables X, Y ∈ L∞, ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ); ρ is positively homogeneous, if for
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X ∈ L∞ and constant λ > 0, ρ(λX) = λρ(X); ρ is (uniformly) norm-continuous, if it is
(uniformly) continuous with respect to L∞-norm; ρ is quasi-convex if ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) 6
max{ρ(X), ρ(Y )} for all X, Y ∈ L∞ and λ ∈ [0, 1].
A random variable X is said to be smaller than a random variable Y in convex order,
denoted by X 6cx Y , if E[φ(X)] 6 E[φ(Y )] for all convex φ : R → R, provided that both
expectations exist. The following fact about comonotonicity and convex order is well-
known (see e.g. Theorem 3.5 of Rüschendorf (2013)): for any integrable random variables




= Y c, and Xc and Y c are comonotonic, one has
X + Y 6cx Xc + Y c. We say that a functional ρ : L∞ → R is convex order consistent if
ρ(X) 6 ρ(Y ) for all random variables X, Y ∈ L∞ satisfying X 6cx Y .
2.2.2 Characterization
In the following, we establish a functional characterization for signed Choquet integrals.
As far as we are aware of, this characterization is not known to the literature without
assuming monotonicity. We shall first show that a law-invariant, comonotonic-additive
and uniformly norm-continuous functional from L∞ to R is necessarily a signed Choquet
integral, based on a remarkable result of Schmeidler (1986), which we list as Theorem 2.5.1
in the appendix for completeness. The converse is also true, but it will be verified later as
we establish some further properties of the signed Choquet integrals.
Theorem 2.2.1. A functional I : L∞ → R is law-invariant, comonotonic-additive and
uniformly norm-continuous if and only if I is a signed Choquet integral.
Proof. (i) “⇒”: By Theorem 2.5.1 (Proposition 2 of Schmeidler (1986)), a comonotonic-




(v(X > x)− v(Ω)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
v(X > x) dx, X ∈ L∞, (2.3)
where the set function v : F → R is given by v(E) = I(1E), E ∈ F . Note that I is
law-invariant, which means I(1E) = h(P(E)) for some function h : [0, 1]→ R. Hence




(h(P(X > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(P(X > x)) dx. (2.4)
Next we verify h ∈ H, so that I is indeed a signed Choquet integral. Noting that
comonotonic additivity gives I(0) + I(0) = I(0) = h(0), we have h(0) = 0. It remains
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to verify that h is of bounded variation. Let U be a uniform random variable on
[0, 1]. First, notice that h(t) = I(1{U<t}) <∞ for t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus h is finite. As I is
uniformly norm-continuous, for a fixed ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that |I(X)−
I(Y )| < ε, whenever ‖X−Y ‖∞ < δ. Let P = {t0, . . . , tn} be an arbitrary partition of
[0, 1], where 0 = t0 < · · · < tn = 1. In the summation
∑n
i=1 |h(ti)−h(ti−1)|, there are
exactly n terms of h(x), x ∈ P with a positive sign, and n terms of h(y), y ∈ P with
a negative sign. Therefore, we can write two increasing sequences {x1, . . . , xn} ⊂ P










Since positive and negative terms in the summation
∑n
i=1 |h(ti)− h(ti−1)| appear in
pairs, we have xi, yi ∈ [ti−1, ti], i = 1, . . . , n.





i=1 1{t>1−yi}. Let X = δf(U) and Y = δg(U). Clearly, ‖X − Y ‖∞ 6 δ




h(P(δf(U) > x)) dx = δ
∫ ∞
0




and similarly I(Y ) = δ
∑n
i=1 h(yi). Noting that ‖X − Y ‖∞ < δ, we have
















and this holds for an arbitrary partition P = {t0, . . . , tn}. Thus h has bounded
variation.
(ii) “⇐”: Law-invariance is obvious. The uniform norm-continuity of a signed Choquet
integral is verified by Lemma 2.3.1 in Section 2.3. Comonotonic additivity is implied
by Lemma 2.2.4 below; see Remark 2.2.4.
Remark 2.2.2. Theorem 4.2 of Murofushi et al. (1994) characterizes signed Choquet inte-
grals that are not necessarily law-invariant. Comparing the above result with our Theorem
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2.2.1, our result suggests that this extra law-invariance condition implies the existence of
a function h such that I = Ih, and h has bounded variation on [0, 1]. The corresponding
condition in Murofushi et al. (1994) is that the set function µ, which is h ◦ P in our work,
has bounded variation on (Ω,F). In fact, we can verify from the definition of total varia-
tion in Murofushi et al. (1994) that the total variation of h on [0, 1] is equal to the total
variation of h ◦ P on (Ω,F).
We can also compare Theorem 2.2.1 with Theorem 22 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015)
which characterize signed Choquet integrals without law-invariance on general spaces. In
the latter result, a property of functional bounded variation is imposed, instead of the
uniform norm-continuity in Theorem 2.2.1. Generally, uniform norm-continuity is not suf-
ficient for functional bounded variation used in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012, 2015). The
assumption of law-invariance provides extra regularity and continuity for the underlying
functional, due to a huge dimension reduction resulting from mapping random variables
to their distributions. This phenomenon is well documented in the risk management liter-
ature, see e.g. Jouini et al. (2006) for the case of convex risk measures on L∞ and more
recently, Gao et al. (2017) and Gao and Xanthos (2017) for the case of convex risk mea-
sures on Orlicz hearts. Generally speaking, assuming the same set of other properties,
law-invariant functionals have better regularity conditions than non-law-invariant ones.
Remark 2.2.3. From the proof of Theorem 2.2.1, we see that, if uniform norm-continuity of
I is weakened to norm-continuity, a representation of the form (2.4) holds with a function
h not necessarily of bounded variation (thus, not a signed Choquet integral according to
our definition). Indeed, for a positively homogeneous functional, uniform continuity is
equivalent to Lipschitz continuity; see also Lemma 2.3.1.
2.2.3 Basic properties
In this and the next few sections, we give several basic properties of signed Choquet
integrals which will be useful in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. These properties are partially known
in the literature (see e.g. De Waegenaere and Wakker (2001) and Acerbi (2002) for special
cases), and can be derived from classic properties of increasing Choquet integrals; for the
sake of completeness we provide short self-contained proofs in the appendix.
Lemma 2.2.2. For h1, h2 ∈ H, if h1(1) = h2(1), then
h1 6 h2 on [0, 1] ⇔ Ih1 6 Ih2 on L∞.
In particular, h1 = h2 holds if and only if Ih1 = Ih2 on L
∞.
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For h ∈ H, Ih is said to be increasing (or decreasing) if, for all random variables
X, Y ∈ L∞, X 6 Y almost surely implies Ih(X) 6 Ih(Y ) (or Ih(X) > Ih(Y ), respectively).
Lemma 2.2.3. For h ∈ H,
(i) Ih is increasing (respectively decreasing) if and only if h is increasing (respectively
decreasing);
(ii) for X ∈ L∞ and c ∈ R, Ih(X + c) = Ih(X) + ch(1);
(iii) for X ∈ L∞ and λ > 0, Ih(λX) = λIh(X);
(iv) for X ∈ L∞, Ih(−X) = Iĥ(X), where ĥ : [0, 1]→ R is given by ĥ(x) = h(1−x)−h(1).
In the context of non-law-invariant comonotonic-additive functionals, similar results
to Lemma 2.2.3 (i)-(iii) can be found in Proposition 4.11 of Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2004).
2.2.4 Quantile representation
In this section, we present an important property of signed Choquet integrals, namely,
the quantile representation. This result will be referred to repeatedly in this chapter.
In particular, it is used to show the following properties of a signed Choquet integral:
comonotonic additivity (Theorem 2.2.1 above), convex order consistency (Theorem 2.2.5
below), continuity with respect to weak convergence (Theorem 2.3.2 below), and extreme-
aggregation for heterogeneous portfolios (Theorem 2.4.4 below). In the following Lemma,
the first two conditions (i) and (ii) for a quantile representation are known for increasing
Choquet integrals (see e.g. Denneberg (1994) and Theorems 4 and 6 of Dhaene et al.
(2012)). Although (i) and (ii) can be obtained from corresponding results on increasing
Choquet integrals via a Jordan decomposition, we give an independent short proof here.
Lemma 2.2.4. For h ∈ H and X ∈ L∞,
(i) if h is right-continuous, then Ih(X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1+X (1− p) dh(p);
(ii) if h is left-continuous, then Ih(X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1X (1− p) dh(p);
(iii) if F−1X is continuous, then Ih(X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1X (1− p) dh(p).
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Proof. (i) Without loss of generality, we may assume X > 0, and the general case can be
easily obtained via Lemma 2.2.3. Noting that h is right-continuous, h(P(X > x)) =∫ P(X>x)
0
dh(p). Since h is of bounded variation, one can apply Fubini’s theorem to














F−1+X (1− p) dh(p),
where the second equality is due to p 6 P(X > x)⇔ x 6 F−1+X (1− p).
(ii) Note that ĥ in part (iii) of Lemma 2.2.3 is right-continuous, and F−1X (p) = −F
−1+
−X (1−
p). Applying part (iii) of Lemma 2.2.3, we obtain
Ih(X) = Iĥ(−X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1+−X (1− p) dĥ(p) = −
∫ 1
0




F−1X (1− p) dh(p).
(iii) As h can be replaced by its Jordan decomposition h = h+ − h−, it suffices to show
the representation for h increasing. First note that
∫ 1
0
F−1X (1− p) dh(p) is finite, and
through integration-by-parts,∫ 1
0





h(p) dF−1X (1− p).
For p ∈ [0, 1], we have
p ∈ [P(X > F−1X (1− p)),P(X > F
−1
X (1− p))].
Define g∗1 : R→ R by
g∗1(x) = sup{h(y) ∈ R : y ∈ [P(X > x),P(X > x)]}.
For p ∈ [0, 1],
h(p) 6 g∗1(F
−1
X (1−p)) = sup{h(y) ∈ R : y ∈ [P(X > F
−1










X (1− p)) dF
−1







h(P(X > t)) dt.
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Via a symmetric argument through replacing g∗1 by g
∗
2 : R→ R,
g∗2(x) = inf{h(y) ∈ R : y ∈ [P(X > x),P(X > x)]},
we obtain ∫ F−1X (0)
F−1X (1)
h(P(X > x)) dx 6
∫ 1
0
h(p) dF−1X (1− p).
Note that ∫ F−1X (0)
F−1X (1)
h(P(X > x)) dx =
∫ F−1X (0)
F−1X (1)
h(P(X > x)) dx,
and therefore we have∫ 1
0
h(p) dF−1X (1− p) =
∫ F−1X (0)
F−1X (1)
h(P(X > x)) dx.

















F−1X (1− p) dh(p).
This completes the proof.
Remark 2.2.4. Part (i) of Lemma 2.2.4 implies comonotonic additivity of a signed Choquet
integral Ih. First, we decompose h = hl + hr, where hl and hr are left-continuous and
right-continuous, respectively. This is always possible as h has countably many points of
discontinuity. Then, it follows from Lemma 2.2.4 that Ihl and Ihr are both comonotonic-
additive, as the left- and right-quantiles are comonotonic-additive (a well-known fact; see
e.g. Proposition 7.20 of McNeil et al. (2015) for the case of left-quantiles).
2.2.5 Convexity, convex order consistency, and mixture-concavity
Next we show that convex order consistency of a signed Choquet integral is equivalent
to its distortion function being concave. For increasing Choquet integrals, this result is
established by Yaari (1987).
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Theorem 2.2.5. For random variables X, Y ∈ L∞, X 6cx Y if and only if Ih(X) 6 Ih(Y )
for all concave functions h ∈ H.
Proof. (i) “⇒”: Given X, Y ∈ L∞ with distributions F and G respectively, let
a = ess inf{X} ∧ ess inf{Y }, b = ess sup{X} ∨ ess sup{Y }
and f = 1 − F, g = 1 − G. If X 6cx Y , by Equation (3.A.7) of Shaked and Shan-
thikumar (2007),
E[X] = E[Y ] and
∫ ∞
x
F (u) du 6
∫ ∞
x












g(t) dt for a 6 x 6 b.
A concave function h defined on [0, 1] is necessarily continuous on (0, 1). Define
φ : [0, 1]→ R by
φ(x) =

h(x) for 0 < x < 1;
lim
x↓0
h(x) for x = 0;
lim
x↑1
h(x) for x = 1.
Since h has bounded variation, it can be written as the difference of two increasing
functions. As the bounded monotone functions have finite limits, limx↓0 h(x) and
limx↑1 h(x) are well defined. Note that φ is a continuous concave function, φ = h on
(0, 1) and φ > h on [0, 1]. By the classic Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya inequality (listed






By Equation (3.A.12) of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), a = ess inf{Y } and b =
ess sup{Y }, and therefore h(g(x)) = φ(g(x)) for x ∈ (a, b). Moreover, h(f(x)) =
h(g(x)) for x > b or x < a. Utilizing the above observations, we have











(φ(f(x))− φ(g(x))) dx 6 0.
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(ii) “ ⇐”: For all p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, 1], let h(t) = −1{t>1−p}(t − 1 + p), and then h is














which implies X 6cx Y by Theorem 3.A.5 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Remark 2.2.5. The forward implication of Theorem 2.2.5 can also be deduced by noticing
that ν = h◦P defines a submodular game (see Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004)) whenever
h is concave. Then an application of Corollary 4.2 of Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004)
and Theorem 4.1 of Dana (2005) establishes the claim.
At this point, we are ready to establish six equivalent conditions characterizing the
convexity of a signed Choquet integral. For a law-invariant functional ρ on L∞, define
ρ̃ :M→ R by ρ̃(F ) = ρ(X) where X ∼ F , and we say that ρ is concave on mixtures if ρ̃
is concave.
Theorem 2.2.6. For h ∈ H, the following are equivalent: (i) h is concave; (ii) Ih is
convex order consistent; (iii) Ih is subadditive; (iv) Ih is convex; (v) Ih is quasi-convex;
(vi) Ih is concave on mixtures.
Proof. We complete the proof in the order (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (iv)⇒ (v)⇒ (vi)⇒ (i).
(i)⇒ (ii): Guaranteed by Theorem 2.2.5.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): By Theorem 2.2.1, Ih is law-invariant and comonotonic-additive. We
take random variables X, Y and comonotonic random variables Xc, Y c whose distribution
functions are identical to X, Y , respectively. Then X + Y 6cx Xc + Y c as mentioned in
Section 2.2.1. Thus
Ih(X + Y ) 6 Ih(X
c + Y c) = Ih(X
c) + Ih(Y
c) = Ih(X) + Ih(Y ),
and Ih is subadditive.
(iii)⇒ (iv): As Ih is positively homogeneous, subadditivity is equivalent to convexity.
(iv)⇒ (v): Convexity is stronger than quasi-convexity by definition.
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(v)⇒ (vi): Take any x, y ∈ [0, 1], x 6 y. Define random variables X, Y, Z by
P(X = 0) = 1− y, P(X = 1/2) = y − x, P(X = 1) = x,
and the joint distribution function of Y and Z is given by
P(Y = 0, Z = 0) = 1− y, P(Y = 1, Z = 1) = x,






















6 max{Ih(Y ), Ih(Z)} = Ih(Y ).
Note that
P(X > t) =

1 t 6 0;





< t 6 1;
0 t > 1,
and P(Y > t) =






y 0 < t 6 1;

























































; thus h is mid-point concave. By the
Sierpinski Theorem (see page 12 of Donoghue (1969)), a mid-point concave and Lebesgue
measurable function is a concave function. Therefore h is concave; (i) holds. With con-
cavity of h, (vi) is straightforward from the definition of Choquet integral in (2.1).
(vi)⇒ (i): For p, q, λ ∈ [0, 1], let F be a Bernoulli distribution with mean p and G be
a Bernoulli distribution with mean q. Then λF + (1 − λ)G is the Bernoulli distribution
with mean λp+ (1− λ)q. It follows from simple calculation that
λh(p) + (1− λ)h(q) = λĨh(F ) + (1− λ)Ĩh(G) 6 Ĩh(λF + (1− λ)G) = h(λp+ (1− λ)q),
and thus h is concave.
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Remark 2.2.6. Concavity on mixtures (mixture-concavity) is a natural property for risk
functionals, especially measures of variability, as it assigns a higher risk value to a mixture
of two distributions with equal risk value; see e.g. Acciaio and Svindland (2013). This
property is satisfied by classic variability measures, such as the variance, the standard
deviation and the Gini deviation; see Section 2.2.6 below. Although being equivalent
for signed Choquet integrals, mixture-concavity is essentially different from convexity for
general functionals, in terms of both mathematical and economic interpretations. For
instance, taking a supremum over convex signed Choquet integrals preserves convexity
and may lose mixture-concavity, whereas taking an infimum over convex signed Choquet
integrals preserves mixture-concavity and may lose convexity.
2.2.6 Some examples
Example 2.2.1. We first present some examples of signed Choquet integrals used as
measures of distributional variability. Note that all distortion functions below are concave
but not monotone.
(i) The range:
Range(X) = ess sup(X)− ess inf(X), X ∈ L∞.
The range is a signed Choquet integral with a concave distortion function h given by







dx = ess sup(X)− ess inf(X) = Range(X).
(ii) The mean median difference:
MD(X) = min
x∈R
E[|X − x|] = E
[∣∣∣∣X − F−1X (12
)∣∣∣∣] , X ∈ L∞.
The mean median difference is a signed Choquet integral with a concave distortion







































∣∣∣∣F−1X (u)− F−1X (12
)∣∣∣∣ du = MD(X).




E[|X1 −X2|], X ∈ L∞, X1, X2, X are iid.
The Gini deviation is a signed Choquet integral with a concave distortion function h





F−1X (t)(2t− 1) dt.
Example 2.2.2. Next we present some examples of signed Choquet integrals used as
measures of risk. The first two popular risk measures used in regulation are increasing
signed Choquet integrals. The last one does not necessarily have an increasing distortion
function.
(i) The Value-at-Risk (VaR) for p ∈ (0, 1):
VaRp(X) = inf{x : P(X 6 x) > p}, X ∈ L∞.
VaRp for p ∈ (0, 1) is a signed Choquet integral with distortion function h given by
h(t) = 1{t>1−p}, t ∈ [0, 1]. This can be directly checked via Lemma 2.2.4:
Ih(X) = F
−1
X (p) = VaRp(X).






VaRt(X) dt, X ∈ L∞.
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ESp for p ∈ (0, 1) is a signed Choquet integral with distortion function h given by
h(t) = min{ t






F−1X (t) dt = ESp(X).
(iii) The Gini Shortfall (GS) for p ∈ [0, 1) and λ > 0:
GSλp(X) = ESp(X) + λTGinip(X), X ∈ L∞,






F−1X (t)(2t− (1 + p)) dt, X ∈ L
∞.
By Theorem 4.1 of Furman et al. (2017), GSλp for p ∈ [0, 1) and λ > 0 is a signed









− 1 + p
2
))
1{t61−p} + 1{t>1−p}, t ∈ [0, 1].
A Gini Shortfall is an increasing Choquet integral if and only if λ ∈ [0, 1
2
].
Example 2.2.3. Below we look at the standard deviation, which is not a signed Choquet
integral, but a supremum over some signed Choquet integrals. Let
H̃ =
{
h ∈ H : h(1) = 0,
∫ 1
0
(h′(t))2 dt 6 1, h is concave
}
.
The standard deviation, defined as
σ(X) =
√
E[X2]− (E[X])2, X ∈ L∞,
has the following representation
σ(X) = sup
h∈H̃
Ih(X), X ∈ L∞, (2.5)
and hence it is the supremum over a class of signed Choquet integrals.














and for any Z ∈ Z, we have E[XZ] = cov(X,Z) 6 σ(Z)σ(X) 6 σ(X). Therefore, by the










Via the relation h(t) =
∫ t
0
F−1Z (1 − u) du, t ∈ [0, 1], we establish a one-to-one mapping











F−1X (1− u) dh(u) = sup
h∈H̃
Ih(X), X ∈ L∞.
Note that h ∈ H̃ is concave. As a consequence, each Ih, h ∈ H̃ is subadditive, convex
and consistent with the convex order (see Theorem 2.2.6), and so is the standard deviation
σ by noting that these properties are preserved when taking a supremum.
Indeed, all law-invariant deviation measures in the sense of Rockafellar et al. (2006)
admit a signed Choquet integral representation similar to (2.5); this result is established
in Grechuk et al. (2009).
Example 2.2.4. We look at two further examples of measures of distributional variability
based on risk measures in Example 2.2.2. They will be revisited in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
(i) The inter-quantile range (IQR) for p ∈ (1/2, 1):
IQRp(X) = VaRp(X)− VaR1−p(X), X ∈ L∞.
The inter-quantile range is a commonly used measure of dispersion in statistics, and
the typical choice of p is 0.75, yielding the difference between the first quarter and
the third quarter quantiles. IQRp for p ∈ (1/2, 1) is a signed Choquet integral with
distortion function h given by h(t) = 1{1−p<t6p}, t ∈ [0, 1]; see Figure 2.1. Unlike the
other measures of variability in Example 2.2.1, the distortion function h of IQRp is not
concave, and hence IQRp is not convex or convex-order consistent by Theorem 2.2.6.
For X ∈ L∞ with a continuous quantile at 1− p, noting that F+X (1− p) = −F−X(p)
by Lemma 2.2.3 (iv), we can alternatively write


















Figure 2.1: Distortion functions of IQRp (left) and IERp (right)











, X ∈ L∞.
Similarly to (2.6), we can write, without assuming a continuous quantile,
IERp(X) = ESp(X) + ESp(−X), X ∈ L∞.
IERp for p ∈ (1/2, 1) is a signed Choquet integral with distortion function h given
by h(t) = min{ t
1−p , 1} + min{
p−t
1−p , 0}, t ∈ [0, 1]; see Figure 2.1. In sharp contrast to
IQRp, IERp has a concave distortion function and hence it is convex and convex-order
consistent.
2.3 Continuity
In this section, we discuss some issues related to continuity of signed Choquet integrals.
We first demonstrate the simple fact that a signed Choquet integral is Lipschitz-continuous
with respect to L∞-norm. This result completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.1 above, and will
be used later in Section 2.4 to study risk aggregation. This result can be derived (with a
small effort) from Proposition 4.11 of Marinacci and Montrucchio (2004) on the continuity
of signed Choquet integrals without law-invariance. A simple self-contained proof is put
in the appendix.
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Lemma 2.3.1. For h ∈ H and X, Y ∈ L∞,
|Ih(X)− Ih(Y )| 6 TVh‖X − Y ‖∞, (2.7)
where TVh is the total variation of h on [0, 1].
Next we study continuity with respect to convergence in distribution (equivalently,
weak convergence in the set of distributions M). In general, a signed Choquet integral is
not necessarily continuous with respect to convergence in distribution in L∞, a well-known
property of L-statistics; see Cont et al. (2010) for a discussion on increasing Choquet
integrals (termed distortion risk measures) in risk management.
In risk management practice, convergence in distribution is the most common type of
convergence, due to the statistical nature of data analysis and simulation studies. This
issue is closely related to the notion of qualitative robustness of statistical functionals as
pioneered by Hampel (1971). It would then be of interest to study under what extra
conditions a risk functional can be robust, thus continuous with respect to convergence in
distribution. This direction of research is explored by Embrechts et al. (2015), Pesenti et
al. (2016) and Krätschmer et al. (2017).
The following uniform integrability condition turns out to be relevant. A set D ⊂ L∞















∣∣F−1X (1− t)∣∣ dh(t) = 0. (2.9)
Note that if h ∈ H is linear and non-constant in some neighborhoods of 0 and 1, then
h-uniform integrability reduces to the usual uniform integrability.
Theorem 2.3.2. For h ∈ H and X,X1, X2, · · · ∈ L∞, assume that Xn → X in distribution
as n→∞ and {X,X1, X2, . . . } is h-uniformly integrable. If (i) h is continuous, or (ii) X
has a continuous inverse distribution function, then Ih(Xn)→ Ih(X) as n→∞.
Proof. For n ∈ N, let Fn and F be the distribution functions of Xn and X, respectively.




F−1n (1− p) dh(p) and Ih(X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1(1− p) dh(p). (2.10)
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As h can be replaced by its Jordan decomposition h = h+ − h−, it suffices to show the
statement for an increasing and continuous h. The increasing function h induces a finite
Borel measure µ on [0, 1] via µ([0, x]) = h(x), x ∈ [0, 1]. Since F−1n → F−1 as n→∞ almost
everywhere on R and h is continuous, the convergence is also µ-almost surely. Moveover,
the h-uniform integrability of {Xi}i∈N implies that {F−1n }n∈N is uniformly integrable with
respect to the measure µ. Therefore, using Vitali’s Convergence Theorem (Rudin (1987,
p. 133)), we have Ih(Xn)→ Ih(X) as n→∞.
Next we assume (ii). In this case the convergence F−1n → F−1 is point-wise on (0, 1).
Suppose for the moment that h is left-continuous. By Lemma 2.2.4, (2.10) holds. Sim-
ilarly to the case above, we assume that h is increasing, and it induces a finite Borel
measure µ on [0, 1] via µ([0, x)) = h(x), x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the h-uniform integrability
of {X,X1, X2, . . . } implies that, if µ({0}) > 0, then F−1n (1) → 0 and F−1(1) = 0. Anal-
ogously, if µ({1}) > 0, then F−1n (0) → 0 and F−1(0) = 0. Combining the above facts,
F−1n → F−1 µ-almost surely as n → ∞. Using Vitali’s Convergence Theorem, we have
Ih(Xn)→ Ih(X) as n→∞.
If h is right-continuous, define the Borel measure µ on [0, 1] via µ([0, x]) = h(x), x ∈
[0, 1] and use the representation in Lemma 2.2.4 (i). The conclusion follows analogously.
Finally, for a general h, we decompose h = hl + hr, where hl and hr are left-continuous
and right-continuous, respectively. Then we have
|Ih(Xn)− Ih(X)| 6 |Ihl(Xn)− Ihl(X)|+ |Ihr(Xn)− Ihr(X)| → 0, as n→∞.
The proof is complete.
Next we present a condition on h which implies the h-uniform integrability for all
random variables. We say that h ∈ H is flat in neighborhoods of 0 and 1 if it satisfies the
following condition: if there exists some δ > 0 such that for all 0 < ε < δ, h(ε) = h(0) and
h(1−ε) = h(1). In this case, clearly, any set of random variables is h-uniformly integrable.
This condition is satisfied if, for instance, Ih is a finite linear combination of some quantile
functionals.
Corollary 2.3.3. For h ∈ H and X,X1, X2, · · · ∈ L∞, assume that Xn → X in distribu-
tion as n→∞ and h is flat in neighborhoods of 0 and 1. If (i) h is continuous, or (ii) X
has a continuous inverse distribution function, then Ih(Xn)→ Ih(X) as n→∞.
Robustness properties of the two popular classes of risk measures VaR and ES (de-
fined in Section 2.2.6) are well-studied in the literature. With respect to convergence in
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distribution, it is known that VaRp is continuous at random variables with a continuous
quantile function, and ESp is continuous at random variables among a uniformly integrable
set. These are special cases of Theorem 2.3.2 and Corollary 2.3.3.
Theorem 2.3.2 and Corollary 2.3.3 generalize Theorem 1 of Cont et al. (2010) for dis-
tortion risk measures, Theorem 2.5 of Embrechts et al. (2015) on robustness in the set
of risk aggregation, and Theorem 3.5 of Pesenti et al. (2016) for finite-valued convex risk
measures. Moreover, different from the settings of Krätschmer et al. (2014, 2017) and
Pesenti et al. (2016), our results do not rely on any convexity assumptions.
Example 2.3.1 (Continuity of measures of distributional variability). As mentioned above,
continuity of risk measures with respect to convergence in distribution are well studied in
the recent risk management literature. Below, we apply Theorem 2.3.2 and Corollary 2.3.3
to the measures of variability in Examples 2.2.1, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
(i) The range is generally not continuous with respect to convergence in distribution.
Note that for the distortion function h of the range, given by h(t) = 1{0<t<1}, t ∈ [0, 1],
the h-uniform integrality condition in (2.8) and (2.9) implies X = 0 a.s. for X ∈ D,
which is very restrictive.
(ii) The mean median difference has a continuous distortion function h given by h(t) =
min{t, 1− t}, t ∈ [0, 1]. Since h is linear in neighbourhoods of 0 and 1, the h-uniform
integrability is equivalent to the usual uniform integrability. Hence, by Theorem 2.3.2,
the mean median difference is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution
over any uniformly integrable set.
(iii) The Gini deviation has a continuous distortion function h given by h(t) = t− t2, t ∈
[0, 1]. For this distortion function h, as it has non-zero (one-sided) derivatives at 0
and 1, the h-uniform integrability is equivalent to the usual uniform integrability.
Therefore, by Theorem 2.3.2, the Gini deviation is also continuous with respect to
convergence in distribution over any uniformly integrable set.
(iv) The inter-quantile range for p ∈ (1/2, 1) has a distortion function h given by h(t) =
1{1−p<t6p}, t ∈ [0, 1]. Note that h is flat in neighborhoods of 0 and 1, but it is
not continuous. Hence, by Corollary 2.3.3, the inter-quantile range is continuous
with respect to convergence in distribution over any set of random variables with
continuous quantile functions.
(v) The inter-ES range for p ∈ (1/2, 1) has a distortion function h given by h(t) =
min{ t
1−p , 1} + min{
p−t
1−p , 0}, t ∈ [0, 1]. Since h is linear in neighbourhoods of 0 and
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1, the h-uniform integrability is equivalent to the usual uniform integrability. Hence,
by Theorem 2.3.2, the inter-ES range is continuous with respect to convergence in
distribution over any uniformly integrable set.
(vi) The standard deviation is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution
over any uniformly square-integrable set. One can show this statement by applying
Vitali’s Convergence Theorem to the first and second moments. Theorem 2.3.2 does
not directly lead to this statement. Nevertheless, in Example 2.2.3 we have seen
σ(X) = suph∈H̃ Ih(X), X ∈ L∞. By Hölder’s inequality, uniform square-integrability
implies h-uniform integrability for each h ∈ H̃. Hence, Theorem 2.3.2 implies that Ih
is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution over any uniformly square-
integrable set.
Remark 2.3.1. The continuity results of signed Choquet integrals in Theorem 2.3.2 also
hold on a set larger than L∞, as long as Ih is well-defined on the corresponding set. In
this chapter, due to the limitation of space, we focus on random variables in L∞. For
robustness properties of risk functionals defined on Orlicz hearts, we refer to Krätschmer
et al. (2014, 2017).
2.4 Risk aggregation under uncertainty
In the literature of risk management, risk aggregation concerns quantities related to
the sum S = X1 + · · · + Xn (e.g. the distribution or a risk measure of S) of a risk vec-
tor (X1, . . . , Xn) representing random losses from a certain portfolio. A currently popu-
lar direction of research is risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty, where for each
i = 1, . . . , n, the marginal distribution Fi of Xi, is known while the joint distribution of
(X1, ..., Xn) remains unspecified. We refer to Embrechts et al. (2013, 2014) and Wang
et al. (2013) for the case of the risk measure VaR (defined in Section 2.2.6), Bernard et
al. (2017a,b) for some recent development, and Section 8.4 of McNeil et al. (2015) for a
general discussion. As the precise distribution of S is unknown, one typically studies the
worst-case value of the aggregate risk evaluated by a risk measure ρ, that is,
sup{ρ(X1 + · · ·+Xn) : Xi ∼ Fi, i = 1, ..., n}. (2.11)
Another important quantity related to portfolio diversification is the worst-case diversifi-
cation ratio, defined as
sup
{
ρ(X1 + · · ·+Xn)
ρ(X1) + · · ·+ ρ(Xn)




If the functional ρ is not convex, the quantities in (2.11)-(2.12) are generally difficult to
analytically compute. In this section we investigate them for signed Choquet integrals.
2.4.1 Homogeneous portfolios and the extreme-aggregation mea-
sure
To investigate the asymptotic behaviour of the values in (2.11)-(2.12) for homoge-
neous portfolios, Wang et al. (2015) introduced the extreme-aggregation measure as fol-
lows. Denote the set of possible sums of n F -distributed random variables by Sn(F ) =
{X1 + · · ·+Xn : Xi ∼ F, i = 1, ..., n}, n ∈ N.
Definition 2.4.1. The extreme-aggregation measure Γρ induced by a law-invariant func-
tional ρ : L∞ → R is defined as
Γρ : L





sup{ρ(S) : S ∈ Sn(FX)}
}
.
Γρ provides a limit of (2.11)-(2.12) for homogenous portfolios. The VaR-ES relation
ΓVaRp = ESp for p ∈ (0, 1) is shown in Wang and Wang (2015) via direct construction;
some first special cases of this relation are established by Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2014).
Generalizations to inhomogeneous portfolios are given in Embrechts et al. (2015) (VaR
and ES) and Cai et al. (2017) (distortion risk measures and convex risk measures). For
a distortion risk measure (equivalently, an increasing Choquet integral) ρ, Wang et al.
(2015) obtained an explicit expression for Γρ, which is the smallest subadditive distortion
risk measure dominating ρ. The proof used in Wang et al. (2015) is based on analyzing the
precise form of h, which requires a lot of delicate analysis and random variable construction.
Below we give a much more concise proof, generalizing the characterization of Γρ to signed
Choquet integrals.
To present our main result, for h ∈ H, define its concave envelope
h∗(t) = inf{g(t) : g is a concave function on [0, 1] and g > h}, t ∈ [0, 1]. (2.13)
Note that calculating h∗ for a given h ∈ H is equivalent to finding the convex hull of the
set {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× R : h(x) > y}.
It is clear that h∗ is concave as it is an infimum of concave functions. Further, h∗(0) =
h(0) = 0 and h∗(1) = h(1); to see this, as h ∈ H is bounded, we can define a concave
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function g : [0, 1]→ R as
g(t) =

0 t = 0
supt∈[0,1] h(t) 0 < t < 1
h(1) t = 1
Then one has 0 = h(0) 6 h∗(0) 6 g(0) = 0 and h(1) 6 h∗(1) 6 g(1) = h(1).
Our main result is the following theorem, which generalizes Theorem 3.2 of Wang et
al. (2015) for increasing Choquet integrals.
Theorem 2.4.1. For h ∈ H, the extreme-aggregation measure induced by Ih is Ih∗, and it
is the smallest law-invariant convex functional on L∞ dominating Ih.
The key to our proof of Theorem 2.4.1 is to show that the law-invariant functional ΓIh
is comonotonic-additive and uniformly norm-continuous, and from there we can rely on
Theorem 2.2.1 to justify that it is a signed Choquet integral. We first demonstrate some










C(F ) = {X : X 6cx Y, where Y ∼ F} .
Lemma 2.4.2. For h ∈ H, the following statements hold.
(i) For F ∈M,
lim sup
n→∞
{sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ Bn(F )}} = sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ C(F )}. (2.14)
(ii) The functional on L∞, X 7→ supY ∈C(FX) Ih(Y ) is comonotonic-additive and convex
order consistent.
Proof. (i) Lemma 3.4 of Mao and Wang (2015) (which can be seen as a special case of
Lemma 1 of O’Cinneide (1991)) states Bn(F ) ⊂ C(F ) for n ∈ N. Therefore
lim sup
n→∞
{sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ Bn(F )}} 6 sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ C(F )}. (2.15)
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On the other hand, by Proposition 3.6 of Mao and Wang (2015), lim supn→∞ Bn(F )
∗
=
C(F ), where B∗ is the L∞-closure of a set B. It follows that, for each Y ∈ C(F ),
ε > 0 and m ∈ N, there exists k ∈ N and Xk ∈ Bk(F ) such that ||Xk − Y ||∞ < ε.
Hence, by Lemma 2.3.1,




{sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ Bn(F )}} > sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ C(F )} − εTVh.
As ε is arbitrary, we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
{sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ Bn(F )}} > sup{Ih(X) : X ∈ C(F )}. (2.16)
Combining (2.15)-(2.16), we obtain (2.14).
(ii) Corollary 4.3 of Mao and Wang (2015) states that the functionalX 7→ supY ∈C(FX) ρ(Y )
is comonotonic-additive and convex order consistent if ρ is comonotonic-additive,
which is the case if ρ = Ih.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. For any X ∈ L∞, by positive homogeneity of Ih and the definition
of Bn(FX), we have















{sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ Bn(FX)}} .
Applying Lemma 2.4.2 (i), it is
ΓIh(X) = sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ C(FX)}, X ∈ L∞.
By Lemma 2.4.2 (ii), ΓIh is comonotonic-additive and convex order consistent.
Next we verify that ΓIh is uniformly norm-continuous. Fix n ∈ N. For any S ∈ Sn(FX),
write S = X1 + · · ·+Xn, where Xi ∼ FX , i = 1, . . . , n. Let U1, . . . , Un be uniform random
variables on [0, 1] such that F−1X (Ui) = Xi almost surely, i = 1, . . . , n. The existence of
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such U1, . . . , Un is given by, for instance, Lemma A.32 of Föllmer and Schied (2016). Let
Z = F−1Y (U1) + · · ·+ F
−1
Y (Un). Clearly, Z ∈ Sn(FY ). By Lemma 2.3.1,
Ih(S)− sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ Sn(FY )}
6 Ih(S)− Ih(Z)
6 TVh‖S − Z‖∞
= TVh
∥∥(F−1X (U1) + · · ·+ F−1X (Un))− (F−1Y (U1) + · · ·+ F−1Y (Un))∥∥∞
6 nTVh‖X − Y ‖∞,
where the last inequality is due to the well-known fact that ‖F−1X (U1) − F
−1
Y (U1)‖∞ 6
‖X − Y ‖∞ (see e.g. Lemma 8.2 of Bickel and Freedman (1981)). It follows from taking a
supremum over S ∈ Sn(FX) that
1
n
sup{Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(FX)} 6
1
n
sup{Ih(T ) : T ∈ Sn(FY )}+ TVh‖X − Y ‖∞.
Therefore,
ΓIh(X) 6 ΓIh(Y ) + TVh‖X − Y ‖∞.
By symmetry, we have |ΓIh(X) − ΓIh(Y )| 6 TVh‖X − Y ‖∞; thus ΓIh is uniformly norm-
continuous.
At this point, we know that the law-invariant functional ΓIh is norm-continuous,
comonotonic-additive and convex order consistent. By Theorem 2.2.1, there exists g ∈ H
such that ΓIh is identified with a signed Choquet integral Ig = ΓIh . Note that
Ig(X) = sup
T∈C(FX)
Ih(T ) > Ih(X),
and therefore g > h by Lemma 2.2.2. Since ΓIh is convex order consistent, g is concave
by Theorem 2.2.6. From the definition of h∗, h∗ 6 g, and this implies Ih∗ 6 Ig by Lemma
2.2.2 again.
On the other hand, h∗ > h, and hence Ih∗ > Ih. Noting that h∗ is concave and thus
Ih∗ is also convex order consistent, we have
Ih∗(X) = sup
T∈C(FX)
Ih∗(T ) > sup
T∈C(FX)
Ih(T ) = Ig(X)
Therefore, we conclude that Ih∗ = Ig = ΓIh .
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Finally we show that Ih∗ is the smallest law-invariant convex functional on L
∞ domi-
nating Ih. Suppose that I : L
∞ → R is a law-invariant convex functional and I > Ih. For
any n ∈ N and X ∈ L∞,





I(X1) + · · ·+
1
n






By taking a limit on both sides of the above equation, we conclude that Ih∗ 6 I. Thus,
Ih∗ is the smallest law-invariant convex functional dominating Ih.
Example 2.4.1. Theorem 2.4.1 implies two well-known facts in the literature of risk
measures on the relation between VaRp and ESp for p ∈ (0, 1): First, the worst-case
aggregation of VaRp is asymptotically equivalent to that of ESp (Corollary 3.7 of Wang and
Wang (2015)). Second, ESp is the smallest law-invariant convex risk measure dominating
VaRp (Theorem 9 of Kusuoka (2001); see also Theorem 4.67 of Föllmer and Schied (2016)).
Theorem 2.4.1 generalizes these results to all signed Choquet integrals, and our approach
is different from those in the literature.
Example 2.4.2 (The inter-quantile range and inter-ES range). In Examples 2.2.4 and
2.3.1 we have already seen many differences between the two measures of variability IQRp
and IERp in terms of convexity, convex-order consistency, and continuity. Next, we will
see, by applying Theorem 2.4.1, an interesting connection between the two signed Choquet
integrals. Recall that for p ∈ (1/2, 1), IQRp has a (non-concave) distortion function h given
by h(t) = 1{1−p<t6p}, t ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward that the smallest concave function
h∗ dominating h is given by h∗(t) = min{ t
1−p , 1} + min{
p−t
1−p , 0}, t ∈ [0, 1], which is the
distortion function of IERp; see Figure 2.1 for these distortion functions. Therefore, for
Ih = IQRp, we have Ih∗ = IERp. By Theorem 2.4.1, IERp is the extreme-aggregation
measure of IQRp; in other words, the worst-case value of the aggregate risk evaluated by
IQRp is asymptotically equivalent to that evaluated by IERp. This relationship will be
further illustrated by the numerical example in Section 2.4.3.
Remark 2.4.1. Wang et al. (2015) gives a few conditions for the upper limit in the definition
of Γρ to be replaced by a supremum or a limit. If ρ is a positively homogeneous functional,
then the upper limit can be replaced by a supremum. Furthermore, for h ∈ H and X ∈ L∞,
















We conclude this section by showing that the result in Theorem 2.4.1 can be generalized
to suprema over a set of signed Choquet integrals. Indeed, suprema over a set of signed
Choquet integrals represent all continuous law-invariant coherent risk measures and devi-
ation measures, as established in Kusuoka (2001) and Grechuk et al. (2009), respectively.
Corollary 2.4.3. Define a functional ρ = suph∈H0 Ih, where H0 ⊂ H. Then Γρ =
suph∈H0 Ih∗ and Γρ is the smallest law-invariant convex functional on L
∞ dominating ρ.
Proof. For X ∈ L∞, as ρ is positively homogeneous, we can write
Γρ(X) = sup
n∈N
{sup{ρ(T ) : T ∈ Bn(FX)}};


















where the last equality is due to Theorem 2.4.1. The last statement of the corollary can
be obtained via an argument analogous to the last part of the proof of Theorem 2.4.1.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous portfolios
For a sequence of distribution functions {Fi}i∈N ⊂M, denote the set of possible sums
of n random variables with respective distributions by
Sn(F1, . . . , Fn) = {X1 + · · ·+Xn : Xi ∼ Fi, i = 1, ..., n}, n ∈ N.
To investigate risk aggregation for heterogeneous portfolios, we study an asymptotic equiv-
alence of the following type,
lim
n→∞
sup {Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)}
sup {Ih∗(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)}
= 1. (2.17)
The asymptotic equivalence (2.17) is established in Theorem 3.5 of Cai et al. (2017) for
increasing Choquet integrals under some regularity conditions. Interpreting (2.17), to
evaluate large portfolios with dependence uncertainty via a non-convex functional Ih, one
can replace Ih by a convex functional Ih∗ , the extreme-aggregation measure induced by Ih,
which is much easier to calculate due to its comonotonic-additivity and subadditivity. It
is clear that if F1 = F2 = · · · = FX , then (2.17) reads as
lim
n→∞




which is precisely Theorem 2.4.1 if Ih∗(X) 6= 0. For the same relation to hold for hetero-
geneous portfolios, one needs some regularity conditions on {Fi}i∈N and h ∈ H.




i=1 Ih∗(Xi)| =∞, where Xi ∼ Fi, i ∈ N.
Condition C2 (bounded ranges). sup
i∈N
{F−1i (1)− F−1i (0)} <∞.
Sections 2.2 and 3.3 of Cai et al. (2017) contain counter-examples where (2.17) fails to
hold without some regularity conditions. Next we present the asymptotic equivalence for
signed Choquet integrals with a continuous distortion function h under Conditions C1-C2.




sup {Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)}
sup {Ih∗(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)}
= 1. (2.18)
Proof. Our proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.5 of Cai et al. (2017), although the
conditions in the latter result are different from Conditions C1-C2. Since h is continuous,
we directly work with the quantile representation in Lemma 2.2.4 (ii). By Lemma 5.1 of
Brighi and Chipot (1994), there exist disjoint open intervals (ak, bk), k ∈ K ⊂ N on which
h 6= h∗, and h∗ is linear on each of [ak, bk], k ∈ K. Define Ak = (1 − bk, 1 − ak), k ∈ K.
Let U, V be independent U[0, 1] random variables, and
Scn = F
−1




F−11 (U) + · · ·+ F−1n (U), if U 6∈ ∪k∈KAk,
E
[
F−11 (U) + · · ·+ F−1n (U) | U ∈ Ak
]
, if U ∈ Ak, k ∈ K.
Clearly, F−1i (U) ∼ Fi, i = 1, . . . , n, and hence Scn ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn). Since
E
[







and F−1Scn (t) =
n∑
i=1




















































By Corollary A.3 of Embrechts et al. (2015), for each k, we can find random variables
Y1k, . . . , Ynk, independent of U (guaranteed by the existence of V ), such that Yik is identi-
cally distributed as F−1i (U)|U ∈ Ak, i = 1, . . . , n, and∣∣Y1k + · · ·+ Ynk − E [F−11 (U) + · · ·+ F−1n (U) | U ∈ Ak]∣∣
6 max
i=1,...,n
{F−1i (1− ak)− F−1i (1− bk)}.
Let X∗i = F
−1
i (U)1{U 6∈∪k∈KAk} +
∑
k∈K Yik1{U∈Ak}, i = 1, . . . , n. It is easy to check that
X∗i ∼ Fi, i = 1, . . . , n. Denote by S∗n = X∗1 + · · · + X∗n. Clearly, S∗n ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn) and
by definition




{F−1i (1− ak)− F−1i (1− bk)} 6M,
where M = supi∈N{F−1i (1)−F−1i (0)} and M <∞ by Condition C2. Therefore, by Lemma
2.3.1, we have
|Ih(Rn)− Ih(S∗n)| 6 TVh ×M. (2.20)


















(h(t)− h∗(t)) dF−1Rn (1− t) = 0, (2.21)
where the last equality follows as F−1Rn (1− t) is constant for t in each (ak, bk). Combining
(2.19)-(2.21), we have
|Ih∗(Scn)− Ih(S∗n)| = |(Ih∗(Scn)− Ih∗(Rn)) + (Ih∗(Rn)− Ih(Rn)) + (Ih(Rn)− Ih(S∗n))|
= |0 + 0 + (Ih(Rn)− Ih(S∗n))| = TVh ×M. (2.22)
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Since h 6 h∗, we have
sup {Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)} 6 sup {Ih∗(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)} = Ih∗(Scn)
and hence (2.22) implies |Ih∗(Scn) − sup {Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)} | 6 TVh × M . By
Condition C1, limn→∞ |Ih∗(Scn)| =∞. Therefore, as n→∞,∣∣∣∣ sup {Ih(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)}sup {Ih∗(S) : S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn)} − 1
∣∣∣∣ 6 TVh ×M|Ih∗(Scn)| → 0.
The desired result follows.
Remark 2.4.2. We can compare Theorem 2.4.4 with Theorem 3.5 of Cai et al. (2017),
and there are several major differences on the assumptions. First, the latter result is
about increasing Choquet integrals. Second, random variables are non-negative in Cai
et al. (2017) because they focus on random losses and risk measures. For signed Choquet
integrals, non-negativity seems irrelevant, and we assume instead that the random variables
have a bounded sequence of ranges. Third, our Condition C1 is weaker than their Condition
A1, and our Condition C2 is stronger than their Condition A2. Fourth, we assume h to
be continuous for technical convenience.
2.4.3 Numerical illustration
In this section, we present numerical examples of risk aggregation under dependence
uncertainty for the inter-quantile range and the inter-ES range. As explained in Example
2.4.2, IQRp and IERp are asymptotically equivalent in terms of the worst-case risk ag-
gregation under dependence uncertainty; this also holds for inhomogeneous portfolios as
implied by Theorem 2.4.4. Although we work with bounded random variables throughout
the chapter to establish the theoretical results, the numerical examples in this section are
built for unbounded risks to be more realistic for risk management practice. As we shall
see below, the results of Theorem 2.4.4 are numerically valid for unbounded risks although
they do not satisfy Condition C2.
We consider the following three representative models studied in Embrechts et al.
(2015). The portfolios in Models (A) and (B) are inhomogeneous whereas the portfolio in
Model (C) is homogeneous and very heavy-tailed.
(A) (Mixed portfolio) Fi = Pareto(2 + 0.1i), i = 1, . . . , 5; Fi = Exp(i − 5), i = 6, . . . , 10;
Fi = Log-Normal(0, (0.1(i− 10))2), i = 11, . . . , 20.
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(B) (Light-tailed portfolio) Fi = Exp(i), i = 1, . . . , 5; Fi = Weibull(i−5, 1/2), i = 6, . . . , 10;
Fi = Fi−10, i = 11, . . . , 20.
(C) (Very heavy-tailed portfolio) Fi = Pareto(1.5), i = 1, · · · , 50.
As the common choice of p for the inter-quantile range is 0.75, we compare the values of
IQR0.75 and IER0.75 in each of the above models. We look at the influence on the number
of risks in the portfolio (n = 5, 10, 20 for Models (A) and (B) and n = 5, 10, 20, 50 for
Model (C)), and on different dependence structures. We report the following quantities for

























(iv) IQR0.75(Sn): the worst-case value of IQR0.75(S) over S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn).
(v) IER0.75(Sn): the worst-case value of IER0.75(S) over S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn). By








: the ratio of the worst-case value of IER0.75(S) to that of IQR0.75(S).
The calculation for the independence model in (i) and (ii) is carried out through a
Monte-Carlo simulation with sample size N = 106, and the marginal values in (iii) and (v)
are carried out by analytical formulas. The numerical calculation of the worst-case value
of IQR0.75 in (iv) is carried out through the Rearrangement Algorithm (RA) of Embrechts
et al. (2013) with tail discretization parameter N = 106 (R package: QRM)1. The numerical
results are reported in Tables 2.1-2.2.
From Tables 2.1-2.2, we make the following observations.
1Although the RA is designed for the worst-case risk aggregation of VaRp, it also works for IQRp since
VaRp(S) and −VaR1−p(S) can be simultaneously maximized over S ∈ Sn(F1, . . . , Fn); this is because the
worst-case scenario for quantiles concerns only tail events; see e.g. Theorem 4.6 of Bernard et al. (2014).
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Table 2.1: Numerical values for two inhomogeneous portfolio models
Model (A) Model (B)
n = 5 n = 10 n = 20 n = 5 n = 10 n = 20
IQR0.75(S
⊥
n ) 2.7108 3.2664 5.3565 1.4649 1.6836 2.4712
IER0.75(S
⊥
n ) 6.7298 7.5964 11.4492 2.9024 3.2967 4.7444
IQR0.75(S
c
n) 3.4939 6.0024 13.7364 2.5085 3.9262 7.8523
IQR0.75(Sn) 9.7960 15.3198 33.3608 4.9976 7.8054 15.7044
IER0.75(Sn) 11.0144 16.1504 33.8089 5.1360 7.8541 15.7082
IER0.75(Sn)
IQR0.75(Sn)
1.1243 1.0542 1.0134 1.0277 1.0062 1.0002
Table 2.2: Numerical values for a very heavy-tailed portfolio model
Model (C)
n = 5 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50
IQR0.75(S
⊥
n ) 6.4091 11.6276 20.4428 41.3704
IER0.75(S
⊥
n ) 21.9388 37.3421 62.6127 121.5008
IQR0.75(S
c
n) 6.5421 13.0843 26.1686 65.4214
IQR0.75(Sn) 22.6459 51.7782 111.7977 296.4094
IER0.75(Sn) 32.3112 64.6225 129.2450 323.1125
IER0.75(Sn)
IQR0.75(Sn)
1.4268 1.2481 1.1561 1.0901
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suggests that neither independence or comonotonicity serves as a conservative bench-
mark when studying risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty for Ih with a
non-concave h such as Ih = IQRp.
(ii) The ratio of IER0.75(Sn) to IQR0.75(Sn) goes to 1 as n grows for all models (for
bounded risks this is shown in Theorem 2.4.4). The convergence is very fast for the
light-tailed model (B) and relatively slow for the heavy-tailed model (C).
(iii) The values of IER0.75(Sn) and IQR0.75(Sn) are very close for the light-tailed model
(B) even for small n such as n = 5.
(iv) The difference between IQR0.75(Sn) and IQR0.75(S
c
n) is more pronounced for the
heavy-tailed model (C), compared to the light-tailed model (B).
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Two classic results
Here we list two classic results used in this paper for the sake of completeness. The first
result is used in the proof of Theorem 2.2.1. The original choice of notation in Schmeidler
(1986) is kept here.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Proposition 2 of Schmeidler (1986)). Let Σ denote a nonempty algebra of
subsets of a set S, let B denote the set of all bounded, real-valued, Σ-measurable functions
on S. Suppose that I : B → R is comonotonic additive and continuous with respect to
supremum norm in B. Then, for any E in Σ, defining v(E) = I(1E) on Σ, we have for




(v(a > α)− v(S)) dα +
∫ ∞
0
v(a > α) dα.
The second result is the classic Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya inequality (see e.g. page 22 of
Olkin and Marshall (2016)), which is used in the proof of Theorem 2.2.5.
Theorem 2.5.2 (Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya). Let f and g be two decreasing integrable func-







holds for all continuous concave function φ (for which both functions φ ◦ f and φ ◦ g are












2.5.2 Proofs in Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. (i) “ ⇒”: This is trivial from the definition of signed Choquet
integrals.
(ii) “⇐”: Fix p ∈ [0, 1], we take a Bernoulli random variable X such that
P(X = 0) = p, P(X = 1) = 1− p.
It follows that
Ihi(X) = hi(1− p) +
∫ ∞
1
hi(0) dx = hi(1− p), i = 1, 2.
As Ih1 6 Ih2 and p is arbitrary, we conclude h1 6 h2.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.3. (i) “ ⇒”: We only show the case when Ih is increasing. Take
U ∼ U[0, 1], for any t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1], t1 6 t2, we let X = 1{U6t1} and Y = 1{U6t2}.
X 6 Y implies h(t1) = Ih(X) 6 Ih(Y ) = h(t2). This shows that h is increasing.
“⇐”: We only show the case when h is increasing. For random variables X, Y ∈ L∞,
x ∈ R, if X 6 Y , then P(X > x) 6 P(Y > x). If h is increasing, then
h(P(X > x)) 6 h(P(Y > x)),
which implies Ih(X) 6 Ih(Y ). Hence Ih is increasing.




(h(P(c > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0







h(1) dx = ch(1).
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Since Ih is comonotonic-additive, and X and c are comonotonic, Ih(X+c) = Ih(X)+





(h(P(λX > x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h(P(X > y))− h(1)) dy + λ
∫ ∞
0
h(P(X > y)) dy = λIh(X).




(h(P(X < −x))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0


















ĥ(P(X > x))− ĥ(1)
)
dx = Iĥ(X).
2.5.3 Proofs in Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. Replace h by its Jordan decomposition h = h+−h−, where h+, h−
are increasing. We have TVh+ + TVh− = TVh, and
|Ih(X)−Ih(Y )| = |Ih+(X)−Ih−(X)−Ih+(Y )+Ih−(Y )| 6 |Ih+(X)−Ih+(Y )|+|Ih−(X)−Ih−(Y )|.
Therefore, it suffices to show (2.7) for h increasing. From Lemma 2.2.3, we have
Ih(Y ) 6 Ih(X + ||X − Y ||∞) = Ih(X) + h(1)||X − Y ||∞ = Ih(X) + TVh||X − Y ||∞.
Therefore, by symmetry, (2.7) holds.
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Chapter 3
Risk Functionals with Convex Level
Sets
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on the CxLS property of (possibly multi-dimensional) risk
functionals. This chapter appears in large part in the submitted paper Wang and Wei
(2018b). To make the chapter concentrated, we will present the formal definitions of
elicitability, identifiability and backtestability, their risk management implications, and
their relation with the CxLS property in Section 3.6. Below, we give the definition of the
CxLS property, the main object of this chapter. Denote by M0 the set of distributions
(i.e. Borel probability measures on R).
Definition 3.1.1. (The CxLS property) For M ⊂M0, we say a functional ρ :M→ Rd
has convex level sets (CxLS) onM if the level set {F ∈M : ρ(F ) = γ} is convex for each
γ ∈ Rd.
In other words, the CxLS property of ρ means that, if F,G ∈ M satisfy ρ(F ) = ρ(G),
then ρ(λF + (1−λ)G) = ρ(F ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], assuming λF + (1−λ)G ∈M (guaranteed
ifM is convex). Although Definition 3.1.1 does not requireM itself to be convex, common
choices of M are convex sets, such as the set of distributions with bounded support, or
the set of distributions with positive densities.
To interpret the CxLS property, it means that if two risk models are assessed as equally
risky, then a mixture of the two models should remain at the same risk level.
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This chapter contains two main contributions to the theory of risk functionals with
the CxLS property, and hence to the theory of elicitability. First, in Section 3.3, we char-
acterize all one-dimensional signed Choquet integrals with the CxLS property (Theorem
3.3.1). This result generalizes the existing characterization in Kou and Peng (2016) on
distortion risk measures, a class of increasing Choquet integrals. It turns out that the only
signed Choquet integrals that have CxLS are the monotone ones with CxLS multiplied by
a constant. This result requires some new techniques which we provide in a few lemmas,
as non-monotonicity of signed Choquet integrals creates great challenges, which cannot
be addressed by the existing methods in the literature. Second, in Sections 3.4-3.5, we
extend our discussion to the multi-dimensional setting. Because of the special role of the
quantile functionals in the theory of elicitabiltiy and backtestability, we characterize the
CxLS property of all two-dimensional signed Choquet integrals, whose one component is
a quantile (Theorem 3.5.2). To our knowledge, this result is the first CxLS characteriza-
tion in the literature beyond the one-dimensional case, and it partially answers the open
question of Kou and Peng (2016) and Fissler and Ziegel (2016). To establish this result,
we provide some general results on multi-dimensional CxLS property in Section 3.4. Since
CxLS is a necessary condition of elicitability, identifiability and backtestability, our char-
acterization identifies candidates for risk functionals with these statistical properties. In
particular, based on the result in dimension two, we show that the only coherent risk mea-
sure co-elicitable with a Value-at-Risk is a combination of the mean and the corresponding
Expected Shortfall (Theorem 3.6.5). To better illustrate the concept of the CxLS prop-
erty, we present a list of commonly used functionals with or without CxLS in Section 3.2,
and in Section 3.6 we give an overview on the relationship among the statistical concepts
of elicitability, identifiability, backtestability and the CxLS property. The proofs of the
technical results are put in the Appendix.
Notation
For q ∈ [1,∞), let Mq be the set of distributions with finite q-th moments. Denote
by M∞ the set of distributions of bounded random variables, Mcon = {F ∈ M∞ :
F has a density}, and Mdis = {F ∈ M∞ : F is discrete}. For the ease of presentation,
we identify distributions inM0 with the corresponding cumulative distribution functions,
that is, for F ∈ M0 and x ∈ R, F (x) is understood as F ((−∞, x]). For F ∈ M0, define
the left-continuous generalized inverse (left-quantile) as
F−1(t) = inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > t}, t ∈ (0, 1],
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and in addition let F−1(0) = sup{x ∈ R : F (x) = 0}. For x ∈ R, δx denotes the point
mass at x. Throughout this article, we stick to the following convention. In a result, if
we do not specify M, then the statements hold for any set M ⊂ M0 such that the risk
functional at consideration is finite on M.
3.2 Examples of risk functionals and their CxLS prop-
erties
We first present some common examples of one-dimensional risk functionals with or
without CxLS. These examples will help to understand the main concepts in this chapter,
and they will be referred to repeatedly throughout. We start with a few interesting common
quantities that have CxLS. They are, in fact, increasing Choquet integrals; see Section 3.3.
A full characterization of all signed Choquet integrals with CxLS will be given in Theorem
3.3.1 below.




x dF (x), F ∈M1.
Note that in this chapter we define E on the set of distributions M1 instead of the
set of integrable random variables.
(ii) The left-quantile, or the Value-at-Risk (VaR): For p ∈ (0, 1], define
VaRp(F ) = inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > p}, F ∈M0.
In addition, let ess sup = VaR1.
(iii) The right-quantile: For p ∈ [0, 1), define
VaR+p (F ) = inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > p}, F ∈M0.
In addition, let ess inf = VaR+0 .
(iv) The mixed-quantile: For p ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1], define
VaRcp = cVaR
+
p + (1− c)VaRp.
In addition, we include the cases p = 0 and p = 1 by letting VaRc1 = VaR1 = ess sup
and VaRc0 = VaR
+
0 = ess inf for all c ∈ [0, 1].
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ess sup(F ) +
1
2
ess inf(F ), F ∈M∞.
Next, let f : R→ R be a measurable function and ρ :M→ R, ρ(F ) =
∫
f dF . In this
case, ρ has CxLS since it is linear in F ∈M. Common examples of such functionals include
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities, expected loss functionals, and moments.
Example 3.2.2. (i) A von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functional has the
form F 7→
∫∞





x2 dF (x), F ∈M2.














(x− k)+ dF (x), F ∈M1.
A lot of results on CxLS of risk measures appear in the recent literature. For definitions
of these risk measures, see McNeil et al. (2015). A coherent risk measure does not have
CxLS on M∞ unless it is an expectile (Corollary 4.6 of Ziegel (2016)). A convex risk
measure has CxLS on M∞ if and only if it is a shortfall risk measure (Theorem 3.10 of
Delbaen et al. (2016); this includes Examples 3.2.2 (iii) and 3.2.3 (ii)). In particular, the
Expected Shortfall (ES) does not have CxLS, as noted by Gneiting (2011).






VaRt(F ) dt, F ∈M1,
is a coherent risk measure, and it does not have CxLS. The following famous ES-VaR
relation of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) will be used repeatedly in this chapter.
[VaRp(F ),VaR
+








(y − x)+ dF (y)
}
;













(ii) The expectile (see e.g. Newey and Powell (1987)) for p ∈ (0, 1), defined as






(y − x)2 dF (y) + (1− p)
∫ x
−∞
(y − x)2 dF (y)
}
, F ∈M2,
is a coherent risk measure, and it has CxLS since it is a shortfall risk measure.
A deviation measure, such as the variance or the standard deviation, is a functional D
that satisfies D(δc) = 0 for a constant c and D(µ) > 0 for µ ∈M not a point mass. For a
general theory on deviation measures and measures of variability, see Bickel and Lehmann
(1976), Rockafellar et al. (2006) and Furman et al. (2017). Deviation measures generally
cannot have CxLS, as easily seen from the following argument. For any x, y ∈ R, x 6= y,
by definition, D(λδx + (1− λ)δy) > 0 = D(δx) = D(δy) for λ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that D
does not have CxLS on M. We summarize this observation in the following proposition.
Nevertheless, later in Section 3.4 we shall see that deviation measures may have CxLS
when they are paired with other risk functionals.
Proposition 3.2.1. Let M be a set that contains all point masses and two-point distribu-
tions. A deviation measure does not have CxLS on M.
Example 3.2.4. As shown in Proposition 3.2.1 above, the following deviation measures
do not have CxLS on their domains.
(i) The variance Var(F ) =
∫
(x− E[F ])2 dF (x), F ∈M2.
(ii) The standard deviation SD(F ) =
√
Var(F ), F ∈M2.
(iii) The mean median deviation (MD):








)∣∣∣∣) dF (y), F ∈M1.




F−1(t)(2t− 1) dt, F ∈M1.
(v) The range:
Range(F ) = ess sup(F )− ess inf(F ), F ∈M∞.
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Finally, we give a few other notable functionals with or without CxLS.
Example 3.2.5. (i) LetM be the set of all the continuous distributions with a unique
mode. Then the mode functional T(F ) = maxx∈R
d
dx
F (x) has CxLS onM by defini-
tion.





dF (x) for F ∈ M3























































= 1 6= 0.
The skewness functional does not have CxLS on its domain.
3.3 Main characterization result in dimension one
3.3.1 Signed Choquet integrals
We first define signed Choquet integrals, a popular class of functionals in risk manage-
ment and statistics and the main object of this section. Let
H = {h : h maps [0, 1] to R, h is of bounded variation and h(0) = 0}.




(h(1− F (x)))− h(1)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(1− F (x)) dx,
where h ∈ H and M is a convex subset of M0 such that Ih is well-defined. The function
h is called the distortion function of Ih. An increasing (resp. decreasing) Choquet integral
is a signed Choquet integral with an increasing (resp. decreasing) distortion function.
Signed Choquet integrals are studied extensively in the literature; for its axiomatic
characterization and economic interpretation, we refer to Yaari (1987), De Waegenaere and
Wakker (2001), Kou and Peng (2016) and Wang et al. (2018). A functional onM is a signed
Choquet integral if and only if it is comonotonic-additive and satisfies a continuity condition
(Theorem 2.1 of Wang et al. (2018)); see Proposition 3.5.1 below for a precise statement
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of this characterization in multi-dimension. Many of examples of signed Choquet integrals
are listed in Section 3.2. In particular, increasing Choquet integrals Ih with h(1) = 1
are also known as distortion risk measures, which include the mean, the quantiles, and
the Expected Shortfalls, and many measures of variability belong to the class of Signed
Choquet integrals. We give the distortion functions of these examples below.
(i) The expectation in Example 3.2.1 has distortion function h(t) = t, t ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) VaRp in Example 3.2.1 for p ∈ (0, 1] has distortion function h(t) = 1{t>1−p}, t ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) VaR+p in Example 3.2.1 for p ∈ [0, 1) has distortion function h(t) = 1{t>1−p}, t ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) The mid-point range in Example 3.2.1 has distortion function h(t) = 1
2
1{0<t<1} +
1{t=1}, t ∈ [0, 1].
(v) ESp in Example 3.2.3 for p ∈ (0, 1) has distortion function h(t) = min{ t1−p , 1}, t ∈
[0, 1].
(vi) MD in Example 3.2.4 has distortion function h(t) = min{t, 1− t}, t ∈ [0, 1].
(vii) The Gini deviation in Example 3.2.4 has distortion function h(t) = t− t2, t ∈ [0, 1].
(viii) The range in Example 3.2.4 has distortion function h(t) = 1{0<t<1}, t ∈ [0, 1].
In the above examples, (i)-(iv) have CxLS and (v)-(viii) do not; (i)-(v) are increasing
Choquet integrals and (vi)-(viii) are not.
3.3.2 Characterization of signed Choquet integrals with CxLS
As we have seen in Section 3.2, some signed Choquet integrals have CxLS whereas some
others do not. The main result in this section characterizes all signed Choquet integrals
with CxLS. It turns out that the following three forms of h in the subsets H∗1,H∗2 and H∗3
of H are important for the CxLS property.
(i) h ∈ H∗1: For some c ∈ [0, 1], h(t) = ch(1)1{0<t<1} + h(1)1{t=1}, t ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
Ih(F ) = h(1)(c ess sup(F ) + (1− c) ess inf(F )), F ∈M. (3.2)
(ii) h ∈ H∗2: h(t) = th(1), t ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
Ih(F ) = h(1)E[F ], F ∈M. (3.3)
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(iii) h ∈ H∗3: For some α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1], h(t) = ch(1)1{t=α} + h(1)1{t>α}, t ∈ [0, 1].
In this case,
Ih(F ) = h(1)VaR
c
1−α(F ), F ∈M. (3.4)
We also denote by H∗ =
⋃3
i=1H∗i .
For increasing Choquet integrals Ih with h(1) = 1, Kou and Peng (2016) show that only
the above three cases are possible for Ih to have CxLS. Without monotonicity, the class of
signed Choquet integrals is much larger than the class of increasing ones. Nevertheless, in
the next theorem, we show that the only possible signed Choquet integrals with CxLS are
still the ones listed above.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let M be a convex set that contains all three-point distributions. A
signed Choquet integral Ih has CxLS on M if and only if h ∈ H∗.
Comparing Theorem 3.3.1 with the characterization of increasing Choquet integrals
with CxLS in Kou and Peng (2016), we see that removing monotonicity does not lead to
many more choices of functionals with CxLS. More precisely, all functionals in (3.2)-(3.4)
have either an increasing or decreasing distortion function, and they are monotone with
respect to stochastic order (e.g. Lemma 2.3 of Wang et al. (2018)).
Corollary 3.3.2. If Ih has CxLS on Mdis, then it is monotone (i.e. increasing or decreas-
ing).
Corollary 3.3.2 is a surprising result, as the CxLS property by definition is not related
to monotonicity. For instance, for any measurable function f : R → R, the mapping
ρ : F 7→
∫
f(x) dF (x) has CxLS; whether f is monotone (i.e. whether ρ is monotone with
respect to stochastic order) is irrelevant to the CxLS property. Among the class of signed
Choquet integrals, however, the CxLS property surprisingly implies monotonicity.
On the other hand, the proofs for signed Choquet integrals are much more involved than
the case of increasing ones, due to the lack of monotonicity. Two new technical lemmas
are needed for a proof of Theorem 3.3.1, which are put in the Appendix.
3.3.3 The choice of M
In risk management practice, one may be only interested in backtestability or elicitabil-
ity over the set of continuous distribution models. In the following we will show that, when
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constrained on the set of continuous distributions, the only possible choices of h to allow
for the CxLS property of Ih are still the three cases in Theorem 3.3.1.
We define the metric w on M∞ by w(F,G) = supt∈[0,1] |F−1(t) − G−1(t)|, known as
the Wasserstein-L∞ metric. This metric will be the mathematical tool to bridge between
continuous and discrete models. For a sequence {Fn}n∈N ⊂ M∞, we write Fn
w→ F
if the sequence {Fn}n∈N converges to F in the metric w. We first provide some technical
properties of the w-convergence. They will be useful in bridging the gap between continuous
and discrete distributions, as well as in the characterization of multi-dimensional signed
Choquet integrals in Section 3.5.
Proposition 3.3.3. (i) Suppose that Fn, Gn ∈ M∞, n ∈ N, Fn
w→ F ∈ M∞ and
Gn
w→ G ∈M∞. Then λFn + (1− λ)Gn
w→ λF + (1− λ)G for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) For h ∈ H, Ih is uniformly continuous with respect to w on M∞.
With the help of Proposition 3.3.3, we can show that CxLS on Mcon implies CxLS on
Mdis for Ih, and as a consequence of Theorem 3.3.1, we know h ∈ H∗.
Proposition 3.3.4. For h ∈ H, if Ih has CxLS onMcon, then Ih has CxLS onMdis, and,
as a consequence, h ∈ H∗.
3.4 CxLS in multi-dimension
3.4.1 Some general properties
In this section, we provide some simple results for CxLS in multi-dimension, which will
be found useful later to show our main characterization result in dimension two, as well as
the CxLS in some examples. These results are easy to verify, and self-contained proofs are
provided in the Appendix for completeness. First, a d-dimensional functional has CxLS
if it is an injective function of other one-dimensional functionals with CxLS. Since one-
dimensional functionals with CxLS are well studied, this result gives a convenient way to
construct simple functionals with CxLS in multi-dimension.
Proposition 3.4.1. A functional ρ :M→ Rd has CxLS onM if it is an injective function
of some R-valued functionals with CxLS on M.
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As a direct consequence of Proposition 3.4.1, a functional ρ : M → Rd has CxLS on
M if each of its component has CxLS on M.
The next proposition establishes a link between a 2-dimensional functional with CxLS
and its components, assuming one of the component already has CxLS.
Proposition 3.4.2. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be the functionals from M to R such that ρ2 has CxLS
on M. The pair of functionals (ρ1, ρ2) has CxLS on M if and only if ρ1 has CxLS on
M(r) for all r ∈ R, where M(r) = {F ∈M : ρ2(F ) = r}.
Proposition 3.4.2 is very useful to prove or disprove the CxLS property of two-dimensional
functionals. For instance, it would justify the CxLS of (VaRp,ESp) in Example 3.4.1 below,
and it is used repeatedly in the proofs of Theorems 3.5.2 and 3.6.5.
3.4.2 Examples in multi-dimension
In this section, we list some multi-dimensional functionals with CxLS. Since any func-
tional that have all components with CxLS automatically has CxLS, we only give examples
where at least one of the components do not have CxLS.
Example 3.4.1 (Two-dimensional examples).
(i) (VaRp,ESp) for p ∈ (0, 1) on M1: We know VaRp has CxLS by Theorem 3.3.1. On






(x − r) dF (x) + r. Note that ESp is linear in F for F ∈ M(r).
Therefore, by Proposition 3.4.2, we know that (VaRp,ESp) has CxLS.
(ii) (Median,MD) on M1: The median (i.e. VaR1/2) has the CxLS property. From the
definition of MD and similar steps as in (i) above, the pair (Median,MD) has CxLS.
(iii) (Mid-range,Range) has CxLS on M∞ by Proposition 3.4.1, since the pair is a bijec-
tion from (ess inf, ess sup), which has components with CxLS.
(iv) (E,Var) has CxLS onM2 by Proposition 3.4.1, since the pair is a bijection from the
pair of the first two moments, which has components with CxLS. Consequently, the
pair (E, SD) has CxLS as well.
Example 3.4.2 (Three-dimensional examples).
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(i) The Range-Value-at-Risk (RVaR; see Embrechts et al. (2018)) is a signed Choquet
integral with distortion function h(t) = t−1+q
q−p 1{1−q6t61−p}, t ∈ [0, 1], for some 0 < p <
q < 1. An RVaR does not have CxLS as its distortion function does not belong to




((1− p)ESp(F )− (1− q)ESq(F )), F ∈M,
and therefore the triplet (VaRp,VaRq,RVaRp,q) has CxLS by a similar argument in
(i) of Example 3.4.1.
(ii) Recall that the skewness functional SK in (ii) of Example 3.2.5 does not have CxLS.
The triplet (E, SD, SK) has CxLS on M = {F ∈ M3 : SD(F ) > 0}, by using
Proposition 3.4.1, since the triplet is a bijection from the triplet of the first three
moments on M, which has components with CxLS.
3.5 Main characterization result in dimension two
3.5.1 Multi-dimensional signed Choquet integrals
In this section we investigate the CxLS property in higher dimension. It is natural to
define the signed Choquet integral in dimension d > 2 as follows.
Definition 3.5.1. Let h = (h1, · · · , hn), where each hi ∈ H, i = 1, . . . , d. A signed
Choquet integral Ih :M→ Rd is defined as
Ih(F ) = (Ih1(F ), · · · , Ihd(F )) , (3.5)
where each Ihi , i = 1, . . . , d is the one-dimensional signed Choquet integral defined in
Definition 3.3.1.
A functional ρ : M → R is law-invariant if ρ(F ) = ρ(G) for any F,G ∈ M. Signed
Choquet integrals in multi-dimension shares a similar characterization via
comonotonic-additivity (see Section 2.2.1 for the definition of comonotonic-additivity).
Recall that we useM∞ to denote the set of distributions of bounded random variables.
By applying Theorem 2.1 of Wang et al. (2018) to each component of I, and noting
that the w-continuity of ρ is equivalent to L∞-continuity of ρ̂, we obtain the following
characterization of multi-dimensional signed Choquet integrals.
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Proposition 3.5.1. A functional I : M∞ → Rd is comonotonic-additive and uniformly
continuous with respect to w if and only if I is a d-dimensional signed Choquet integral.
Clearly, for h1, h2 ∈ H∗, the 2-dimensional signed Choquet integral (Ih1 , Ih2) has CxLS,
due to Proposition 3.4.1. More interestingly, (Ih1 , Ih2) may have CxLS even if it is not a
injection from one-dimensional signed Choquet integrals with CxLS. A famous example is
(VaRp,ESp) for p ∈ (0, 1) as in Example 3.4.1, as shown by Fissler and Ziegel (2016) and
Acerbi and Szekely (2017).
Characterization of multi-dimensional signed Choquet integrals with CxLS seems to be
an extremely challenging task, which is left as an open question by Fissler and Ziegel (2016)
and Kou and Peng (2016). Since VaRp is a canonical candidate for a one-dimensional signed
Choquet integral with CxLS, below we explore for which h ∈ H, (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS.
3.5.2 Characterizing a signed Choquet integral and a VaR with
CxLS
Below we will characterize all pairs (Ih,VaRp) with CxLS. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first result in the literature on characterizing CxLS in multi-dimension. By
Proposition 3.4.1, (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS if and only if (Ih + aVaRp,VaRp) has CxLS for
one (or all) a ∈ R. Therefore, adding a constant times VaRp to Ih does not change the
CxLS property of (Ih,VaRp). This explains why the term aVaRp appears in all cases in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.2. For p ∈ (0, 1) and h ∈ H, (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS on Mdis if and only if
Ih is one of the following cases
(i) Ih = aVaRp + Ih∗ for some a ∈ R and h∗ ∈ H∗;
(ii) Ih = aVaRp + bE + cESp for some constants a, b, c ∈ R;
(iii) Ih = aVaRp + bVaR
+
p + c ess sup for some constants a, b, c ∈ R with bc > 0;
(iv) Ih = aVaRp + bVaR
+
p + c ess inf for some constants a, b, c ∈ R with bc < 0.
Theorem 3.5.2 reveals a characterization of all signed Choquet integrals that has CxLS
jointly with VaRp, p ∈ (0, 1). In particular, for risk management practice, one usually does
not distinguish VaRp and VaR
+
p . If we treat VaRp and VaR
+
p as identical, then cases (iii)
and (iv) can be combined into case (i). Therefore, we are left with the following two cases.
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(i) Ih = aVaRp + Ih∗ for some a ∈ R and h∗ ∈ H∗;
(ii) Ih = aVaRp + bE + cESp for some constants a, b, c ∈ R.
From (i) and (ii), if (Ih,VaRp) is not a bijection from a pair of signed Choquet integrals
with CxLS, then Ih has to be a linear combination of VaRp, E and ESp. Regarding the
CxLS property, the class of VaRp for p ∈ (0, 1) plays a unique role among the class of
distortion risk measures (Kou and Peng (2016)) and among positively homogeneous tail
risk measures (Liu and Wang (2016)). The above observation shows that ESp is also very
special regarding CxLS. In particular, as the CxLS property is necessary for elicitability
(see Section 3.6), we will see in Theorem 3.6.5 that a convex combination of ESp and E
is the only type of comonotonic-additive coherent risk measure that is co-elicitable with
VaRp.
It may be worth noting that the roles of VaRp and VaR
+
p are symmetric. To get
functionals Ih such that (Ih,VaR
+
p ) has CxLS, one simply switches the positions in the
pairs (VaRp,VaR
+
p ) and (ess inf, ess sup) in Theorem 3.5.2. This statement is due to the
following relation. For any distribution F ∈M0, let F̄ be given by F̄ (A) = F (−A), where
−A = {−x : x ∈ A}, A ∈ B(R).
Proposition 3.5.3. For p ∈ (0, 1) and h ∈ H, (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS on M if and only if
(Ih̄,VaR
+
1−p) has CxLS on M̄, where h̄ ∈ H is given by h̄(t) = h(1 − t) − h(1), t ∈ [0, 1]
and M̄ = {F̄ : F ∈M}.
3.6 Backtestability, elicitability and identifiability
This section gives formal definitions of elicitability, backtestability and identifiability as
studied by Osband (1985), Gneiting (2011) and Acerbi and Szekely (2017), and discusses
their relation with the CxLS property. As the main focus of this chapter is the CxLS
property, this section collects some major relevant facts for the interested reader with self-
contained proofs, and we refer to Fissler and Ziegel (2016), Kou and Peng (2016) and Acerbi
and Szekely (2017) for excellent summaries and detailed discussions on the implications in
statistical inference, risk management, and banking regulation. In addition to the known
facts, we obtain a new characterization result (Theorem 3.6.5) on co-elicitability of coherent
risk measures with VaRp.
Elicitability refers to the existence of a scoring function for the forecasted value of a
risk functional and realized value of future observations, so that the mean of the scoring
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function attains its minimum value if and only if the value of the risk functional is truly
forecasted; see Gneiting (2011) for elicitability in a decision-theoretic framework. Compar-
ative backtest is discussed in Nolde and Ziegel (2017) as an alternative to the traditional
backtest, for which elicitability is a necessary condition.
Definition 3.6.1 (Elicitability). The functional ρ :M→ Rd isM-elicitable if there exists
a strictly consistent scoring function S : Rd+1 → R such that for all F ∈M,




S(x, y) dF (y). (3.6)
We also say that ρ1 : M → R is co-elicitable with ρ2 : M → R on M if (ρ1, ρ2) is
M-elicitable.
In the literature, elicitability is often defined for set-valued risk functionals (e.g. gen-
erally, quantiles are interval-valued), as the minimizer to the scoring function is not nec-
essarily a singleton. In this chapter, as we look at risk functionals mapping M to Rd, we
use the slightly narrower definition on Rd-valued functionals. This choice of definition does
not affect our discussion.
Next, identifiability refers to the existence of an identification function for the forecasted
value of a risk functional and realized value of future observations. The mean of the
identification function is zero if and only if the value of the risk functional is truly forecasted.
Therefore, the realized average value of the identification function can identify whether a
risk forecast is accurate.
Definition 3.6.2 (Identifiability). A functional ρ :M→ Rd is said to be M-identifiable,
if there exists an identification function I : Rd+1 → R such that for all F ∈M,∫ ∞
−∞
I(x, y) dF (y) = 0 if and only if x = ρ(F ).
Finally, we define backtestability as in Acerbi and Szekely (2017). Backtestability
refers to the existence of a backtest function, whose mean reports positive value if the risk
functional is under-forecasted, and negative value if the risk functional is over-forecasted.
Thus, the realized average value of this backtest functional can distinguish between under-
and over-estimation in risk forecasts. Due to the lack of a natural order in Rd, one cannot
speak of under-estimation or over-estimation for Rd-valued risk functionals. Therefore, the
notion of backtestability is suitable for dimension one only (a related notion for multi-
dimensional functionals is ridge backtests ; see Acerbi and Szekely (2017)).
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Definition 3.6.3 (Backtestability). A functional ρ :M→ R is said to beM-backtestable,
if there exists a backtest function Z : R2 → R such that for all F ∈M,∫ ∞
−∞
Z(x, y) dF (y) = 0 if and only if x = ρ(F ),
and
∫
Z(t, ·) dF is strictly increasing in the prediction t ∈ R.
The three notions introduced above are model-free in the sense that the statements
holds for all F ∈ M, that is, in order to compare scores, to identify forecasts, or to
quantify backtests, one does not need to know the underlying distribution that generates
the random observations.
In what follows, we illustrate the relationship among the above three concepts and the
CxLS property. First, in dimension one, identifiability follows directly from backtesta-
bility, and backtestability is generally stronger than elicitability. In any dimension, both
elicitability and identifiability imply the CxLS property. Finally, for one-dimensional signed








The above statements will be verified (with some conditions) below.
We shall first see that elicitability and backtestability both imply the CxLS prop-
erty. Suppose that F,G ∈ M satisfy ρ(F ) = ρ(G) = x ∈ Rd. If ρ is M-elicitable, let
S be its scoring function in (3.6). As x is a minimizer for both
∫∞
−∞ S(·, y) dF (y) and∫∞
−∞ S(·, y) dG(y), it must also be a minimizer for
∫∞
−∞ S(·, y) d(λF +(1−λ)G)(y). By defi-
nition of elicitability, x = ρ(λF+(1−λ)G), and ρ has CxLS. Similarly, if ρ isM-identifiable,
let I : Rd+1 → R is its identification function. As x satisfies
∫∞
−∞ I(x, y) dF (y) = 0 and∫∞
−∞ I(x, y) dG(y) = 0, we know
∫∞
−∞ I(x, y) d(λF + (1−λ)G) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. By the
definition of identifiability, we have x = ρ(λF + (1 − λ)G). We summarize these simple
arguments in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.6.1. ForM⊂M0, if ρ :M→ Rd isM-elicitable orM-identifiable, then
ρ has CxLS on M.
The next proposition verifies that one-dimensional backtestability implies elicitability,
as shown by Acerbi and Szekely (2017).
Proposition 3.6.2. If ρ : M→ R is M-backtestable with backtest function Z, then ρ is





|Z(x, y)| dx dF (y) <∞ for all z ∈ R}.
By Theorem 3.3.1, if a signed Choquet integral Ih has CxLS, then h ∈ H∗, belonging
to one of the three cases (3.2)-(3.4). Hence, it suffices to analyze backtestability in these
cases. Note that by Theorem 3.3.1, a signed Choquet integral Ih with CxLS is either
a mean, a mix-quantile, or a convex combination of ess sup and ess inf, multiplied by a
constant equal to h(1). The next proposition verifies that the constant multiplier does not
affect backtestability as long as it is not zero.
Proposition 3.6.3. Suppose that ρ :M→ R is backtestable with backtest function Z, then
for c 6= 0, the functional cρ is backtestable with backtest function Z∗(x, y) = cZ(x/c, y),
x, y ∈ R.
For the signed Choquet integral Ih, h ∈ H∗, if h(1) = 0, then Ih(F ) = 0 for all
F ∈ M. This trivial functional is backtestable with the backtest function Z(x, y) = x for
all x, y ∈ R. If h(1) 6= 0, by Proposition 3.6.3, the backtestability of Ih reduces to that of
increasing Choquet integrals studied in Acerbi and Szekely (2017). We list them here for
completeness.
Proposition 3.6.4. For h ∈ H∗ with h(1) 6= 0,
(i) if h ∈ H∗1, Ih is not Mdis-backtestable;
(ii) if h ∈ H∗2, Ih is M1-backtestable;
(iii) if h ∈ H∗3, Ih is M∗0-backtestable, where M∗0 = {F ∈M0 : F−1 is continuous}.
Remark 3.6.1. For a given p ∈ (0, 1), VaRp (or VaRcp as in case (iii) of Proposition 3.6.4) is
M∗0(p)-backtestable (andM-elicitable), whereM∗0(p) = {F ∈M0 : F−1 is continuous at p}.
The choice of M = M∗0(p) is the biggest such that VaRp is M-backtestable (or M-
elicitable).
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We conclude this chapter by a characterization theorem on spectral risk measures that
are co-elicitable with a VaR. Let X be the set of bounded random variables. According to
Artzner et al. (1999), a functional ρ̂ : X → R is set to be a coherent risk measure if it is
increasing, cash-additive, convex, and positively homogeneous. Translating this definition
into our setting, we say that the functional ρ :M∞ → R is a coherent risk measure, if ρ̂ is
a coherent risk measure in the sense of Artzner et al. (1999), where ρ̂ : X → R is given by
ρ̂(X) = ρ(F ) and F is the distribution of X.
We focus on comonotonic-additive coherent risk measures, a popular class of one-
dimensional signed Choquet integrals. Elicitability of comonotonic-additive risk measures
is studied by, for instance, Ziegel (2016), Kou and Peng (2016) and Fissler and Ziegel
(2016). Using the characterization result of Kusuoka (2001), a functional ρ : M∞ → R
is a comonotonic-additive coherent risk measure if and only if it can be written as ρ =∫ 1
0
ESp dµ(p) for a Borel probability measure µ on [0, 1], or equivalently (see e.g. Theorem
2.8 of Wang et al. (2018)), ρ = Ih for a concave and increasing h ∈ H satisfying h(1) = 1.
Since VaRp is elicitable only on M∗0(p), we consider co-elicitability on M∗∞(p) = {F ∈
M∞ : F−1 is continuous at p}. Among the forms of risk measures identified by Theorem
3.5.2, it is easy to see that the only choice of coherent risk measures is ρ = aESp+ (1−a)E
for some a ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, naturally we would expect that the above form of ρ is the
only coherent risk measure that is co-elicitable with VaRp, although some detailed analysis
needs to be carried out to translate from the CxLS property on the setM∗∞(p) to that on
the set Mdis, in order to utilize Theorem 3.5.2.
Theorem 3.6.5. For a comonotonic-additive coherent risk measure ρ : M∞ → R and
p ∈ (0, 1), ρ is co-elicitable with VaRp on M∗∞(p) if and only if it is a convex combination
of E and ESp.
To make sense of the co-elicitability of (VaRp, aESp + (1 − a)E) in Theorem 3.6.5, we
obtain its scoring function in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6.6. For p ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1], let ρ = aESp + (1− a)E. The functional
(VaRp, ρ) is M∗∞(p)-elicitable with the strictly consistent scoring function










+ (1− a)y − x2
)
, x1, x2, y ∈ R,
where g is any differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function on R.
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3.7 Proofs of the main results
3.7.1 Proofs in Section 3.3
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. In order to prove Theorem 3.3.1, we present two technical lemmas.
Lemma 3.7.1. If h ∈ H satisfies, for all t, q ∈ [0, 1], 0 6 h(t) 6 h(1) = 1 and
h(t) = h(t)h(1− q + qt) + (1− h(t))h(qt), (3.7)
then h ∈ H∗.
Proof of the lemma. We first get some smoothness of h using the same trick as in Wang

































(g(1)− g(t)) + g(t)
)
= g(t). (3.8)
Note that the function g is continuous on (0, 1). For t ∈ (0, 1), if g(t) 6= 0, then (3.8)
implies that h is continuous at t. If g(t) = 0 and h is not continuous at t, then t −
t
1−t(g(1)− g(t)) + g(t) = 0, which implies t = 1− g(1). To summarize, either h has a jump
at t = 1 − g(1) and continuous elsewhere, or h is continuous on (0, 1). This fact implies
that g is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) except for at the point t = 1−g(1). Using the
above relation (3.8) again, we know that h is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) except
at the point t = 1− g(1).




(h(t)h(1− q + qt) + (1− h(t))h(qt)).
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By the product rule,
d
dq
(h(t)h(1− q+ qt) + (1−h(t))h(qt)) = h(t)h′(1− q+ qt)(t−1) + (1−h(t))h′(qt)t, (3.9)
assuming the derivatives in the right-hand-side of (3.9) exist. Plugging in q = 1 in (3.9)
and rearranging terms, we have
h(t)h′(t) = h′(t)t for all t ∈ (0, 1) \ {1− g(1)}.
As a consequence,
h(t) = t or h′(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1) \ {1− g(1)}. (3.10)
Pick any point t0 ∈ (0, 1)\{1−g(1)}, and assume that h′(t0) 6= 0 and h′(t0) 6= 1. Using
(3.10), we have h(t0) = t0. Since h
′(t0) 6= 1, there exists a neighbourhood (t0 − ε, t0 + ε)
such that h(t) 6= t for all t ∈ (t0 − ε, t0 + ε) and t 6= t0. Using (3.10) again, we know that
h′(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (t0 − ε, t0 + ε) and t 6= t0. The continuous differentiability of h at t0
then implies h′(t0) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude
h′(t) = 1 or h′(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1) \ {1− g(1)}. (3.11)
First, suppose that h is continuously differentiable on (0, 1). In this case, h′ cannot switch
between 0 and 1. Therefore, we have, either h′(t) = 0 on (0, 1) or h′(t) = 1 on (0, 1). This
means either h(t) = c on (0, 1) for some constant c ∈ [0, 1], or h(t) = t on (0, 1). In other
words, h ∈ H∗1 or h ∈ H∗2 .
Next, suppose that h is not continuously differentiable at t0 = 1 − g(1). Note that





h(t) dt 6 1−t0, we know that h(t) = 1 a.e. on (t0, 1). Since h is continuously
differentiable on (0, t0) and (t0, 1), we know that h(t) = 0 on (0, t0) and h(t) = 1 on (t0, 1).
Thus, h ∈ H∗3.
The next lemma gives a sufficient condition for h(t) to have the same sign as h(1).
Since h is not necessarily monotone for a signed Choquet integral, it is an important step
to verify that h(t) has the same sign as h(1) in order to utilize Lemma 3.7.1.
Lemma 3.7.2. Fix h ∈ H and t ∈ (0, 1], and suppose h(t) 6= 0 and h(1) 6= 0. For x, y ∈ R,







, if h satisfies
h(1) = Ih(q((1− t)δx + tδy) + (1− q)δ1), (3.12)




Proof of the lemma. Without loss of generality, we assume h(1) = 1. Because y − x =
1
h(t)





(x− 1), by the fact that x < y, there exist three cases.
(a) x > 1, y > 1 and h(t) < 0: Equation (3.12) reduces to
h(q)h(t) = h(tq). (3.13)
(b) x < 1, y < 1 and h(t) > 1: Equation (3.12) reduces to
h(t) = h(1− q(1− t)) + h(1− q)(h(t)− 1). (3.14)
Then
h(t) =
h(1− q(1− t))− h(1− q)
1− h(1− q)
.
(c) x < 1, y > 1 and 0 < h(t) 6 1: Equation (3.12) reduces to
h(t) = h(t)h(1− q(1− t)) + (1− h(t))h(tq). (3.15)
We show that cases (a) and (b) above are actually not possible. In other words, a function
h ∈ H satisfying h(1) = 1 and (a)-(c) takes values in [0, 1].
We first show that such a function h is non-negative. Note that (c) implies
for any t ∈ [0, 1], if h(t) = 0, then h(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [0, t]. (3.16)
Suppose that there exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that h(t) < 0. If h(
√





t) > 0, which is a contradiction. Hence, h(
√
t) > 0. Note that (3.13) also















On the other hand, (a) also gives
h(t2) = h(t)h(t) > 0,
a clear contradiction. Therefore, h(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Next we show h(t) 6 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. We note the following two useful facts. First,
for any t ∈ [0, 1] such that h(t) ∈ (0, 1], by (c), we have




Using the fact that h is non-negative, we have h(1−q(1−t)) 6 1 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
we conclude the following statement:
For any t ∈ [0, 1] such that h(t) ∈ (0, 1], h(s) ∈ [0, 1] for all s ∈ [t, 1]. (3.17)
Second, for any t ∈ [0, 1] such that h(t) > 1, by taking q = 1− t, (3.14) gives
h(t) = h(1− (1− t)2) + h(t)(h(t)− 1).
Rearranging terms, we have (h(t)−1)2 = 1−h(1−(1−t)2). This implies h(1−(1−t)2) < 1.
Therefore, we have:
For any t ∈ [0, 1] such that h(t) > 1, h(1− (1− t)2) < 1. (3.18)
Suppose that there exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that h(t) > 1. Let s = 1 −
√
1− t. Clearly,
s < t. If h(s) > 1, then by (3.18), we have h(1− (1− s)2) = h(t) < 1, a contradiction. If
h(s) ∈ (0, 1], then by (3.17), h(t) ∈ [0, 1], another contradiction. Hence, h(s) = 0.
Plugging q = 1− s =
√
1− t in (3.14),
h(t) = h(1− (1− t)(1− s)) + h(s)(h(t)− 1)) = h(1− (1− t)
√
1− t) > 1. (3.19)
In particular,
h(t) = h(1− (1− t)
√
1− t) > 1, (3.20)
and setting w = 1− (1− t)
√
1− t in (3.19), we get
h(1− (1− w)
√
1− t) = h(1− (1− t)2) > 1.
This is a contraction to (3.18). Combining all cases, there does not exist t ∈ (0, 1) such
that h(t) > 1. Together with the fact that h is non-negative, we come to the conclusion
that h(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus only case (c) is possible.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1 continued. It is easy to verify that the three classes of functionals
in (3.2)-(3.4) have CxLS, and hence h ∈ H∗ is sufficient for the CxLS property. Below we
show the necessity of h ∈ H∗. Suppose h(t0) = 0 for some fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that
Ih(δ0) = 0 and Ih((1− t0)δ0 + t0δ1) = h(t0) = 0. Since Ih has CxLS, for any fixed q ∈ [0, 1],
Ih ((1− q)δ0 + q(1− t0)δ0 + qt0δ1) = h(t0q) = Ih(δ0) = 0. (3.21)
It follows that if h(1) = 0, then h(t) = 0 on [0, 1]. This is included in each of cases (i)-(iii).
In the following, h(t) 6= 0 for any t ∈ (0, 1], and we can assume h(1) = 1 without loss of
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generality, since the set H∗ is invariant under a constant multiplier. For 0 < x < y and
any fixed t ∈ (0, 1], we have
Ih((1− t)δx + tδy) = x+ h(t)(y − x).








Ih((1− t)δx + tδy) = 1. Since Ih has CxLS, for all q ∈ [0, 1],
1 = Ih(q((1− t)δx + tδy) + (1− q)δ1). (3.22)
By Lemma 3.7.2, we have x < 1 6 y and h(t) ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, (3.22) reduces to
h(t) = h(t)h(1− q + qt) + (1− h(t))h(qt), (3.23)
for all t ∈ (0, 1] with h(t) 6= 0 and q ∈ [0, 1]. Note that (3.22) holds for t = 0 and if h(t) = 0,
then (3.23) holds automatically by (3.21). Therefore, (3.23) holds for all t, q ∈ [0, 1]. This
is precisely (3.7). By applying Lemma 3.7.1, we obtain h ∈ H∗.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. For both statements, we note that Fn
w→ F if and only if
F−1n (U)→ F−1(U) in L∞ for any U[0, 1] random variable U .





n (U) has the distribution λFn+(1−λ)Gn, n ∈ N.
Moreover, by the w-convergence of {Fn}n∈N and {Gn}n∈N, 1AF−1n (U)+1AcG−1n (U)→
1AF
−1(U) + 1AcG
−1(U) in L∞. Therefore, λFn + (1− λ)Gn
w→ λF + (1− λ)G.
(ii) The conclusion follows from the fact that a Signed Choquet integral as a functional
on L∞ is uniformly continuous with respect to L∞-norm (Theorem 2.1 of Wang et
al. (2018)).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. (i) Assume h(1) = 0. Let Fn = U[0, 1/n] and Gn = U[1, 1 +
1/n], n ∈ N. Note that Fn
w→ δ0 and Gn
w→ δ1. By Proposition 3.3.3, we have
λFn + (1 − λ)Gn
w→ Bernoulli(λ) for λ ∈ (0, 1). Also note that from the translation
invariance of Ih (e.g. Lemma 2.4 of Wang et al. (2018)), Ih(Gn) = Ih(Fn) + h(1) =




Ih(λFn + (1− λ)Gn) = lim
n→∞
Ih(Fn) = Ih(δ0) = 0.
Also note that Ih(Bernoulli(λ)) = h(λ). This gives h(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence
Ih(F ) = 0 for all F ∈M0, and it has CxLS on any set of distributions.
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(ii) Assume h(1) 6= 0. Take F,G ∈ Mdis such that Ih(F ) = Ih(G). Write c = h(1) and
b = Ih(F ). Take two sequences of distributions {Fn}n∈N ⊂ Mcon and {Gn}n∈N ⊂
Mcon such that Fn
w→ F and Gn
w→ G. Such sequences are easy to construct by, e.g.,
replacing each point mass with a uniform on a small interval of length 1/n. Let U be
a U[0, 1] random variable. For n ∈ N, let F ∗n be the distribution of F−1n (U) + 1c (b −
Ih(Fn)). We have F
∗
n
w→ F , because Fn
w→ F and Ih(Fn) → b by Proposition 3.3.3.
Moreover, by the translation invariance of Ih again, Ih(F
∗
n) = Ih(Fn)+b−Ih(Fn) = b.









n) = b. By Proposition 3.3.3, we have λF
∗
n + (1− λ)G∗n
w→ λF + (1− λ)G.
Finally, noting that F ∗n , G
∗
n ∈ Mcon, the CxLS on Mcon implies that Ih(λF ∗n + (1 −
λ)G∗n) = Ih(F
∗
n) = b. Therefore, by Proposition 3.3.3 again,




n + (1− λ)G∗n) = b = Ih(F ) = Ih(G).
Hence, Ih has CxLS on Mdis.
3.7.2 Proofs in Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Fix an m ∈ N. The functional ρ can be written as ρ(·) =
h(f1(·), · · · , fm(·)), where h : Rm → Rd is an injective function and (fi)16i6m : M → R
has CxLS. For any F,G ∈ M that satisfy ρ(F ) = ρ(G), we have (f1(F ), · · · , fm(F )) =
(f1(G), · · · , fm(G)) by the fact that h is an injection. Because each fi has CxLS, then
(f1(λF + (1− λ)G), · · · , fm(λF + (1− λ)G)) = (f1(F ), · · · , fm(F )) for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. So
ρ(λF+(1−λ)G) = h(f1(λF+(1−λ)G), · · · , fm(λF+(1−λ)G)) = h(f1(F ), · · · , fm(F )) =
ρ(F ) = ρ(G) for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. We only need to show the “if” direction. For any F,G ∈M, if
(ρ1(F ), ρ2(F )) = (ρ1(G), ρ2(G)) = (r1, r2), then ρ2(λF + (1− λ)G) = r2 for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
Since ρ1 has CxLS on M(r2), ρ1(λF + (1 − λ)G) = r2 for any λ ∈ [0, 1], which means ρ1
has CxLS on M.
3.7.3 Proofs in Section 3.5
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2. In order to prove Theorem 3.5.2, we need the following technical
lemma, which connects the problem on dimension two with the result in dimension one.
64
















for some h1 and h2 ∈ H∗.
Proof of the lemma. Define h1, h2 : [0, 1] → R by h1(t) = h(t(1 − p)), t ∈ [0, 1] and
h2(t) = h(1−tp)−h(1), t ∈ [0, 1). Further, let h2(1) = limt↑1 h2(t), so that h2 is continuous
at t = 1. Clearly, h1, h2 ∈ H and (3.24) holds. We shall show h1, h2 ∈ H∗ below.
Let M+ = {F ∈ Mdis : F ((−∞, 0)) = 0} which is the set of distributions supported
on [0,∞). Further, let M∗ = {pδ0 + (1 − p)F : F ∈ M+}. Note that VaRp(F ) = 0 for
F ∈M∗ by definition. Therefore, by Proposition 3.4.2, Ih has CxLS onM∗. By definition
of Ih, for F ∈M+,
Ih(pδ0 + (1− p)F ) =
∫ ∞
0
h(1− (p+ (1− p)F (x))) dx =
∫ ∞
0
h1(1− F (x)) dx = Ih1(F ).
Note that in the above equation we treat the measure F as the corresponding cumulative
distribution function. Since Ih has CxLS on M∗, and there is a linear mapping between
M∗ and M+, we know that Ih1 has CxLS on M+.
For G ∈ Mdis, we can write G = TxF for some x ∈ R and F ∈ M+, where Tx is the
operator of left-shift by x ∈ R, that is, TxF (y) = F (y + x) for y ∈ R. By definition of
a signed Choquet integral (or, see Lemma 2.4 of Wang et al. (2018)), we have Ih1(G) =
Ih1(TxF ) = Ih1(F ) − xh1(1). Therefore, if G1, G2 ∈ Mdis satisfy Ih1(G1) = Ih2(G2), then
for some x ∈ R such that T−xG1, T−xG2 ∈ M+, we know Ih1(T−xG1) = Ih2(T−xG2). Since
Ih1 has CxLS on M+,
Ih1(λG1 + (1− λ)G2) = Ih1(λT−xG1 + (1− λ)T−xG2) + xh1(1)
= Ih1(T−xG1) + xh1(1) = Ih1(G1).
As a consequence, Ih1 has CxLS on Mdis. By Theorem 3.3.1, we know h1 ∈ H∗.
The statement for h2 is somehow more complicated as it is not symmetric to the case
of h1. Fix q ∈ (0, p), and letM− = {F ∈Mdis : F ((−∞, 0]) = 1}, gq(t) = h(1− tq)−h(1),
t ∈ [0, 1], and M∗q = {(1− q)δ0 + qF : F ∈M−}. Note that VaRp(F ) = 0 for F ∈M∗q by
definition. Therefore, by Proposition 3.4.2, Ih has CxLS on M∗q. Let ḡq(t) = gq(1 − t) −
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gq(1), t ∈ [0, 1]. Note that ḡq ∈ H and ḡq(1) = −gq(1). By definition of Ih, for F ∈M−,
Ih((1− q)δ0 + qF ) =
∫ 0
−∞




gq (F (x)) dx =
∫ 0
−∞
(ḡq (1− F (x))− ḡq(1)) dx = Iḡq(F ).
Since Ih has CxLS on M∗q, and there is a linear mapping between M∗q and M−, we know
that Igq has CxLS on M−. Following the similar arguments for h1, we obtain ḡq ∈ H∗.
Checking the three forms of functions in H∗, we know that gq ∈ H∗. Note that q is
arbitrarily chosen in (0, p), and h2(t) = gq(pt/q) = gtp(1) for t 6 q/p. If gq(1) = 0 for all
q ∈ (0, 1), then h2 is zero on (0, 1), thus h2 ∈ H∗1. Next, assume that there exists q0 ∈ (0, p)
such that gq0(1) = c 6= 0. There are four cases to analyze. If gq0 ∈ H∗1 and gq0(1−) = 0,
i.e. h2 is zero on (0, q0/p), then, by letting q vary in (q0, p), constrained by gq ∈ H∗, h2
must be equal to a constant d on (q0/p, 1) with dc > 0 and |d| > |c|, thus h2 ∈ H∗3. If
gq0 ∈ H∗1 and gq0(1−) 6= 0, i.e. h2 is a non-zero constant on (0, q0/p), then, by letting q
vary in (q0, p), constrained by gq ∈ H∗, h2 must be equal to c on (q0/p, 1), thus h2 ∈ H∗1.
If gq0 ∈ H∗2, i.e. h2 is linear on (0, q0/p), then, by letting q vary in (q0, p), constrained by
gq ∈ H∗, h2 must be linear on (0, 1), thus h2 ∈ H∗2. If gq0 ∈ H∗3, i.e. there is a jump of h2
in (0, q0/p), then, by letting q vary in (q0, p), constrained by gq ∈ H∗, h2 must be equal to
c on (q0/p, 1), thus h2 ∈ H∗3. In all cases, h2 ∈ H∗.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2 continued. For r ∈ R, denote by M(r) = {F ∈Mdis : VaRp(F ) =
r}. We first verify (Ih,VaRp) in cases (i)-(iv) indeed has CxLS.
(i) Both VaRp and Ih∗ have CxLS by Theorem 3.3.1. Hence, (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS as
justified by Proposition 3.4.1.
(ii) For F ∈M(r), using the ES-VaR formula of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002),
Ih(F ) = ar + b
∫ ∞
−∞







(x− r) dF (x)
)
.
Hence, Ih is linear for F ∈ M(r). So Ih has CxLS on M(r). By Proposition 3.4.2,
we know that (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS.
(iii) For F,G ∈ M(r), if Ih(F ) = Ih(G), then bVaR+p (F ) + c ess sup(F ) = bVaR+p (G) +
c ess sup(G). Without loss of generality, assume VaR+p (F ) > VaR
+
p (G), which implies
ess sup(F ) 6 ess sup(G) since bc > 0. Note that for λ ∈ (0, 1), since VaRp(F ) =
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VaRp(G) = VaRp(λF + (1 − λG)) = r, we have VaR+p (λF + (1 − λ)G) = VaR+p (G).
Therefore, for λ ∈ (0, 1).
bVaR+p (λF + (1− λ)G) + c ess sup(λF + (1− λ)G) = bVaR+p (G) + c ess sup(G).
Hence, Ih has CxLS on M(r). By Proposition 3.4.2, we know that (Ih,VaRp) has
CxLS.
(iv) For F,G ∈ M(r), if Ih(F ) = Ih(G), then bVaR+p (F ) + c ess inf(F ) = bVaR+p (G) +
c ess inf(G). Without loss of generality, assume VaR+p (F ) > VaR
+
p (G), which implies
ess inf(F ) > ess inf(G) since bc < 0. Note that for λ ∈ (0, 1), since VaRp(F ) =
VaRp(G) = VaRp(λF + (1 − λG)) = r, we have VaR+p (λF + (1 − λ)G) = VaR+p (G).
Therefore, for λ ∈ (0, 1).
bVaR+p (λF + (1− λ)G) + c ess inf(λF + (1− λ)G) = bVaR+p (G) + c ess inf(G).
Hence, Ih has CxLS on M(r). By Proposition 3.4.2, we know that (Ih,VaRp) has
CxLS.
Next, suppose that (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS, and we show that it has to be one of the cases
(i)-(iv). To simply notation, for p ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1], let





VaRt(F ) dt, F ∈M∞,
and
Qcp(F ) = c ess sup(F ) + (1− c)VaR+p (F ), F ∈M∞.




















1{t>1−p} = g1(t) + g2(t),
where g1(t) = h1(
t
1−p)1{t61−p} and g2(t) = (h2(
1−t
p
) + h(1))1{t>1−p}, t ∈ [0, 1]. Analyzing
all possible forms of Ig1 and Ig2 , we have
Ih = Ig1 + Ig2 = aVaRp + a1I + a2J,




p}, a, a1, a2 ∈ R, α ∈ [0, p), β ∈ (p, 1]
and c1, c2, c ∈ [0, 1]. Since (Ih,VaRp) has CxLS if and only if (Ih − aVaRp,VaRp) has
67
CxLS, we can freely set a = 0. Hence, we can write Ih = a1I + a2J . Without loss of
generality we assume a1 > 0; otherwise we can replace Ih by −Ih. There are a few cases
to analyze. Below, we use the fact that ES−p is a linear combination of ESp and E via
pES−p + (1− p)ESp = E.
(a) a1 = 0. The case J ∈ {VaRc2β ,VaR
+
p , ess sup} is included in case (i); the case J = ESp
is included in case (ii), and the case J = Qcp for c ∈ (0, 1) is included in case (iii).
(b) a2 = 0. The case I = VaR
c1
α is included in case (i) and I = ES
−
p is included in case (ii).
(c) a1 > 0, a2 > 0. We claim that if Ih has CxLS on M(0), then either (I, J) =
(ess inf, ess sup), included in case (i), or (I, J) = (ES−p ,ESp), included in case (ii).
Below we show our assertion.
First, suppose that I = VaRc1α . For ε ∈ (α, p), let F = εδ−a2 +(p−ε)δ0 +(1−p)δa1 and
G = δ0. We can easily calculate VaRp(F ) = VaRp(G) = 0, I(F ) = −a2, J(F ) = a1
and I(G) = J(G) = 0. Therefore, Ih(F ) = Ih(G) = 0. For λ ∈ [0, 1],
λF + (1− λ)G = λεδ−a2 + (1− λ+ λ(p− ε))δ0 + λ(1− p)δa1 .
If Ih has CxLS onM(0), then Ih(λF +(1−λ)G) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all ε ∈ (α, p).
Note that the function λ 7→ I(λF + (1 − λ)G) has a jump at λ1 = α/ε ∈ [0, 1),
and the function λ 7→ J(λF + (1 − λ)G) either has no jump (J = ESp), a jump at
λ2 = 1 (J = Q
c
p for c 6= 0), a jump at λ2 = 0 (J = ess sup = Q0p), or a jump at
λ2 = (1 − β)/(1 − p) (J = VaRcβ). Note that λ1 6= λ2 for almost every ε ∈ (α, p),
except for the case (α, c) = (0, 0). Hence, except for (I, J) = (ess inf, ess sup), the
function λ 7→ Ih(λF +(1−λ)G) does not take a constant value on [0, 1], and Ih cannot
have CxLS on M(0).
Next, suppose that I = ES−p . For ε ∈ (0, p), let F = εδ−a3 + (p− ε)δ0 + (1− p)δa1 and
G = δ0, where a3 = pa2/ε. We can easily calculate VaRp(F ) = VaRp(G) = 0, I(F ) =
−εa3/p = −a2, J(F ) = a1 and I(G) = J(G) = 0. Therefore, Ih(F ) = Ih(G) = 0. For
λ ∈ [0, 1],
λF + (1− λ)G = λεδ−a3 + (1− λ+ λ(p− ε))δ0 + λ(1− p)δa1 .
If Ih has CxLS on M(0), then Ih(λF + (1− λ)G) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the
function λ 7→ I(λF+(1−λ)G) has no jump whereas the function λ 7→ J(λG+(1−λ)F )
has a jump on [0, 1] except for J = ESp. Hence, except for J = ESp, the function
λ 7→ Ih(λF + (1 − λ)G) does not take a constant value on [0, 1], and Ih cannot have
CxLS on M(0).
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(d) a1 > 0, a2 < 0. We claim that if Ih has CxLS on M(0), then either (I, J) =
(ess inf,VaR+p ), included in case (iv), or (I, J) = (ES
−
p ,ESp), included in case (ii).
Below we show our assertion.
First, suppose that I = VaRc1α . For ε ∈ (α, p), let F = εδa2 + (1 − ε)δ0 and G =
pδ0 + (1 − p)δa1 . We can easily calculate VaRp(F ) = VaRp(G) = 0, I(F ) = a2,
J(F ) = 0, I(G) = 0 and J(G) = a1. Therefore, Ih(F ) = Ih(G) = a1a2. Note that, for
λ ∈ [0, 1],
λF + (1− λ)G = λεδa2 + (λ(1− ε) + (1− λ)p)δ0 + (1− λ)(1− p)δa1 .
If Ih has CxLS on M(0), then Ih(λF + (1 − λ)G) = a1a2 for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all
ε ∈ (α, p). Note that the function λ 7→ I(λF+(1−λ)G) has a jump at λ1 = α/ε ∈ [0, 1),
and the function λ 7→ J(λG + (1 − λ)F ) either has no jump (J = ESp), a jump at
λ2 = 1 (J = Q
c
p for c 6= 1), a jump at λ2 = 0 (J = VaR+p = Q1p), or a jump at
λ2 = 1 − (1 − β)/(1 − p) (J = VaRcβ). Note that λ1 6= λ2 for almost every ε ∈ (α, p),
except for the case (α, c) = (0, 1). Hence, except for (I, J) = (ess inf,VaR+p ), the
function λ 7→ Ih(λF +(1−λ)G) does not take a constant value on [0, 1], and Ih cannot
have CxLS on M(0).
Next, suppose that I = ES−p . For ε ∈ (0, p), let F = εδa3 + (1 − ε)δ0 and G =
pδ0 + (1− p)δa1 , where a3 = pa2/ε. We can easily calculate VaRp(F ) = VaRp(G) = 0,
I(F ) = εa3/p = a2, J(F ) = 0, I(G) = 0 and J(G) = a1. Therefore, Ih(F ) = Ih(G) =
a1a2. For λ ∈ [0, 1],
λF + (1− λ)G = λεδa3 + (λ(1− ε) + (1− λ)p)δ0 + (1− λ)(1− p)δa1 .
If Ih has CxLS on M(0), then Ih(λF + (1− λ)G) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the
function λ 7→ I(λF+(1−λ)G) has no jump whereas the function λ 7→ J(λG+(1−λ)F )
has a jump except for J = ESp. Hence, except for J = ESp, the function λ 7→
Ih(λF + (1− λ)G) does not take a constant value on [0, 1], and Ih cannot have CxLS
on M(0).
To summarize our findings in (a)-(d), all (Ih,VaRp) with CxLS are included in cases (i)-
(iv).
Proof of Proposition 3.5.3. By definition, it is easy to verify that Ih(F ) = Ih̄(F̄ ) and
VaRp(F ) = −VaR+1−p(F̄ ) for all F ∈ M (or, see Lemma 2.5 of Wang et al. (2018)).
Therefore, F,G ∈M satisfy (Ih(F ),VaRp(F )) = (Ih(G),VaRp(G)) if and only if F̄ , Ḡ ∈ M̄
satisfy (Ih̄(F̄ ),VaR
+
1−p(F̄ )) = (Ih̄(Ḡ),VaR
+
1−p(Ḡ)). Hence, the CxLS property of (Ih,VaRp)
on M and that of (Ih̄,VaR+1−p) on M̄ are equivalent.
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3.7.4 Proofs in Section 3.6




Observe that for any F ∈M, Fubini’s Theorem gives∫ ∞
−∞










Z(x, y) dF (y) dx.












Z(z, y) dF (y).
Since Z is a backtest function of ρ,∫ ∞
−∞
Z(z, y) dF (y) = 0 if and only if ρ(F ) = z,
and the following two inequalities hold,∫ ∞
−∞
Z(z, y) dF (y) <
∫ ∞
−∞
Z(ρ(F ), y) dF (y) = 0 for z < ρ(F ),
and ∫ ∞
−∞
Z(t, y) dF (y) >
∫ ∞
−∞
Z(ρ(F ), y) dF (y) = 0 for z > ρ(F ).
Thus,
∫∞
−∞ S(z, y) dF (y) achieves the global minimum at and only at ρ(F ) = z. Hence S
is strictly consistent for ρ and ρ is M-elicitable.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.3. For F ∈M, let z = cρ(F ), we have∫ ∞
−∞
Z∗(z, y) dF (y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(z/c, y) dF (y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(ρ(F ), y) dF (y) = 0.
For z1 < z2, if c > 0, we have z1/c < z2/c, and by the fact that Z is a backtest function
for ρ, we have ∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(z1/c, y) dF (y) <
∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(z2/c, y) dF (y).
If c < 0, we have z1/c > z2/c, and in this case,∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(z1/c, y) dF (y) <
∫ ∞
−∞
cZ(z2/c, y) dF (y).
In both cases, the function
∫
Z∗(z, y) dF (y) is strictly increasing in z. Therefore, Z∗ is a
backtest function for cρ.
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Proof of Proposition 3.6.4. Without loss of generality, we assume h(1) = 1. If h ∈ H∗1,
Ih = c ess sup +(1 − c) ess inf. We show that Ih is not backtestable based on an example
in Kou and Peng (2016), used to show that Ih is not elicitable (their definition is slightly
different from ours). Suppose Ih is backtestable and Z is a backtest function. For any
u, v ∈ R, u < v, we have Ih(δu) = u, and by definition of the backtest function,
Z(u, v) < Z(v, v) = 0 = Z(u, u) < Z(v, u). (3.25)
For v > u and p ∈ (0, 1), let G = pδu + (1 − p)δv, then Ih(G) = cv + (1 − c)u. If c = 0,




Z(u, y) dG(y) = pZ(u, u) + (1− p)Z(u, v) < 0,
a contradiction. If c ∈ (0, 1], by (3.25), as u < Ih(G),
0 = pZ(cv + (1− c)u, u) + (1− p)Z(cv + (1− c)u, v) > pZ(u, u) + (1− p)Z(u, v).
Letting p→ 1, we have
0 = Z(cv + (1− c)u, u) > Z(u, u),
a contradiction. In either case, Ih is not backtestable.
If h ∈ H∗2, one can easily check that it is backtestable with backtest function Z(x, y) =
x− y, x, y ∈ R. If h ∈ H∗3, then for some α ∈ (0, 1), Ih = VaR1−α onM∗con. One can easily
check that it is backtestable with backtest function Z(x, y) = α1{y>x} + (1 − α)1{y<x},
x, y ∈ R. The above two backtest functions can be found in Table 3 of Acerbi and
Szekely (2017). Finally, using Proposition 3.6.3 we get the backtest functions for the
signed Choquet integral Ih.
Proof of Theorem 3.6.5. In order to show Theorem 3.6.5, we need to use the following
lemma, as well as Proposition 3.6.6.
Lemma 3.7.4. For a comonotonic-additive coherent risk measure ρ : M∞ → R and
p ∈ (0, 1), if (ρ,VaRp) has CxLS on M∗∞(p), then it has CxLS on Mdis.
Proof of the lemma. Write ρ = Ih where h ∈ H is concave and increasing with h(1) = 1.
We first assume h is continuous. If h is not continuous, it can only have a jump at 0, and
we will comment on that case at the end of the proof.
For r ∈ R, denote by Mdis(r) = {F ∈ Mdis : VaRp(F ) = r} and M∗∞(p, r) = {F ∈
M∗∞(p) : VaRp(F ) = r}. By Proposition 3.4.2, to show that (ρ,VaRp) has CxLS on Mdis,
it suffices to show that ρ has CxLS on Mdis(r) for all r ∈ R.
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Fix r ∈ R and take F,G ∈Mdis(r) such that ρ(F ) = ρ(G). We construct two sequences
of distributions {Fn}n∈N ⊂M∗∞(p) and {Gn}n∈N ⊂M∗∞(p) as follows. Let εn = (1− p)/n,
n ∈ N. For n ∈ N, let F̂−1n (t) = F−1(t) for t ∈ [0, p] ∪ [p + εn, 1], and F̂−1n is linear on
[p, p + εn]. Similarly, let Ĝ
−1
n (t) = G
−1(t) for t ∈ [0, p] ∪ [p + εn, 1], and Ĝ−1n is linear
on [p, p + εn]. Note that the quantile function is always left-continuous by definition.
Next, let F−1n (t) = min{F̂−1n (t), F−1(t)}, t ∈ [0, 1] and G−1n (t) = min{Ĝ−1n (t), G−1(t)},
t ∈ [0, 1]. Since F−1 and G−1 may only have an up-side jump at p, and F̂n and Ĝn have
continuous quantiles at p, we know that Fn and Gn both have continuous quantiles at p,
i.e. {Fn}n∈N ⊂ M∗∞(p, r) and {Gn}n∈N ⊂ M∗∞(p, r). It is also easy to see that Fn → F
and Gn → G weakly.
Note that F−1n (t) = F
−1(t) for t close to 0 and 1, and hence {F−1n }n∈N is bounded above
and below. Therefore, the uniform integrability condition in Theorem 3.2 of Wang et al.
(2018) is satisfied, and we have ρ(Fn) → ρ(F ) as n → ∞. Similarly, ρ(Gn) → ρ(G) as
n→∞.
Let B be the Bernoulli distribution with mean c = (1 − p)/2. Since ρ > E, we know
that ρ(B) > c > 0. Further, since F−1n (t) 6 F
−1(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1], we know ρ(Fn) 6 ρ(F )
since a coherent risk measure is monotone with respect to stochastic order. For n ∈ N, let
F ∗n be given by
(F ∗n)
−1(t) = F−1n (t) + 1{t>1−c}
ρ(F )− ρ(Fn)
ρ(B)
, t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that (F ∗n)
−1 is increasing and left-continuous, thus a well-defined quantile function.
We can calculate, using the comonotonic-additivity of ρ, that





−1(p) = F−1n (p) = F
−1(p) = r. Therefore, {F ∗n}n∈N ⊂ M∗∞(p, r). On the
other hand, since ρ(Fn) → ρ(F ) as n → ∞, we have F ∗n → F weakly. Similarly, we can
construct {G∗n}n∈N ⊂M∗∞(p, r) such that ρ(G∗n) = ρ(G), n ∈ N, and G∗n → G weakly.
It is clear that λF ∗n +(1−λ)G∗n → λF +(1−λ)G weakly for λ ∈ [0, 1]. By noting again
the uniform integrability in the sense of Theorem 3.2 of Wang et al. (2018) is satisfied by
{λF ∗n + (1− λ)G∗n}n∈N, we have ρ(λF ∗n + (1− λ)G∗n)→ ρ(λF + (1− λ)G). Thus,
ρ(F ) = ρ(λF ∗n + (1− λ)G∗n)→ ρ(λF + (1− λ)G),
and hence ρ has CxLS on Mdis(r). This shows that (ρ,VaRp) has CxLS on Mdis.
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If h has a jump at 0, then ρ can be decomposed into a convex combination of ess sup
and Ig for a continuous and concave g ∈ H. Since F−1n (1) = F−1(1) and G−1n (1) = G−1(1),
this does not affect the arguments that ρ(Fn) → ρ(F ) and ρ(Gn) → ρ(G) as n → ∞, or
the construction of F ∗n and G
∗
n.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.6. Fix F ∈M∗∞(p). For x1, x2 ∈ R, let
H(x1, x2) =
∫∞




1−p(y − x1)+) dF (y). Both H
and G are clearly R-valued. Obviously,
H(x1, x2) = g(x2) + g
′(x2) (aG(x1) + (1− a)E[F ]− x2) .
Using the ES-VaR relation (3.1), and noting that F has a continuous quantile at p, we
have VaRp(F ) = arg minx1∈RG(x1) and ESp(F ) = minx1∈RG(x1). Hence, for fixed x2 ∈ R,
since af(x2) > 0, a minimizer of H(x1, x2) satisfies x1 = VaRp(F ). Note that
H(VaRp(F ), x2) = g(x2) + g
′(x2)(aESp(F ) + (1− a)E(F )− x2)
= g(x2) + g
′(x2)(ρ(F )− x2).
Since g is strictly concave, we have g(x2) + g
′(x2)(ρ(F ) − x2) > g(ρ(F )) for x2 ∈ R and
the equality is attained at x2 = ρ(F ). Therefore,




S(x1, x2, y) dF (y),
which shows that S is a strictly consistent function for (VaRp, ρ).
Proof of Theorem 3.6.5 continued. To show the “only-if” part, note that the elicitability
of (ρ,VaRp) implies that it has CxLS onM∗∞(p), and ρ is an increasing Choquet integral.
By Lemma 3.7.4, we know that (ρ,VaRp) has CxLS onM∗dis. Hence, we know that ρ is one
of the four cases in Theorem 3.5.2. Clearly, case (ii) gives a possible coherent risk measure
ρ of the form ρ = aESp + (1− a)E for a ∈ [0, 1], and all other forms of ρ in Theorem 3.5.2
are not coherent. The “if” part for a ∈ (0, 1] follows from Proposition 3.6.6, and the case




in Quantile-based Risk Sharing
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the existence and uniqueness of a risk sharing problem. It appears
in large part in the submitted paper Wang and Wei (2018a).
This chapter is organized in a straightforward manner. In Section 4.2 we present
preliminaries on quantile-based risk sharing, as well as some existing results. In Section 4.3,
we address the existence issue of optimal allocations by showing that optimal allocations
exist in exactly four cases (Theorem 4.3.3). Section 4.4 contains characterization results of
optimal allocations as well as some technical lemmas. In particular, Propositions 2 and 3
characterize the optimal allocations for RVaR agents based on explicit results in the cases
of VaR agents (Theorem 4.4.1), ES agents (Theorem 4.4.2), and one VaR plus one ES
agents (Theorem 4.4.5). Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by presenting a representative
class of optimal allocations and discusses some future questions.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Risk measures
Let (Ω,F ,P) be an atomless probability space, and X be the set of real, integrable
random variables (i.e. random variables with finite means) defined on (Ω,F ,P). We treat
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almost surely equal random variables as identical in this chapter; equalities, inequalities
and set inclusions should always be understood in the almost sure sense. A risk measure
is a functional ρ : X → [−∞,∞].
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of X ∈ X at level α ∈ R+ := [0,∞) is defined as the
100(1− α)% left quantile of X,
VaRα(X) = inf{x ∈ [−∞,∞] : P(X 6 x) > 1− α}. (4.1)
The corresponding right quantile is denoted by VaR+α , namely,
VaR+α (X) = inf{x ∈ [−∞,∞] : P(X 6 x) > 1− α}. (4.2)
In (4.1)-(4.2), we use the convention inf{∅} = ∞. Note that in (4.1), for α > 1,
VaRα(X) = −∞ for all X ∈ X . Certainly, only the case α ∈ [0, 1) is relevant in risk
management; in particular, practical values of α are close to 0 in banking and insurance
regulation.







VaRγ(X)dγ if β > 0,
VaRα(X) if β = 0.
(4.3)
For X ∈ X and α + β > 1, RVaRα,β(X) = −∞. Besides VaR, another special case of
RVaR is the Expected Shortfall (ES), defined as





VaRγ(X) dγ, β > 0.
Different from RVaR and VaR, an ES is subadditive.
Remark 4.2.1 (Terminological remark). There are several different conventions used in
the literature of risk measures. Some papers use the convention VaR1 = limα→1 VaRα,
which corresponds to our VaR+1 . The convention VaR1 = −∞ used in this chapter and
Embrechts et al. (2018) unifies several technical results. In different contexts, ES has
various alternative names, such as AVaR (Föllmer and Schied (2016)), CVaR (Rockafellar
and Uryasev (2000)) and TVaR (Denuit et al. (2005)).
A useful optimization property linking VaR and ES obtained by Rockafellar and Urya-
















E[(X − x)+] + x : x ∈ R
}
. (4.5)
The second parameter β in RVaRα,β is referred to as the tolerance parameter ; see the
discussions in Embrechts et al. (2018) after Theorem 2. RVaR was first introduced by
Cont et al. (2010) featuring its robustness properties (see Embrechts et al. (2018) for more
details on the family of RVaR). The RVaR family of risk measures provide a flexible and
tractable framework for the study of risk sharing, including the two most practical risk
measures as special cases. Following the setup of Embrechts et al. (2018), we shall focus
on the RVaR family of risk measures in this chapter. As far as we know, there are very
few results on risk sharing problems with other non-convex distortion risk measures; see
Weber (2018) for some available results.
4.2.2 Risk sharing and inf-convolution
Similarly to Embrechts et al. (2018), we refer to a participant in the risk sharing trans-
actions as an agent, which may represent an affiliate, a firm, an insured, an insurer, or
an investor in various specific contexts. Let n be a positive integer which represents the
number of agents. Given random variable X ∈ X , we define the set of allocations of X as
An(X) =
{






For i = 1, . . . , n, agent i is equipped with a risk measure ρi : X → R, which is the agent’s
objective to minimize. In this chapter, we consider Pareto-optimal allocations defined
below.
Definition 4.2.1 (Pareto-optimal allocations). Fix the risk measures ρ1, . . . , ρn and the
total risk X ∈ X . An allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) is Pareto-optimal with respect to
(ρ1, . . . , ρn) if for any allocation (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ An(X), ρi(Yi) 6 ρi(Xi) for all i = 1, . . . , n
implies ρi(Yi) = ρi(Xi) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Throughout, we shall simply call a Pareto-
optimal allocation an optimal allocation.
To study risk sharing problems for risk measures, define the inf-convolution of risk








ρi(Xi) : (X1, · · · , Xn) ∈ An(X)
}
, X ∈ X . (4.7)
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Our choices of ρ1, . . . , ρn in this chapter do not take the value −∞ on X and hence the
infimum in (4.7) is well posed. It is well-known that for monetary risk measures (Artzner
et al. (1999)) including the RVaR family, Pareto optimality is equivalent to optimality with
respect to the sum (Proposition 1 of Embrechts et al. (2018)). More precisely, assuming
that each of ρi(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n is finite, (X1, . . . , Xn) is a Pareto-optimal allocation of X








In the sequel, an allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) satisfying (4.8) is called a sum-optimal allo-
cation. We will omit “with respect to (ρ1, . . . , ρn)” in most cases as long as the underlying
risk measures are clear. As mentioned above, unless ni=1 ρi(X) is infinite, optimal alloca-
tions and sum-optimal ones are equivalent; see Lemma 4.3.1 and Remark 4.3.1 below for
more discussions on the subtle cases ni=1 ρi(X) = ±∞.
4.2.3 Existing results on optimal allocations
We first specify agents’ preferences in the risk sharing problems in this chapter. As
these preferences will be used throughout the chapter, we emphasize it in the following as-
sumption. Throughout, for any constants β1, . . . , βn ∈ R, write
∨n
i=1 βi = max{β1, . . . , βn}
and
∧n
i=1 βi = min{β1, . . . , βn}.
Assumption. Unless otherwise specified, all optimal allocations are with respect to the
risk measures (RVaRα1,β1 , . . . ,RVaRαn,βn), where αi ∈ [0, 1), βi ∈ [0, 1] and αi + βi 6 1,
i = 1, . . . , n.
We will always denote by α =
∑n
i=1 αi and β =
∨n
i=1 βi. The above specification of
parameters guarantees RVaRαi,βi(X) > −∞ for all X ∈ X . If the assumption is not
satisfied (i.e. αi + βi > 1 or αi = 1), then RVaRαi,βi(X) = −∞ for all X ∈ X , leading to a
trivial case.
Below we summarize the main results from Embrechts et al. (2018) on optimal allo-
cations. Let UX be a uniform random variable on [0, 1] such that F
−1(UX) = X almost
surely where F is the distribution function of the random variable X and F−1(p) = inf{x ∈
R : F (x) > p}, p ∈ (0, 1). If X is continuously distributed, then UX = F (X). For a gen-
eral random variable X, the existence of UX is guaranteed; see, for instance, Lemma A.32
of Föllmer and Schied (2016).
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RVaRαi,βi(X) = RVaRα,β(X), X ∈ X . (4.9)
Moreover, if p := α + β < 1, then, assuming (without loss of generality) βn = β, a
sum-optimal allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) of X ∈ X is given by
Xi = (X −m) 1{1−∑ik=1 αk<UX61−∑i−1k=1 αk}, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (4.10)
Xn = (X −m) 1{UX61−∑n−1k=1 αk} +m, (4.11)
where m ∈ (−∞,VaRp(X)] is a constant.
Theorem 4.2.1 implies the following useful inequality, which is given in Theorem 1 of










Theorem 4.2.1 and (4.12) will be used repeatedly in this chapter. It is clear that the above
results do not fully address the issue of existence, and no results on the unique forms of
optimal allocations are provided. In particular, the following questions are unanswered:
(i) Theorem 4.2.1 implies that a sum-optimal allocation exists if α+ β < 1, and it does
not exist if α + β > 1. Under what conditions a Pareto-optimal allocation exists?
(ii) When an optimal allocation exists, is it possible to identify all possible optimal allo-
cations (unique form up to certain freedom)?
This chapter is dedicated to complete answers to both questions above.
4.3 Existence of the optimal allocations
In this section, we analyze the existence of optimal allocations in a quantile-based
risk sharing problem. The main results are that Pareto-optimal and sum-optimality are
the equivalent for RVaR, unless α = β = 0, and the existence of a Pareto-optimal allo-
cation can be characterized in four cases (A1)-(A4) below depending on the parameters
α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn and the total risk X.
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In the sequel, for X ∈ X , we say that X is bounded from below (resp. above) if
VaR+1 (X) > −∞ (resp. VaR0(X) <∞). The following lemma clarifies the subtle difference
between optimal allocations and sum-optimal ones.
Lemma 4.3.1. For X ∈ X , the following hold.
(i) If RVaRα,β(X) =∞, there does not exist an optimal allocation, whereas all allocations
are sum-optimal.
(ii) If −∞ < RVaRα,β(X) <∞, an allocation is optimal if and only if it is sum-optimal.
(iii) If RVaRα,β(X) = −∞, there does not exist an optimal allocation or a sum-optimal
allocation.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (X1, . . . , Xn) is an optimal allocation. As
RVaRα,β(X) 6
∑n
i=1 RVaRαi,βi(Xi), at least one of RVaRαi,βi(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n is
equal to ∞. Without loss of generality, assume RVaRα1,β1(X1) =∞. If
RVaRα2,β2(X2) = ∞, then we take an allocation (X1 + X2, 0, X3 . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X).
It is clear that RVaRα1,β1(X1 +X2) 6∞ = RVaRα1,β1(X1) and RVaRα2,β2(0) <∞ =
RVaRα2,β2(X2). Hence, (X1, . . . , Xn) is not Pareto-optimal. If RVaRα2,β2(X2) < ∞,
then we take an allocation (X1 + c,X2 − c,X3, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) for some c > 0.
It is clear that RVaRα1,β1(X1 + c) = ∞ = RVaRα1,β1(X1) and RVaRα2,β2(X2 − c) <
RVaRα2,β2(X2). Hence, (X1, . . . , Xn) is not Pareto-optimal.
On the other hand, as RVaRα,β(X) = ni=1 RVaRαi,βi(X) =∞, any choice of
(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) satisfies
∑n
i=1 RVaRαi,βi(Xi) = ∞, and hence it is a sum-
optimal allocation.
(ii) This is due to Proposition 1 of Embrechts et al. (2018).
(iii) Note that for our choices of parameters, RVaRαi,βi does not take the value −∞.
Suppose that (Y1, · · · , Yn) is an optimal allocation. Since RVaRα,β(X) = −∞, there





Then at least one RVaRαi,βi(Xi) < RVaRαi,βi(Yi). Without loss of generality, assume
RVaRα1,β1(X1) < RVaRα1,β1(Y1). Let ci = RVaRαi,βi(Xi) − RVaRαi,βi(Yi) for i =

















This means that (X1 +
∑n
i=2 ci, X2 − c2, · · · , Xn − cn) ∈ An(X) strictly dominates
(Y1, · · · , Yn), and the latter is not Pareto-optimal.
On the other hand, since for i = 1, . . . , n, RVaRαi,βi does not take the value −∞,
one always have, for any (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X),
∑n
i=1 RVaRαi,βi(Xi) > −∞ =
ni=1 RVaRαi,βi(X). Therefore, no sum-optimal allocations exist.
Remark 4.3.1. The only possible difference between an optimal allocation and a sum-
optimal one is case (i) in Lemma 4.3.1. More precisely, it corresponds to α = β = 0
(implying α1 = · · · = αn = β1 = · · · = βn = 0) and VaR0(X) = ∞. As any allocation
(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) is sum-optimal in this case and no Pareto-optimal allocation exists,
it is not interesting for further study.
Lemma 4.3.1 implies that, unless α = β = 0 and X is unbounded from above, there
is no difference between optimal allocation and sum-optimal ones. By (4.8) and Theorem
4.2.1, an allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) is optimal if and only if
n∑
i=1
RVaRαi,βi(Xi) = RVaRα,β(X) and RVaRα,β(X) <∞.
Below we illustrate four cases where an optimal allocation can be explicitly formulated:
(A1) α = β = 0 and X is bounded from above;
(A2) 0 < α + β < 1;
(A3) α + β = 1, β > 0 and X is bounded from below;
(A4) α + β = 1, β > 0 and there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that αi = α and βi = β.
To describe the corresponding optimal allocations under (A1)-(A4), assume, without loss
of generality, βn = β, i.e. βn is the largest among β1, . . . , βn.
Case (A1): A sum-optimal allocation is provided by (4.10) and (4.11) in Theorem 4.2.1,
which is optimal by Lemma 4.3.1 (ii) due to −∞ < RVaRα,β(X) <∞.
Case (A2): Same as Case (A1).
Case (A3): Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be given by (4.10) and (4.11), where m = VaR
+
1 (X). One
can check that RVaRαi,βi(Xi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and RVaRαn,βn(Xn) =
RVaRα,β(X), and hence
∑n
i=1 RVaRαi,βi(Xi) = RVaRα,β(X), i.e. (X1, . . . , Xn)
is a sum-optimal allocation.
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Case (A4): Let Xi = X and Xj = 0 for j 6= i. Recall that our specification of (αi, βi)
guarantees αi+βi 6 1 and αi < 1; thus RVaRαi,βi(X) > −∞. We can easily see∑n
i=1 RVaRαi,βi(Xi) = RVaRα,β(X), and hence (X1, . . . , Xn) is a sum-optimal
allocation.
In all four cases, since RVaRα,β(X) <∞, sum-optimal allocations are optimal.
Note that condition (A4) implies αj = 0 for j 6= i and in fact all other agents are
essentially not participating in the risk sharing transactions except for agent i, because
they have very conservative risk attitude (each of them uses an ES with a smaller tolerance
parameter βj compared to βi). Obviously, this case is very special and not very practically
relevant.
Next, we shall show that (A1)-(A4) are precisely the only possible cases where an
optimal allocation may exist. We first present a lemma on the sum of a VaR and an ES,
which may be of independent interest.
Lemma 4.3.2. For α ∈ (0, 1) and X, Y ∈ X such that X + Y is unbounded from below,
we have
VaRα(X) + ES1−α(Y ) > RVaRα,1−α(X + Y ). (4.13)
Proof. Since one can freely replace X by X+c for any constant c ∈ R in (4.13), without loss
of generality we assume VaRα(X) = 0. It suffices to show ES1−α(Z −X) > RVaRα,1−α(Z)
for all X,Z ∈ X such that Z is unbounded from below and VaRα(X) = 0. Note that
ES1−α(Z − X) > ES1−α(Z − X+), and VaRα(X) = 0 can be loosened to VaRα(X) > 0,
which is equivalent to P(X > 0) 6 α. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it suffices to show
ES1−α(Z −X) > RVaRα,1−α(Z) (4.14)
for all X,Z ∈ X such that X > 0, P(X > 0) 6 α and Z is unbounded from below.
Fix arbitrary X,Z ∈ X satisfying the above conditions. Write Y = Z−X and note that
P(Z = Y ) > 1− α. As a consequence, for all x ∈ R, P(Y 6 x)− P(Z 6 x) 6 α. Using the
above relation and the definition of VaR, for γ 6 1− α, we have VaRγ(Y ) > VaRγ+α(Z).
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VaRγ(Z) dγ = RVaRα,1−α(Z), (4.15)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that Z is unbounded from below and VaR1−α(Y )
is a constant. Therefore, (4.14) holds and the proof is complete.
Remark 4.3.2. The condition that X + Y is unbounded from below is essential to the
statement of Lemma 4.3.2. In fact, from the proof of Lemma 4.3.2 we can see that, if
Z is bounded from below, then one can choose X such that VaR1−α(Y ) is small enough
so that the last inequality in (4.15) is an equality, leading to VaRα(X) + ES1−α(Y ) >
RVaRα,1−α(X + Y ), a special case of the inequality (4.12).
Remark 4.3.3. Obtained from the definition of RVaR, for any random variable Z, one has
RVaRα,1−α(Z) = −ES1−α(−Z).
Therefore, Lemma 4.3.2 is equivalent to the following statement: For any α ∈ (0, 1) and
(X, Y, Z) ∈ A3(0) with Z unbounded from above,
VaRα(X) + ES1−α(Y ) + ES1−α(−Z) > 0.
With the help of Lemma 4.3.2, we are ready to give a full characterization of the
existence of an optimal allocation.
Theorem 4.3.3. For X ∈ X , an optimal allocation exists if and only if one of (A1)-(A4)
holds.
Proof. As explicitly constructed above, under each of the conditions (A1)-(A4), an optimal
allocation exists. We only need to show that no optimal allocation exists when none of
(A1)-(A4) holds. First, note that if α + β > 1, α = 1, or RVaRα,β(X) = ∞, no optimal
allocation may exist according to Lemma 4.3.1. Hence, we only need to consider the case
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where α + β = 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). As (A3) does not hold, X is unbounded from below.
Furthermore, α+ β = 1 and (A4) does not hold, we have αi + βi < 1 for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Take an arbitrary (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X). For i = 1, . . . , n, we assert that there exists
(Yi, Zi) ∈ A2(Xi) such that
VaRαi(Yi) + ESβi(Zi) = RVaRαi,βi(Xi).
This assertion is shown by noticing the fact that, for the risk sharing problem of two agents
with VaRαi and ESβi as their preferences, an optimal allocation always exists, because
condition (A2) is satisfied for this problem. Write Y =
∑n












ESβi(Zi) > VaRα(Y ) + ESβ(Z) > RVaRα,β(X),
where the first inequality is an application of (4.12) and the second inequality is due to
Lemma 4.3.2 by noting that X is unbounded from below, Y + Z = X, and α + β = 1.
Therefore, no optimal allocation exists if none of (A1)-(A4) holds.
Note that the cases (A1)-(A3) are mutually exclusive, but (A4) may overlap with (A3).
To obtain mutually exclusive cases, one can replace (A4) by
(A4’) α+ β = 1, β > 0, X is unbounded from below, and there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that αi = α and βi = β.
With this modification, Theorem 4.3.3 reads as, for X ∈ X , an optimal allocation exists if
and only if precisely one of (A1)-(A3) and (A4’) holds.
4.4 Characterizing optimal allocations
4.4.1 The route and notation
In this section, we characterize all optimal allocations in a quantile-based risk sharing
problem. We first make an intuitive statement. Due to the fact that each risk measure in
the RVaR family ignores part of the distribution, one might naturally expect that the class
of optimal allocations has a lot of freedom. As we shall see in this section, this is indeed
the case.
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We outline the key ideas behind our main results. In order to characterize optimal allo-




















Intuitively, a risk sharing problem for RVaR agents may be decomposed into two steps:
first, allocate X to (Y, Z) ∈ A2(X) such that RVaRα,β(X) = VaRα(Y ) + ESβ(Z), and
second, allocate Y and Z to (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ An(Y ) and (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ An(Z) such that∑n
i=1 VaRαi(Yi) = VaRα(Y ) and
∑n
i=1 ESαi(Zi) = ESβ(Z). If all of the above allocations
exist, then by letting Xi = Yi + Zi, i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain an optimal allocation for the
RVaR agents. Note that the above allocations are optimal with respect to the corresponding
risk sharing problems, namely, the case of one VaR and one ES agent, the case of n VaR
agents, and the case of n ES agents.
Following the above plan, we analyze the special case α = β = 0 in Section 4.4.2, the
case of n VaR agents (β = 0) in Section 4.4.3 and the case of n ES agents (α = 0) in Section
4.4.4. In Section 4.4.5, we study the case of one VaR agent and one ES agent. Finally, in
Propositions 2 and 3 in Section 4.4.6, we characterize optimal allocations for RVaR agents
based on the above two-step decomposition and the results obtained in Sections 4.4.2-4.4.5.
The following notation will be useful in this section. For a set A ∈ F , let πn(A) be the
set of n-partitions of A in Fn, namely,
πn(A) =
{
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ Fn :
n⋃
i=1
Ai = A, and A1, . . . , An are mutually disjoint
}
.
Let A+n (X) (resp. A−n (X)) be the set of non-negative (resp. non-positive) allocations of a
random variable X, namely,
A+n (X) = {(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) : Xi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n}, X > 0,
and
A−n (X) = {(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) : Xi 6 0, i = 1, . . . , n}, X 6 0.
For a constant x, let Acn(x) be the set of constant allocations, namely,
Acn(x) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn : x1 + · · ·+ xn = x}, x ∈ R.
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To simplify the notation, for a specified X, we always write yα = VaRα(X) and y
+
α =
VaR+α (X) for α ∈ [0, 1]. For given α1, . . . , αn > 0, if yα ∈ R, let
Zn =
{
(Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ X n : Zi > 0, P(Zi > 0) 6 αi, i = 1, . . . , n and
n∑
i=1
Zi > (X − yα)+
}
.
We can verify that Zn is non-empty since P((X − yα)+ > 0) 6 α.
4.4.2 The special case of essential supremum agents
We first consider the special case where α1 = · · · = αn = β1 = · · · = βn = 0, cor-
responding to Case (A1) in Section 4.3. In this case an optimal allocation exists if and
only if y0 < ∞, according to Theorem 4.3.3. This special case is obviously the simplest,
and it is treated separately since its solution form is different from any of the later, more
complicated, cases.
Proposition 1. Suppose that α = β = 0, X ∈ X , and y0 < ∞. (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ X n is an
optimal allocation of X if and only if
Xi = Yi + ci, i = 1, . . . , n (4.17)
for some (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (X − y0) and (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Acn(y0).
Proof. Recall that by Theorem 4.2.1, (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ An(X) is optimal if and only if∑n





i=1 VaR0(ci) = y0. It remains to show that any optimal alloca-
tion (X1, . . . , Xn) admits the form (4.17). Note that
∑n
i=1 VaR0(Xi) = y0 < ∞ implies
VaR0(Xi) < ∞ for each i = 1, . . . , n. Take ci = VaR0(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n. It is clear that∑n
i=1(Xi − ci) = X − y0 and hence (4.17) holds by taking Yi = Xi − ci, i = 1, . . . , n.
4.4.3 VaR agents
We consider the case where β1 = · · · = βn = 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), that is, the objective
of each agent is a VaR. In this case, by Theorem 4.3.3, an optimal allocation exists if and
only if α =
∑n
i=1 αi is less than 1, i.e. (A2) holds. We introduce the following class of
allocations. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be given by
Xi = Zi + Yi + ci, i = 1, . . . , n,
where (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ Zn, (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (X − yα −
∑n
i=1 Zi) and (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Acn(yα).
(4.18)
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We assert that (4.18) gives a properly defined allocation of X by verifying a few facts:
1. As we have seen above, Zn is non-empty.
2. Since
∑n
i=1 Zi > (X − yα)+, we have X − yα−
∑n
i=1 Zi 6 0, and hence A−n (X − yα−∑n
i=1 Zi) is non-empty.
3. It is easy to see
∑n
i=1Xi = X for all choices of (Z1, . . . , Zn), (Y1, . . . , Yn) and
(c1, . . . , cn) in (4.18).
Below we show the optimality of (4.18) and that any optimal allocation of X has the form
(4.18).
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume β = 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). For X ∈ X , (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ X n is an
optimal allocation of X if and only if it has the form (4.18).
Proof. We first show the “if” part. For i = 1, . . . , n, we have







ci = yα = VaRα(X).
Using Theorem 4.2.1, we have
n∑
i=1








Noting that sum-optimality is equivalent to Pareto-optimality, we conclude that (X1, . . . , Xn)
is optimal.
Next we show the “only-if” part in two steps.
(i) Let Y ∈ X be such that VaRα(Y ) = 0 and (X1, . . . , Xn) be an optimal allocation of
Y such that VaRαi(Xi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. Write
Xi = 1{Xi>0}Xi + 1{Xi60}Xi, i = 1, . . . , n.
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Write Zi = Xi1{Xi>0}, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that P(Zi > 0) = P(Xi > 0) 6 αi since



















and Yi = 1{Xi60}Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. Since X1 + · · · + Xn = Y , we have (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈
A−n (Y −
∑n
i=1 Zi). Therefore, we have
Xi = Zi + Yi, i = 1, . . . , n
for some Z1, . . . , Zn and Y1, . . . , Yn satisfying P(Zi > 0) 6 αi, i = 1, . . . , n,
∑n
i=1 Zi >
Y+, and (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (Y −
∑n
i=1 Zi).
(ii) Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be an optimal allocation of X. Recall the notation yα = VaRα(X)
and we further write xi = VaRαi(X), i = 1, . . . , n. Note that by Theorem 4.2.1,








VaRαi(Xi − xi) = yα −
n∑
i=1
xi = VaRα(X − yα)
⇒ (X1 − x1, . . . , Xn − xn) is an optimal allocation of X − yα.
Therefore, (X1 − x1, . . . , Xn − xn) is an optimal allocation of X − yα. Observing
VaRα(X − yα) = 0 and VaRαi(Xi − xi) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, by letting Y = X − yα in
part (i), we obtain
Xi − xi = Zi + Yi, i = 1, . . . , n
where (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ Zn and (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (X − yα −
∑n
i=1 Zi). Therefore,
(X1, . . . , Xn) has the form in (4.18).
Assuming β1 = · · · = βn = 0, the optimal allocation (4.10)-(4.11) in Embrechts et al.
(2018) is a special case of (4.18), by taking Zi = (X −m)1{1−∑ik=1 αk<UX61−∑i−1k=1 αk}, i =
1, . . . , n, Y1 = · · · = Yn−1 = 0, Yn = (X−m)1{UX61−∑nk=1 αk}+m−yα, c1 = · · · = cn−1 = 0,
and cn = yα.
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Remark 4.4.1. If P(X > yα) = α, which is satisfied by all X with a continuous distribution
function, then for any (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ Zn, we have
Zi = Z1Ai a.s., i = 1, . . . , n
for some Z > (X − yα)+, (A1, . . . , An) ∈ πn({X > yα}) with P(Ai) = αi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that the random vector (Z1, . . . , Zn) is mutually exclusive (or pair-wise countermono-
tonic; see Section 3.2 of Puccetti and Wang (2015)), showing a strongest form of negative
dependence. Theorem 4.4.1 is the first result showing that an optimal allocation for VaR
agents has to have a mutually exclusive part, whereas in the literature (Embrechts et al.
(2018, 2019)) we only know that some optimal allocations for VaR agents have a mutually
exclusive part.
4.4.4 ES agents
Next, we consider the case where α1 = · · · = αn = 0 and β > 0, that is, the objective
of each agent is an ES. In this case, by Theorem 4.3.3, an optimal allocation exists for
β ∈ (0, 1] since (A2) holds in case β ∈ (0, 1) and (A4) holds in case β = 1. We introduce
the following class of allocations. Let J = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : βi = β}, that is, J is the set of
agents with the largest tolerance parameter. If 0 < β < 1, let (X1, . . . , Xn) be given by
Xi = Zi1{i∈J} + Yi + ci, i = 1, . . . , n,
where x ∈ [yβ, y+β ], (Zi)i∈J ∈ A
+
#J((X − x)+), (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (−(x−X)+),
and (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Acn(x).
(4.19)
If β = 1, let (X1, . . . , Xn) be given by
Xi = Zi1{i∈J} + ci, i = 1, . . . , n,
where (Zi)i∈J ∈ A#J(X), and (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Acn(0).
(4.20)
Below we show the optimality of (4.19)-(4.20) and that any optimal allocation of X has
the forms (4.19)-(4.20).
Theorem 4.4.2. Assume α = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1]. For X ∈ X , (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ X n is an
optimal allocation of X if and only if it has the form (4.19)-(4.20).
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Proof. We first show the “if” part. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be an optimal allocation of X. If











































E[(Zi)+] + x =
1
β
E[(X − x)+] + x = ESβ(X),
















ci = E[(X − x)+] + x = E[X] = ESβ(X).
In both cases, (X1, ..., Xn) is optimal.
Next we show the “only-if” part. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be an optimal allocation of X. By
Theorem 4.2.1, this means
n∑
i=1
ESβi(Xi) = ESβ(X). (4.21)





























































































































































Note that the equalities of expectations in (4.22) and (4.23) are indeed almost surely
point-wise equality.
Next, write x =
∑n
i=1 xi, Zi = (Xi − xi)+ and Yi = −(xi − Xi)+ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Recall that we treat almost equal random variables as identical. By (4.22), we have






(Xi − xi)+ =
n∑
i=1








= (X − x)+.
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Consequently, (Zi)i∈J ∈ A+#J((X − x)+). Since
∑n
i=1Xi = X, we have
n∑
i=1
Yi = X −
n∑
i=1
Zi − x = X − x− (X − x)+ = −(x−X)+,
which gives (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ A−n (−(x−X)+). By (4.24) and using the VaR-ES relation
(4.5), we have x ∈ [yβ, y+β ]. Note that Xi = (Xi−xi)+− (xi−Xi)+ +xi = Zi+Yi+xi
for i = 1, . . . , n and Zi = 0 for i 6∈ J . Therefore, (X1, . . . , Xn) has the form (4.19).
(ii) Assume β = 1. Equation (4.21) reads as
n∑
i=1




Note that for Y ∈ X and γ ∈ [0, 1), ESγ(Y ) > E[Y ] holds, and ESγ(Y ) = E[Y ] if and
only if Y is a constant. Therefore, Xi is a constant for all i 6∈ J . This leads to the
conclusion that (X1, . . . , Xn) has the form (4.20).
Remark 4.4.2. It is trivial to observe that, if there is only one agent whose tolerance pa-
rameter is the largest, that is, #J = 1, then (Z1, . . . , Zn) is mutually exclusive. Combined
with the observation in Remark 4.4.1, in both the case of ES agents and that of VaR
agents, (X1, . . . , Xn) is mutually exclusive on an event that X is large. We will continue
discussing this phenomenon in Section 4.5.1.
4.4.5 One VaR agent and one ES agent
We move on to consider the combined case of one VaR agent and one ES agent. For
this purpose, assume n = 2, α1 > 0, β1 = α2 = 0, and β2 > 0. Recall that α = α1 and
β = β2. According to Theorem 4.3.3, for a fixed X ∈ X , there are two cases where an
optimal allocation exists: either (A2) α+β < 1 or (A3) α+β = 1 and X is bounded from
below. In both cases, y+α+β > −∞. To characterize all optimal allocations, we define the
following set
Aα,β = {A ∈ F : {X > yα} ⊂ A, P(A) = α; moreover, A ⊂ {X > yα} if y+α+β 6= yα}.
In the above notation we omit the reliance on X, which should be clear throughout this
section. It is easy to see that Aα,β is non-empty as P(X > yα) 6 α 6 P(X > yα).
A set A in Aα,β represents an event of probability α on which X takes the largest
values. It is clear that, A = {X > yα} if P(X > yα) = α, and {X > yα} ⊂ A ⊂ {X > yα}
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if y+α+β < yα. A small complication arises when P(X > yα) 6= α and y
+
α+β = yα, in which
case A \ {X > yα} can be arbitrary as long as P(A) = α. The reason for this complication
can be seen from the proof of Lemma 4.4.3, where an optimization for ES relies on the set
Aα,β. For risk management practice such a special case is irrelevant; it is included in our
main results for the completeness of this study.
We first present two lemmas useful in characterizing the optimal allocations, and they
may be of independent interest in optimizing ES.
Lemma 4.4.3. For any X ∈ X , α > 0 and β > 0 with α + β 6 1 and y+α+β > −∞,
(Y,B) ∈ X × F is a solution to the problem
to minimize ESβ(X − Y 1B) subject to B ∈ F , P(B) = α and Y ∈ X , (4.25)
if and only if B ∈ Aα,β and Y 1B > (X − y+α+β)1B. Moreover, the minimum of (4.25) is
RVaRα,β(X).
Proof. We first show the “if” part. Note that by Theorem 4.2.1, for any B ∈ F , P(B) = α
and Y ∈ X ,
RVaRα,β(X) 6 VaRα(Y 1B) + ESβ(X − Y 1B) 6 ESβ(X − Y 1B).
Suppose B ∈ Aα,β and Y 1B > (X − y+α+β)1B. We have











VaRγ−α(X − (X − y+α+β)1B) dγ.
In both the case y+α+β < yα and the case y
+
α+β = yα, we have VaRγ−α(X− (X−y
+
α+β)1B) 6
VaRγ(X) holds for γ ∈ [α, α+β). Hence, ESβ(X −Y 1B) 6 RVaRα,β(X). This shows that
(Y,B) satisfying B ∈ Aα,β and Y 1B > (X − y+α+β)1B minimizes (4.25). Moreover, the
corresponding minimum is ESβ(X − Y 1B) = RVaRα,β(X).
We next show the “only-if” direction. Suppose that (Y,B) is such that ESβ(X−Y 1B) =
RVaRα,β(X), namely,∫ β
α





Observe that for γ ∈ (α, α + β),
VaRγ−α(X−Y 1B) > VaRγ−α(X−Y 1B) + VaRα(Y 1B) > VaRγ−αVaRα(X) = VaRγ(X).
To make (4.26) hold, we need VaRγ−α(X − Y 1B) = VaRγ(X) for γ ∈ (α, α + β) a.e. By
the right-continuity of the left-quantile (VaR), this requires
VaRγ−α(X − Y 1B) = VaRγ(X) (4.27)
holds for γ ∈ [α, α + β).
Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that P(Y < X − y+α+β|B) > 0. Then,





As a consequence, there exists some γ ∈ (α, α + β) such that VaRγ−α(X − Y 1B) >
VaRγ−α(X − (X − y+α+β)1B). It follows that
VaRγ−α(X − Y 1B) > VaRγ−α
(











contradicting (4.27). Therefore, we have P(Y < X − y+α+β|B) = 0, namely, Y 1B >
(X − y+α+β)1B.
Next we show B ∈ Aα,β. Note that we treat two sets as equal if the difference of the
two sets is of measure zero. Equation (4.27) implies P(X −Y 1B 6 VaRγ(X)) > 1− γ+α.
Taking γ = α, we have P(X − Y 1B 6 VaRα(X)) = 1. This implies {X > VaRα} ⊂ B.
It remains to show B ⊂ {X > VaRα(X)} if y+α+β 6= yα. Take (Y ∗, B∗) ∈ X × F such
that B∗ ∈ Aα,β and Y ∗1B∗ > (X − y+α+β)1B∗ . From the first part of the proof, we know
that (Y ∗, B∗) minimizes (4.25). Since (Y,B) also minimizes (4.25), by (4.27), we know
VaRγ−α(X − Y 1B) = VaRγ−α(X − Y ∗1B∗) = VaRγ(X),
for γ ∈ [α, α + β). Since y+α+β < yα, the above equation implies
P(X − Y 1B > yα) = P(X − Y ∗1B∗ > yα). (4.28)
Since Y 1B > (X−y+α+β)1B and Y ∗1B∗ > (X−y
+
α+β)1B∗ , P(X−Y > yα, B) = P(X−Y ∗ >
yα, B
∗) = 0. Using this relation and noting that B∗ ⊂ {X > yα}, (4.28) implies
P(X > yα, Bc) = P(X > yα, (B∗)c) = P(X > yα)− P(B∗) = P(X > yα)− α
= P(X > yα)− P(B).
Therefore, B ⊂ {X > yα}. This shows B ∈ Aα,β.
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Lemma 4.4.4. For any X, Y ∈ X with Y > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), ESβ(X + Y ) = ESβ(X) if
and only if Y 6 (VaR+β (X)−X)+.
Proof. We first show the “if” direction. Note that
X + Y 6 X + (VaR+β (X)−X)+ = X ∨ VaR
+
β (X).
It is easy to see, for γ ∈ (0, β), that
VaRγ(X ∨ VaR+β (X)) = VaRγ(X).
Therefore, ESβ(X) = ESβ(X∨VaR+β (X)) > ESp(X+Y ), which implies ESβ(X) = ESβ(X+
Y ).











VaR+γ (X + Y ) dγ = ESβ(X + Y ),
and VaR+γ (X) 6 VaR
+
γ (X + Y ) for all γ ∈ (0, β], we have VaR+γ (X) = VaR+γ (X + Y )
a.e. on (0, β). Since VaR+γ (Z) is left-continuous in γ for any fixed Z ∈ X , VaR+γ (X) =
VaR+γ (X + Y ) holds for all γ ∈ (0, β]. Using the VaR-ES relation (4.4), it follows that
E
[(











Since Y > 0, (4.29) means(









and therefore Y 6 (VaR+β (X)−X)+.
Now we are ready to characterize the optimal allocations in the setting of this section.
Let (X1, X2) be given by
X1 = Y 1B − Z + c, X2 = X −X1
where B ∈ Aα,β, Y > X − y+α+β, 0 6 Z 6 (y
+
α+β −X + Y 1B)+, and c ∈ R.
(4.30)
Theorem 4.4.5. Assume α1 > 0, β1 = α2 = 0, β2 > 0, and either (A2) or (A3) holds.
For X ∈ X , (X1, X2) ∈ X 2 is an optimal allocation of X if and only if it has the form
(4.30).
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Proof. Obviously, the constant c does not matter in terms of the optimality of (X1, X2),
and we set c = 0 for simplicity.
We first show that (4.30) gives an optimal allocation. It is easy to verify that
VaRα(X1) = VaRα(Y 1B − Z) 6 VaRα(Y 1B) = 0.
Using Lemmas 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, and noting that VaR+β (X − Y 1B) = y
+
α+β as implied by
(4.27), we have
ESβ(X2) = ESβ(X − Y 1B + Z) = ESβ(X − Y 1B) = RVaRα,β(X).
Therefore, (X1, X2) is an optimal allocation.
Next, suppose that (X1, X2) is an optimal allocation. Without loss of generality, assume
VaRα(X1) = 0, which implies P(X1 > 0) > α > P(X1 > 0). Therefore, there exists B ∈ F
such that {X1 > 0} ⊂ B ⊂ {X1 > 0} with P(B) = α. Write X1 = X11B − Z where
Z = −X11Bc . Note that Z = −X11Bc > 0. Since (X1, X2) is an optimal allocation, we
know
RVaRα,β(X) = VaRα(X1) + ESβ(X2) = ESβ(X −X11B + Z) > ESβ(X −X11B).
From Lemma 4.4.3, we know that (X1, B) minimizes (4.25). The results of Lemma 4.4.3
imply B ∈ Aα,β, X11B > (X − y+α+β)1B, and
RVaRα,β(X) = ESβ(X −X11B) = ESβ(X −X11B + Z).
Using Lemma 4.4.4, we have Z 6 (y+α+β −X +X11B)+. Let Y = X11B + (X − y
+
α+β)1Bc .
It is clear that Y 1B = X11B, Y > X − y+α+β. Therefore, X1 = X11B +X11Bc = Y 1B −Z,
which has the form (4.30).
4.4.6 RVaR agents
Finally, based on the results in Sections 4.4.2-4.4.5, we are able to present some general
result for in the case of RVaR agents. The main idea here is that, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we
write RVaRαi,βi = VaRαiESβi , and reduce the risk sharing problem to the above studied
cases. We summarize this methodology in the following proposition. Since we need to
translate between different cases, below we emphasize the risk measures with respect to
which we speak of optimality. The case (A4’) requires a special treatment which will be
discussed later.
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Proposition 2. Assume (A4’) does not hold. (X1, . . . , Xn) is an optimal allocation of
X ∈ X with respect to (RVaRα1,β1 , . . . ,RVaRαn,βn) if and only if there exist an optimal
allocation (Y, Z) of X with respect to (VaRα,ESβ), an optimal allocation (Y1, . . . , Yn) of
Y with respect to (VaRα1 , . . . ,VaRαn), and an optimal allocation (Z1, . . . , Zn) of Z with
respect to (ESβ1 , . . . ,ESβn), such that
Xi = Yi + Zi, i = 1, . . . , n.


















= VaRα(Y ) + ESβ(Z) = RVaRα,β(X).
Therefore, (X1, . . . , Xn) is an optimal allocation of X with respect to
(RVaRα1,β1 , . . . ,RVaRαn,βn). Next we show the “only-if” part. Suppose that (X1, . . . , Xn)
is an optimal allocation of X with respect to (RVaRα1,β1 , . . . ,RVaRαn,βn).
Since (A4’) does not hold, it is easy to see from the existence of the optimal allocation
and Theorem 4.3.3 that for each i = 1, . . . , n, αi + βi < 1 and RVaRαi,βi(Xi) 6= ∞. As
a consequence, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we can use Theorem 4.3.3 on Xi to conclude that
there exists (Yi, Zi) ∈ A2(Xi) such that VaRαi(Yi) + ESβi(Zi) = RVaRαi,βi(Xi). Write
Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi and Z =
∑n



















ESβi(Zi) > VaRα(Y ) + ESβ(Z) > RVaRα,β(X),
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where the two inequalities are due to Theorem 4.2.1. Noting that
RVaRα,β(X) > VaRα(Y ) + ESβ(Z) > RVaRα,β(X),
the inequalities herein are equalities. Therefore
∑n
i=1 VaRαi(Yi) = VaRα(Y ),∑n
i=1 ESβi(Zi) = ESβ(Z), and VaRα(Y )+ESβ(Z) = RVaRα,β(X). In other words, (Y, Z) is
an optimal allocation ofX with respect to (VaRα,ESβ), (Y1, . . . , Yn) is an optimal allocation
of Y with respect to (VaRα1 , . . . ,VaRαn), and (Z1, . . . , Zn) is an optimal allocation of Z
with respect to (ESβ1 , . . . ,ESβn).
The reason why case (A4’) requires a special treatment can also be seen from the
proof. A key step in the proof is to write Xi = Yi + Zi where (Yi, Zi) ∈ A2(Xi) satisfies
VaRαi(Yi) + ESβi(Zi) = RVaRαi,βi(Xi). If (A4’) holds, then such (Yi, Zi) may not exist,
as shown in Lemma 4.3.2. Below we analyze the case of (A4’), which is different from all
other cases. Recall that, (A4’) implies that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that αj = α
and βj = β = 1− α.
Proposition 3. Assume that (A4’) holds, and without loss of generality, αn = α and
βn = β. Then, (X1, . . . , Xn) is an optimal allocation of X ∈ X with respect to
(RVaRα1,β1 , . . . ,RVaRαn,βn) if and only if (X1, . . . , Xn−1,−X) is an optimal allocation of
−Xn with respect to (ESβ1 , . . . ,ESβn).
Proof. We shall use the fact that, for all Y ∈ X ,
RVaRα,β(Y ) = RVaRα,1−α(Y ) = −ES1−α(−Y ) = −ESβn(−Y ), (4.31)










By (4.31) and (4.32), the equality
n∑
i=1




ESβi(Xi)− ESβn(−Xn) = −ESβn(−X).
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Rearranging terms, it is
n−1∑
i=1
ESβi(Xi) + ESβn(−X) = ESβn(−Xn). (4.34)
As (4.33) is equivalent to (4.34), the proposition holds.
Before ending this section, we remark that, although we are able to translate the general
case of RVaR agents to the completely characterized cases in Sections 4.4.2-4.4.5, we were
not able to write down an elegant unifying form of the optimal allocations, due to the
complications raised in the two-step characterization in Proposition 2.
4.5 Discussions
4.5.1 A representative class of optimal allocations
As is seen from Section 4.4, optimal allocations may take various forms, and this is due
to the fact that the RVaR family only uses partial information of the underlying distribu-
tion. Among many choices of optimal allocations, the allocation (4.10)-(4.11) obtained by
Embrechts et al. (2018) is a rather simple and intuitive choice. One small disadvantage
of (4.10)-(4.11) is that it is not symmetric with respect to the order of agents. Below we
present a slightly more general class, which is also simple, and generalizes (4.10)-(4.11) to
a symmetric form. We consider the most relevant case (A2), that is, 0 < α+β < 1. Define
Pn =
{
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ Fn : {X > yα} ⊂
n⋃
i=1
Ai ⊂ {X > yα}, P(Ai) = αi, A1, . . . , An are disjoint
}
.
Recall that J = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : βi = β}. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be given by
Xi = (X − yα+β)1Ai +
1
#J
(X − yα+β)1{i∈J}1(⋃ni=1 Ai)c + ci, i = 1, . . . , n,
where (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Pn, and (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Acn(yα+β).
(4.35)
One can easily verify that (4.35) defines a class of optimal allocations, and it includes
(4.10)-(4.11) if #J = 1. Comparing with the results in Section 4.4, (4.35) gives one of the
the simplest forms of optimal allocations.
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The economic intuition behind (4.35) is also simple: the agents first share the most
dangerous outcomes, modelled by the event
⋃n
i=1Ai with probability α. They divide the
event into pieces so that each agent feels safe, because the probability of loss is equal to
αi for agent i, thus insensitive to the agent. Then, they share the rest of the risk among
agents in J , the most tolerant agents (with the biggest βi value). Finally, they make some
side-payments c1, . . . , cn.
The dependence structure of (4.35) may be worth noting. Assume P(X > yα) = α,
as satisfied by all continuously distributed X. In this case,
⋃n
i=1Ai = {X > yα}. The
optimal allocation (X1, . . . , Xn) is mutually exclusive on the event {X > yα}, a consistent
observation with the ones made in Remarks 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Mutual exclusivity represents
the strongest form of negative dependence (see e.g. Puccetti and Wang (2015)). This is in
sharp contrast to the classic risk sharing problems with law-invariant and convex objective
functionals, where an optimal allocations is always comonotonic (based on a result of
Landsberger and Meilijson (1994); see Rüschendorf (2013)), representing the strongest
form of positive dependence. For related discussions on this phenomenon in the context of
heterogeneous beliefs, see Embrechts et al. (2019).
We remark that in order to arrive at a specific form of optimal allocations, one may
need to involve a second-step optimization. Here, we give the representative allocation
(4.35) only for the simplicity in its form, economic intuition and dependence structure.
4.5.2 VaR-type risk measures
In this section, we discuss how the techniques developed in this chapter can be applied
to other types of risk measures. In particular, we consider the VaR-type risk measures as
studied by Weber (2018). To avoid cases of ∞ −∞, we choose the underlying space Y
as the set of bounded random variables as in Weber (2018). We first give the necessary
definitions.
Definition 4.5.1. (i) A distortion function g is a left-continuous and non-decreasing
function on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1. We denote by G the set of distortion
functions.




X d(g ◦ P) =
∫ 0
−∞
(g ◦ P(X > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0
g ◦ P(X > x) dx, X ∈ Y .
(4.36)
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(iii) For a distortion function g, the number α = sup{t ∈ [0, 1] : g(t) = 0} ∈ [0, 1) is called
the parameter of g.
(iv) A distortion risk measure is said to be VaR-type if the parameter α of its distortion
function is positive.
(v) For a distortion function g with parameter α, the function ĝ, defined by ĝ(t) =
g((t+ α) ∧ 1), t ∈ [0, 1], is called the active part of g.
Remark 4.5.1. In the literature, the distortion risk measure ρg defined by (4.36) does not
require g to be left-continuous. Here we consider the case of left-continuous function g






Clearly, (4.37) includes the RVaR family by definition.
Weber (2018) studied the (sum-)optimal risk sharing problem with respect to the dis-
tortion risk measures ρg1 , . . . , ρgn , where the distortion functions have concave active parts.
Clearly, for α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1−α), the risk measure RVaRα,β is a VaR-type distortion
risk measure with parameter α, and its distortion function has a concave active part. Be-
low, we illustrate how the technique developed in Section 4.4 can be applied to investigate
optimal allocations for VaR-type risk measures. In what follows, the set of allocations and
the inf-convolution are defined as in (4.6) and (4.7) with X replaced by Y .
Below, we establish a connection between a VaR-type distortion risk measure and
a corresponding VaR, generalizing the formula RVaRα,β = VaRαESβ which we used
repeatedly in this chapter. To make the presentation concise, for h ∈ G and α ∈ [0, 1),
we define hα(t) = h((t − α)+), t ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, h0 = h, and hα ∈ G if h(1 − α) = 1.
Moreover, for g ∈ G with parameter α, we can easily get ĝα = g.
Theorem 4.5.1. For any h ∈ G and α ∈ [0, 1), we have
VaRαρh =
{
ρhα if h(1− α) = 1,
−∞ if h(1− α) < 1.
In particular, for any g ∈ G with parameter α, we have
ρg = VaRαρĝ.
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Proof. Take any X ∈ Y . We first consider the case h(1 − α) < 1. Take A ∈ F with
P(A) = α and m > 0. Note that
∫∞
0






(h ◦ P(X1Ac −m1A > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h ◦ P(X1Ac −m1A > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h ◦ P(Ac)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h(1− α)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h ◦ P(X > x) dx
= m(h(1− α)− 1) +
∫ ∞
0
h ◦ P(X > x) dx→ −∞ as m→∞.
On the other hand, VaRα((X + m)1A) 6 0 because P((X + m)1A > 0) 6 P(A) = α.
Combining the above observations, we have ρh (X1Ac −m1A) + VaRα((X+m)1A)→ −∞
as m→∞, and hence VaRαρh(X) = −∞ for all X ∈ Y .
Next, we consider the case h(1−α) = 1. AssumeX > 0; this is without loss of generality
since both ρhα and VaRαρh satisfy the property (called cash-additivity) ρ(X + c) =
ρ(X) + c for any constant c ∈ R. The case α = 0 follows from the simple fact that, for all
Y ∈ Y ,
VaR0ρh(X) 6 VaR0(0) + ρh(X) = ρh(X) = VaR0(Y ) + ρh(X − VaR0(Y ))
6 VaR0(Y ) + ρh(X − Y ),
and thus VaR0ρh(X) = ρh(X). In the following we assume α > 0.
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hα(P(X > x)) dx = ρhα(X).
By the definition of inf-convolution, we have ρhα(X) > VaRαρh(X).
(ii) Next we show ρhα(X) 6 VaRαρh(X). For this, it suffices to show ρhα(X) 6 ρh(X−
Y ) for all Y ∈ Y with VaRα(Y ) = 0, again due to cash-additivity. Since VaRα(Y ) = 0
implies P(Y > 0) 6 α, we have
P(X − Y > x) > (P(X > x)− P(Y > 0))+ > (P(X > x)− α)+, x ∈ R.
As a consequence,
ρh(X − Y ) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h ◦ P(X − Y > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h((P(X > x)− α)+)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(hα ◦ P(X > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0
hα ◦ P(X > x) dx = ρhα(X).
Therefore, we know ρhα(X) 6 VaRαρh(X).
As shown in the proof of Theorem 4.5.1, for h ∈ G with h(1 − α) = 1, a sum-optimal
allocation (Y, Z) of X > 0 with respect to (VaRα, ρh) is given by Y = X1{UX>1−α} and
Z = X1{UX61−α}.
Theorem 4.5.1 suggests that a VaR-type distortion risk measure is simply the inf-
convolution of a VaR and another distortion risk measure. Using Theorem 4.5.1, we can
apply the results in Section 4.4 to study forms of optimal allocations for VaR-type distortion
risk measures. For g1, . . . , gn ∈ G with parameters α1, . . . , αn, respectively, assume that
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ni=1 ρgi is finite on Y . Write α =
∑n
i=1 αi and ρ
∗ = ni=1 ρĝi . Similarly to (4.16), noting
























According to (4.38) and following the idea of Proposition 2, the problem of finding op-
timal allocations for the risk measures ρg1 , . . . , ρgn can be decomposed into two steps:
first, allocate X to (Y, Z) ∈ A2(X) such that VaRαρ∗(X) = VaRα(Y ) + ρ∗(Z), and
second, allocate Y and Z to (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ An(Y ) and (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ An(Z) such that∑n
i=1 VaRαi(Yi) = VaRα(Y ) and
∑n
i=1 ρgi(Zi) = ρ
∗(Z). If all of the above allocations exist,
then by letting Xi = Yi + Zi, i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain an optimal allocation for the agents
with risk measures ρg1 , . . . , ρgn . In the above procedure, there are three optimal allocation
problems:
(i) Theorem 4.4.1 gives all forms of optimal allocations (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ An(Y ) with respect
to (VaRα1 , . . . ,VaRαn).
(ii) Solution of the optimal allocations (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ An(Z) with respect to general
choices of ρĝ1 , . . . , ρĝn is not available in the literature. In the special case that
each of g1, . . . , gn has a concave active part, as studied by Weber (2018), ρĝ1 , . . . , ρĝn










see e.g. Proposition 5 of Embrechts et al. (2018). For coherent distortion risk mea-
sures, the forms of optimal allocations (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ An(Z) are extensively studied
in the literature; see Jouini et al. (2008) and Chapter 11 of Rüschendorf (2013).
(iii) The determination of optimal allocations (Y, Z) ∈ A2(X) with respect to (VaRα, ρ∗)
requires a result that is similar to Theorem 4.4.5, which depends highly on the form
of ρ∗. The proof of Theorem 4.5.1 gives an optimal allocation when ρ∗ is also a
distortion risk measure (which is true if g1, . . . , gn have concave active parts).
Although the above arguments do not give explicit forms of all optimal allocations for the
VaR-type distortion risk measures, they offer technical tools as well as new interpretation
of VaR-type risk measures and their optimal allocations. A full characterization of optimal
allocations with respect to VaR-type risk measures requires future research.
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Remark 4.5.2. If ρh is chosen as ESβ, Theorem 4.5.1 recovers the formula RVaRα,β =
VaRαESβ by checking the distortion functions of RVaRα,β, VaRα and ESβ in (4.37).
Hence, Theorem 4.5.1 can be seen as a generalization of Theorem 2 of Embrechts et al.
(2018). Theorem 4.5.1 also implies the result on ni=1 ρgi in Theorem 11 of Weber (2018)
for g1, . . . , gn with concave active parts via (4.38) and (4.39).
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We make some remarks and briefly discuss possible future work in this chapter.
From the results obtained in Chapter 2, we clearly see that many profound and elegant
mathematical results in the theory of risk functionals remain valid for the general class of
signed Choquet integrals; they do not rely on the common assumption of monotonicity.
Hopefully, our results serve as a building block for future theoretical developments and
applications of signed Choquet integrals.
Our discussions are confined to the space of bounded random variables L∞, in order for
signed Choquet integrals to be properly defined, and for all results to be concisely stated.
Some results involve norm-continuity on the space or an operation (addition or subtraction)
on several signed Choquet integrals, and hence we need to fix a suitable domain upfront.
Certainly, many results can be naturally generalized to functional-specific spaces such as
Λ-spaces (Lorentz (1951)) and Orlicz spaces (e.g. Rao and Ren (1991)). We leave this
direction of research for future work.
In Chapter 3, we provide various results on the CxLS property of one- and multi-
dimensional risk functionals. Two major characterization results are established on signed
Choquet integrals Ih with CxLS and on (Ih,VaRp) with CxLS. A particularly elegant
message is that the only type of signed Choquet integral that gains CxLS when paired
with VaRp is a linear combination of ESp and E. Based on these results, we proceed to
show that a convex combination of E and ESp is the only comonotonic-additive coherent
risk measure that is co-elicitable with VaRp.
It however remains an open question to characterize all two-dimensional signed Choquet
integrals (Ih, Ig) with CxLS, or, furthermore, a similar problem in higher dimension. Given
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the level of technical complexity displayed in the techniques used to show Theorem 3.5.2, it
seems to us that a general conclusion to the above question is far from being reachable with
current methods. Even if one assumes that the signed Choquet integrals are increasing as
in the risk measure literature, general results in multi-dimension are not available.
Closely related to the above issue, the characterization of elicitable (or identifiable)
d-dimensional signed Choquet integrals remains an open problem. As explained in Section
3.6, the issues of elicitability, identifiability and backtestability are highly relevant for risk
management practice, and they all require the CxLS property as a necessary condition.
Hence, our study on CxLS provides a useful tool for future studies on the statistical notions
above, especially in the multi-dimensional setting. In addition to the field of risk manage-
ment, elicitation is an important property in machine learning (Steinwart et al. (2014)).
Many open problems related to elicitation complexity remain in the field of computer
science (Frongillo and Kash (2018)).
Chapter 4 obtained the characterization of the optimal allocations in quantile-based risk
sharing. The competitive equilibria discussed in Embrechts et al. (2018) is left untouched.
In Embrechts et al. (2018), competitive equilibria for RVaR agents were studied under a
“no-short-sell” assumption, thus an incomplete market. It is shown that an equilibrium
allocation is necessarily optimal, but an optimal allocation is not necessarily an equilibrium
allocation; the optimal allocation (4.10)-(4.11) is in a competitive equilibrium under some
non-trivial conditions. Results in Embrechts et al. (2019) show that if the “no-short-sell”
assumption is removed, thus in a complete market, competitive equilibria generally fail
to exist, unless all agents are ES agents. Moreover, in the case of ES agents, optimal
allocations and equilibrium allocations are equivalent. Note that the negative dependence
discussed in Section 4.5.1 already alerts the non-existence of competitive equilibria in
a complete market, where an equilibrium allocation should be comonotonic under mild
conditions (see e.g. Boonen et al. (2018) and Xia and Zhou (2016)).
A lot of questions remain open in the settings of an incomplete market. It would be of
great interest to answer the following questions in an incomplete market setting for RVaR
agents:
1. What trading constraints on the incomplete market allow for a competitive equilib-
rium to exist?
2. Given trading constraints such as the one in Embrechts et al. (2018), what is a
necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn and the
total risk X for a competitive equilibrium to exist?
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3. When a competitive equilibrium exists, is it possible to identify all possible equilibria,
and what conditions give uniqueness of the equilibrium price?
As is already seen from the analysis in Chapter 4, fundamental questions in quantile-based
risk sharing seem much more difficult than those in utility-based risk sharing problems,
where convexity or concavity is typically assumed. We anticipate great technical challenges
in the above questions, and at this moment we leave them for future work.
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Krätschmer, V., Schied, A. and Zähle, H. (2017). Domains of weak continuity of statistical
functionals with a view toward robust statistics. Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 158, 1–19.
Kusuoka, S. (2001). On law invariant coherent risk measures. Advances in Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 3, 83–95.
Lambert, N., Pennock, D. M. and Shoham, Y. (2008). Eliciting properties of probability distri-
butions. Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 129–138.
Lambert, N. (2012). Elicitation and evaluation of statistical functionals. Preprint. Available at:
http://www.stanford.edu/~nlambert/papers/elicitation.pdf
Landsberger, M. and Meilijson, I. (1994). Co-monotone allocations, Bickel-Lehmann dispersion
and the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. Annals of Operations Research, 52, 97–106.
Liu, F. and Wang, R. (2016). A theory for measures of tail risk. Preprint, SSRN: ab-
stract=2841909.
Li, L., Shao, H., Wang, R. and Yang, J. (2018). Worst-case Range Value-at-Risk with partial
information. SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 9(1), 190–218.
Lorentz, G. G. (1951). On the theory of spaces Λ. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 1(3), 411–429.
Mao, T. and Wang, R. (2015). On aggregation sets and lower-convex sets. Journal of Multivariate
Analysis, 136, 12–25.
Marinacci, M. and Montrucchio L. (2004). Introduction to the mathematics of ambiguity. In
Uncertainty in Economic Theory, I. Gilboa, Ed. Routledge, New York, NY, USA. 46–107.
Markowitz, H. (1951). Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77–91.
McNeil, A. J., Frey, R. and Embrechts, P. (2015). Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts,
Techniques and Tools. Revised Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
112
Murofushi, T., Sugeno, M. and Machida, M. (1994). Non-monotonic fuzzy measures and the
Choquet integral. Fuzzy sets and Systems, 64(1), 73–86.
Newey, W. and Powell, J. (1987). Asymmetric least squares estimation and testing. Econometrica,
55(4), 819-C847.
Nolde, N. and Ziegel, J. (2017). Elicitability and backtesting: Perspectives for banking regulation.
The Annals of Applied Statistics, 11(4), 1833–1874.
O’Cinneide, C. A. (1991). Phase-type distributions and majorization. The Annals of Applied
Probability, 1(2), 219–227.
Olkin, I. and Marshall, A. W. (2016). Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications.
Academic Press, New York.
Osband, K. (1985).Providing incentives for better cost forecasting. University of California, Berke-
ley.
Pesenti, S. M., Millossovich, P. and Tsanakas A. (2016). Robustness regions for measures of risk
aggregation. Dependence Modeling, 4, 348–367.
Puccetti, G. and Rüschendorf, L. (2014). Asymptotic equivalence of conservative value-at-risk-
and expected shortfall-based capital charges. Journal of Risk , 16(3), 1–19.
Puccetti, G. and Wang R. (2015). Extremal dependence concepts. Statistical Science, 30(4),
485–517.
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
3(4), 323–343.
Rao, M. M. and Ren, Z. D. (1991). Theory of Orlicz Spaces. New York: M. Dekker.
Rockafellar, R. T., Uryasev, S. and Zabarankin, M. (2006). Generalized deviation in risk analysis.
Finance and Stochastics, 10, 51–74.
Rockafellar, R. T. and Uryasev, S. (2000). Optimization of conditional value-at-risk. Journal of
Risk, 2, 21–42.
Rockafellar, R. T. and Uryasev, S. (2002). Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(7), 1443–1471.
Rudin, W. (1987). Real and Complex Analysis. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.
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